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The purpose of this dissertation was to bridge the existing literature gap of outdated
contextual factor (CF) research through examination and determination of current
General Aviation (GA) Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 visual flight
rules (VFR)-into-instrument meteorological condition (IMC) contextual factors.
Contextual factors are a multifaceted arrangement of pertinent events or occurrences
contributing to pilot accidents in weather-related decision-making errors. A total of 46
contextual factors were identified and examined from the reviewed research literature.
The study examined and determined the presence of the 46 contextual factors,
frequencies, and manifestations in the GA VFR-into-IMC Aviation Accident Reports
(AARs) archived in the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) online safety
database. Significant relationships were identified among the contextual factors and pilot
age, flight experience, weather, flight conditions, time of day, and certification level
using point biserial and phi correlations. Contextual factor significant effects on the
crash distance from departure and crash distance from the planned destination were
revealed using multiple regression. A qualitative methodology was used on secondary
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data. Three subject matter experts (SMEs) for the main study analyzed a sample of 85
accidents for the presence of the 46 contextual factors. Raters then reported the presence
of the contextual factors and provided opinions on how the contextual factors were
manifested. Qualitative analysis revealed the presence of 37 out of 46 contextual factors.
Highest frequency factors included number of passengers on board (CF29), accident time
of day (CF1), crash distance from the planned destination (CF15), not filing of a flight
plan (CF21), and underestimating risk (CF43). Raters described numerous
manifestations of the contextual factors including 62% of the accident flights had
passengers on board the aircraft (CF29). Quantitative analysis discovered several
significantly weak to moderate relationships among pilot age, flight experience, weather,
flight conditions, time of day, certification level, and the contextual factors. Several
contextual factors had significant effects on the crash distance from departure and crash
distance from the planned destination. Findings indicated the contextual factors were
extensive in GA accidents. Additional research should focus on all flight domains,
including further study of GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC accidents. It is recommended the
GA Part 91 pilot community be trained on the contextual factors assessed.
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1
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this dissertation was to bridge the existing literature gap of
outdated contextual factor (CF) research through examination and determination of
current General Aviation (GA) Title 14 code of federal regulations (CFR) Part 91
(hereafter referred to as Part 91) visual flight rules (VFR)-into-instrument meteorological
condition (IMC) contextual factors in the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
safety database. Contextual factors in Part 91, GA VFR-into-IMC accidents were
determined and examined in the study. Identifying research-derived contextual factors
from the perspective of the Subject Matter Expert (SME) pilot was the focus of the
research. Approaching the identification of research-derived contextual factors from the
expert point of view is important and has the main advantage of getting the pilot
perspective over a more general point of view. A determination and examination of
visual flight rules VFR-into-IMC, GA pilot-accident contextual factors in the single-pilot
CFR Title 14 Part 91 environment was completed. Part 91 regulates the operation of
small non-commercial aircraft within the United States (electronic code of federal
regulations [e-CFR], 2018a). The most recent (27th) Joseph T. Nall Report (2018)
describes the most currently determined statistics on GA aviation accidents in 2015 and
found VFR-into-IMC, or VFR-into-IMC events, caused 21 (20 fatal) weather accidents
with a 95% fatality rate. The investigation of contextual factors influencing weatherrelated decision-making can assist researchers to change the GA flight system in order to
increase safety. More research is needed to discover contextual factors contributing to
GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC accidents, including qualitative exploratory research using
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secondary data in the current study, so hazards can be mitigated, and the number of GA
accidents can be reduced.
The GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC accident type includes the John F. Kennedy, Jr.
crash of a Piper Saratoga into the Atlantic Ocean after he developed spatial disorientation
during a flight in marginal weather while acting as pilot-in-command (PIC) of a PA-32R301, tail number N9253N, on July 16, 1999, to Martha’s Vineyard in Massachusetts. A
determination was made by the NTSB that the pilot was not proficient at flying the
aircraft by reference to the instruments alone, was not instrument rated, and relied on
visual references to fly the aircraft. On this night, there was no visible horizon due to the
haze and dark night. The NTSB determined the probable cause of the accident to be
spatial disorientation and failure to maintain control of the aircraft while descending over
water on a dark night with haze (NTSB, 2000).
Contributory factors have been identified in Part 91, VFR-into-IMC accidents.
The factors include initiating or continuing VFR-into-IMC, flight into clouds, controlled
flight into terrain (CFIT), spatial disorientation, loss of aircraft control, unrecoverable,
unusual flight attitude such as a spin, graveyard spiral, or inflight structural failure, and
inadequate instrument flight training (Wilson & Sloan, 2003). Human error has also been
identified as a factor in Part 91, VFR-into-IMC accidents (e.g., Gallo et al., 2015; Ison,
2014a). Studies have been conducted on human error to improve understanding of
situational behavior (e.g., Hunter, Martinussen, Wiggins, & O’Hare, 2011; Ison, 2014b).
Hunter et al. (2011) explained situational behavior assumes a person's behavior is
influenced by an external influence from the environment or culture. The results can
assist in mitigating the Part 91, VFR-into-IMC accident rate attributed to human error.
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Contextual factors have been identified in Part 91, VFR-into-IMC accidents. The
factors are generally defined as the degrees of challenge, uncertainty, predictability of
outcome, time pressure, threat, emotionality, and situational understanding in classifying
decisions (Boyes, & Potter, 2015). In the aviation domain, contextual factors are a
multifaceted arrangement of pertinent events or occurrences contributing to pilot
accidents in weather-related decision-making errors. The context term has been
explained as “… contributes to General Aviation pilot errors in weather-related decision
making … considered as a complex configuration of relevant events or phenomena that
may be considered the domain within which the pilot makes the weather-related
decision” (McCoy & Mickunas, 2000, p. 1). A total of 46 contextual factors have been
identified in the reviewed literature on GA VFR-into-IMC accidents. The results of the
studies showed more research is needed, including database research, to understand the
context of pilot actions resulting in VFR-into-IMC accidents, as there are gaps in
understanding among context, pilot characteristics, policy violations, weather information
assessment, perception of display information, training, accident analysis, and associated
decision-making.
Significance of the Study
The Part 91, GA VFR-into-IMC events have been a part of accident and fatality
statistics for over 50 years and identified as a continuing challenge by the most recent
(27th) Joseph T. Nall Report (Nall, 2018). Nall (2018) report findings describe the most
currently determined statistics on GA aviation accidents in 2015 and found VFR-intoIMC, or VFR-into-IMC events, caused 21 (20 fatal) weather accidents with a 95%
fatality rate. New approaches are needed to help reduce these statistics. The presence of
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research-identified, contextual factors in Part 91, GA VFR-into-IMC accidents was
revealed and resulted in a greater understanding of how contextual factors affect both GA
pilot decision-making in the cockpit and flight safety. Awareness of these contextual
factors in the GA pilot community could help improve risk management in decisionmaking through implementation in scenario-based training. A knowledge of the
contextual factors in GA pilot actions in the flight environment can improve the
identification of hazardous behaviors and implementation of alteration techniques for the
hazardous behaviors during ground and flight training.
Statement of the Problem
A very limited number of dated Part 91, GA studies have explored the contextual
factors contributing to VFR-into-IMC accidents (Goh, & Wiegmann, 2001; Goh, &
Wiegmann, 2002; McCoy & Mickunas, 2000; O'Hare, & Owen, 2002; Orasanu, &
Martin, 1998; Orasanu, Martin, & Davison, 1998; Orasanu, Martin, & Davison, 2001;
Wiegmann, & Goh, 2000; Wiegmann, Goh, & O'Hare, 2002). The studies have
identified the presence of contextual factors occurring for this accident type, as well as
the existence of unsafe pilot behaviors negatively affecting judgment and increasing the
probability for error. The lack of a significant number of contextual studies for these
types of events has created a knowledge gap contributing to a failure to resolve the
problem of reducing or eliminating the occurrence of these events despite years of
constant Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and NTSB reported fatality statistics
(Aviation Data & Stats, 2016; FAA, 2018b; NTSB, 2014; NTSB, 2015; NTSB 2016;
NTSB, 2017c; NTSB, 2017d; NTSB 2017-2018; NTSB, 2018). The reporting of FAA
and NTSB statistics may raise awareness of the existing VFR-into-IMC problem, but
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without some form of intervention, behavior change is unlikely. The identified studies
emphasized the need for additional research, including database research, to improve
understanding of how context contributes to GA pilot errors in weather-related decisionmaking through assessment of currently known contextual factors and identification of
yet unknown contextual factors.
Purpose Statement
The study determined and examined contextual factors in Part 91, GA VFR-intoIMC accidents. A focus was placed on identifying research-derived contextual factors
from the perspective of the Subject Matter Expert (SME) pilot. The scope of the study
was from the SME pilot point of view. Approaching the identification of researchderived contextual factors from the expert point of view is important and has the main
advantage of getting the pilot perspective over a more general point of view. The
investigation of contextual factors influencing weather-related decision making can assist
researchers to change the GA flight system in order to increase safety. More research is
needed to discover contextual factors contributing to GA VFR-into-IMC accidents so
hazards can be mitigated, and the number of GA accidents can be greatly reduced. The
data analysis technique the researcher utilized included assessment of the relationships
between the rater-identified contextual factors and factors including pilot age, flight
experience, weather, flight conditions, time of day, and certification level. The
qualitative analysis included a description of how each of the 46 contextual factors is
manifested within pilot actions described in the NTSB online safety database sample of
85 GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC AARs from the rater perspective. Descriptive statistics
were used to report the rater-identified contextual factors and frequencies in the GA
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VFR-into-IMC accidents archived in the NTSB safety database. These statistics were
also used to report pilot age, flight experience, weather, flight conditions, time of day,
and certification level for the identified sample. The quantitative analysis used point
biserial and phi correlations to determine if there are statistically significant relationships
between the previously mentioned 46 contextual factors and pilot age, flight experience,
weather, flight conditions, time of day and certification level. The quantitative analysis
also included multiple regression using dummy variables to determine if there are any
significant effects from the 46 contextual factors on crash distance from departure and
crash distance from the planned destination.
Research Questions
The contextual factors related to Part 91, GA pilot intentions and behavior
resulting in VFR-into-IMC accidents were explored. The specific research questions for
this exploratory study are as follows:
1. What contextual factors contribute to Part 91, GA pilot VFR-into-IMC
accidents in the reviewed NTSB AARs?
2. What is the frequency of occurrence for the contextual factors in Part 91,
GA pilot VFR into-IMC accidents in the reviewed NTSB AARs?
3. How are the contextual factors manifested in Part 91, GA pilot VFR-intoIMC accidents in the reviewed NTSB AARs?
Delimitations
Research-identified contextual factors exhibited during United States aviation
accidents for Part 91, GA VFR-into-IMC operations were the focus of the current
research. VFR-into-IMC transpires when GA pilots, flying in accordance with VFR, fly
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into IMC. VFR-into-IMC can be either intentional or unintentional. A list of 46
contextual factors was derived from an exhaustive literature search. The contextual
factors chosen were identified by recognized experts in Part 91, GA pilot VFR into-IMC
accidents. Specific search criteria were used to focus on only these types of accidents.
The entire NTSB database was queried using specific coding identifying this accident
type in the complete dataset. The specific codes used to filter out only these accidents
included Code 401 for VFR encounter with IMC from 2008 to 2014 and Code 24015 for
pre-2008 accidents for VFR encounter with IMC in the old NTSB coding schema. The
factual reports from the NTSB to explore only Part 91, GA pilot-related accidents were
utilized. All other accident groups were excluded from the analysis. This research
utilized Part 91, GA VFR-into-IMC aviation accidents from this dataset occurring in the
United States during a specific timeframe. The selected accidents were determined by
NTSB investigators as being attributed to pilot error resulting in VFR-into-IMC accidents
occurring during the 1991 to 2014 timeframe. This specific timeframe was selected as
these reports were completed with NTSB investigator’s final probable cause
determinations given. The identified timeframe was selected because the NTSB began
including investigator-determined probable causes in the AARs on January 1, 1991. The
identified timeframe stopped at December 31, 2014, because the researcher was informed
by NTSB personnel the investigative process can take five or more years. The accidents
occurring from January 1, 2015, to the present may not be completed and may not yet
include NTSB investigator’s final probable cause determinations. Therefore, accidents
occurring during this timeframe were not selected for use in the study.

8
Limitations and Assumptions
A limitation of the study was the 46 research-derived contextual factors were
obtained from only a few out-of-date GA Part 91 studies assessing these factors
contributing to VFR-into-IMC accidents (Goh, & Wiegmann, 2001; Goh, & Wiegmann,
2002; McCoy & Mickunas, 2000; O'Hare, & Owen, 2002; Orasanu, & Martin, 1998;
Orasanu, Martin, & Davison, 1998; Orasanu, Martin, & Davison, 2001; Wiegmann, &
Goh, 2000; Wiegmann, Goh, & O'Hare, 2002). The findings in the dated studies might
overlap somewhat with the present research. It is possible the dated studies also looked
for the presence of the identified contextual factors in a limited number of the same
accidents selected for the study between 1998 and 2002, as the current research selected
specific accidents between January 1, 1991, and December 31, 2014. However, it is not
possible to determine if any of the same accidents were assessed in the 1998 and 2002
timeframe, as the specific datasets were not identified by the researchers in their
respective journal articles.
The researcher assumed the reviewed research articles chosen to provide the 46
contextual factors were valid in their assessments since the studies were based on what
these authors wrote, each recognized as an SME in the field. The researcher assumed the
raters understood the contextual factors, and their backgrounds were representatives of
those of the pilots involved in the AARs, validating their judgements. It was assumed the
AAR narratives were accurate.
The contextual factors taken from the identified studies were assumed to be
mutually exclusive. However, it is possible there was overlap considering these factors
were taken from a relatively small set of research articles. Plan Continuation Error (PCE)
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could, for instance, overlap with Goal Conflicts. The problem was resolved by
identifying the overlapping contextual factors and counting the overlap for each
applicable factor. The raters were informed of this possibility and instructed the
contextual factors could overlap and to identify all applicable factors in each AAR. No
overlapping contextual factors were reported by the raters. It was also assumed the
sample of 85 selected AARs was representative of the GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC
population of interest cases in the United States, as these cases were used to make some
generalizations about this accident type.
The raters have many years of flight experience and associated knowledge related
to adverse weather conditions, including VFR-into-IMC. This level of subject matter
expertise could potentially be a limitation of the study and may bias the rater assessment
of pilot decision-making behavior (expert versus novice), as it could be challenging for
the rater to set aside expertise and assume the role of the deceased GA pilot. This
situation could make it difficult for the raters to determine the applicability of the
identified contextual factors in the 85 NTSB AAR sample. In order to minimize the
potential of this type of SME bias affecting the validity of the results, multiple expert
raters were used to identify the presence of the 46 contextual factors in the sample. The
results for all expert raters were reviewed by the researcher to determine if the
identification of contextual factors between the raters was reasonable. It was assumed the
use of the provided 46 research-identified contextual factor definitions mitigated any bias
resulting from prior exposures (familiarity) to the accident types. The researcher
provided instruction, testing, and an inter-rater reliability assessment to reduce the
potential for this bias.
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Another assumption of the study was the choice made by the rater was not
influenced by stress and/or anxiety, as would have likely been the case with the GA pilots
in the AARs. The stress factor could account for some differences in the decisions
between raters and the pilots in the AARs. The replication of the exact scenarios
experienced by the deceased GA pilots for the raters was not possible and would be
considered unethical research to expose the raters to the same stress and/or anxiety and
would not be approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB). The researcher was
therefore reliant on the subject matter expertise of the raters.
The 23-year period selected between 1991 and 2014 for the study could create
confounding variables related to changes in safety regulations and/or standards and
technology. The use of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
defined climate regions was used by the researcher to reduce the adverse effects of the
outside influence of confounding variables on the phi and point biserial correlations
(NOAA, 2018). The sample of 85 NTSB AARs for the main study was selected based on
these NOAA defined climate regions. The stratification method was used to break down
the data set into a manageable number of subsets, or strata, corresponding to the levels of
the potential confounding variables among age, flight experience, weather, flight
conditions, time of day, and certification level. A comparison was made of the overall
cross-tabulations for the associations between exposures and outcomes. A 2 x 2 table for
specific NOAA defined climate regions and percentage of VFR-into-IMC accidents was
compared among stratum-specific age, flight experience, weather, flight conditions, time
of day, and certification level cross-tabulations to determine whether these factors
introduce confounder variables in the analysis. It was determined the stratum-specific
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associations did not deviate markedly from the overall association. Therefore, age, flight
experience, weather, flight conditions, time of day, and certification level did not
introduce confounder variables into the point biserial and phi correlation analyses.

Definitions of Terms
14 CFR Part 91

The regulations defining the operation of
small non-commercial aircraft within the
United States (FAA, 2018a).

Accident

“An occurrence associated with the
operation of an aircraft that takes place
between the time any person boards the
aircraft with the intention of flight and all
such persons have disembarked, and in
which any person suffers death or serious
injury, or in which the aircraft receives
substantial damage” (e-CFR, 2018a, p. 1).

aircraft_key

The basic NTSB Aviation Accident Incident
Database Architecture with Key Fields
diagram “. . . shows the logical relationships
among data elements in the NTSB Aviation
Accident/Incident Database. At its highest
level, the database is organized around
EVENTS (i.e., accidents or incidents).
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Associated with events are date, location,
weather, etc. Because an EVENT may
involve multiple AIRCRAFT (as would be
the case in collisions), the AIRCRAFT table
is logically structured under the EVENTS
table” (NTSB, n.d.-b., p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-c, p.
1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1). Associated with
aircraft is the aircraft_key (aircraft key).
AKey

The basic NTSB Aviation Accident Incident
Database Architecture with Key Fields
diagram “. . . shows the logical relationships
among data elements in the NTSB Aviation
Accident/Incident Database. At its highest
level, the database is organized around
EVENTS (i.e., accidents or incidents).
Associated with events are date, location,
weather, etc. Because an EVENT may
involve multiple AIRCRAFT (as would be
the case in collisions), the AIRCRAFT table
is logically structured under the EVENTS
table” (NTSB, n.d.-b., p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-c, p.
1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1). Associated with
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aircraft are the aircraft_key (aircraft key)
and AKey (aircraft key).
Controlled Flight into Terrain

“An accident whereby an airworthy aircraft,
under pilot control, inadvertently flies into
terrain, an obstacle, or water” (FAA, 2016,
p. G-2).

Change blindness

“… when human observers fail to perceive
changes in their field of view, like when
new objects appear in an image or when
objects change color and/or shape. This
phenomenon is particularly strong during
multitasking situations, such as those
experienced during single pilot operations”
(Ahlstrom, et al., 2015, p. 1).

Contextual Factors

The degrees of challenge, uncertainty,
predictability of outcome, time pressure,
threat, emotionality, and situational
understanding in classifying decisions
(Boyes, & Potter, 2015).

DAWN

The basic NTSB Aviation Accident Incident
Database Architecture with Key Fields
diagram “. . . shows the logical relationships
among data elements in the NTSB Aviation
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Accident/Incident Database. At its highest
level, the database is organized around
EVENTS (i.e., accidents or incidents).
Associated with events are date, location,
weather, etc.” (NTSB, n.d.-b., p. 1; NTSB,
n.d.-c, p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1). Associated
events are light_cond (light condition) and
DAWN (dawn).
DAYL

The basic NTSB Aviation Accident Incident
Database Architecture with Key Fields
diagram “. . . shows the logical relationships
among data elements in the NTSB Aviation
Accident/Incident Database. At its highest
level, the database is organized around
EVENTS (i.e., accidents or incidents).
Associated with events are date, location,
weather, etc.” (NTSB, n.d.-b., p. 1; NTSB,
n.d.-c, p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1). Associated
events are light_cond (light condition) and
DAYL (daylight).

Distance to Diversion

The distance flown by the GA pilot until a
specific point and time the weather began to
deteriorate. “. . . pilots who frame diverting
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from the planned flight as a loss (e.g., loss of
time, money, and effort) will tend to
continue with the flight, whereas those who
frame the diversion as a gain (e.g., in
personal safety) will tend to divert”
(Wiegmann, Goh, & O'Hare, 2002, p. 190).
DUSK

The basic NTSB Aviation Accident Incident
Database Architecture with Key Fields
diagram “. . . shows the logical relationships
among data elements in the NTSB Aviation
Accident/Incident Database. At its highest
level, the database is organized around
EVENTS (i.e., accidents or incidents).
Associated with events are date, location,
weather, etc.” (NTSB, n.d.-b., p. 1; NTSB,
n.d.-c, p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1). Associated
events are light_cond (light condition) and
DUSK (dusk).

ev_date

“In the NTSB database, an event is
classified as an accident or an incident.
“Aircraft accident" means an occurrence
associated with the operation of an aircraft
which takes place between the time any
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person boards the aircraft with the intention
of flight and all such persons have
disembarked, and in which any person
suffers death or serious injury, or in which
the aircraft receives substantial damage.
The NTSB defines "Incident" to mean an
occurrence other than an accident,
associated with the operation of an aircraft,
which affects or could affect the safety of
operations” (FAA, n.d.-a, p. 1). “At its
highest level, the database is organized
around EVENTS (i.e., accidents or
incidents). Associated with events are date,
location, weather, etc.” (NTSB, n.d.-b., p. 1;
NTSB, n.d.-c, p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1).
Also associated with events is the ev_date
(event date).
Event

“In the NTSB database, an event is
classified as an accident or an incident.
“Aircraft accident" means an occurrence
associated with the operation of an aircraft
which takes place between the time any
person boards the aircraft with the intention
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of flight and all such persons have
disembarked, and in which any person
suffers death or serious injury, or in which
the aircraft receives substantial damage.
The NTSB defines "Incident" to mean an
occurrence other than an accident,
associated with the operation of an aircraft,
which affects or could affect the safety of
operations” (FAA, n.d.-a, p. 1). “At its
highest level, the database is organized
around EVENTS (i.e., accidents or
incidents). Associated with events are date,
location, weather, etc.” (NTSB, n.d.-b., p. 1;
NTSB, n.d.-c, p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1).
EventID

The EVENTID (event identification) is a
“Unique identification for each event; each
event is assigned a unique 14-character
alphanumeric code in the database. This
code, used in conjunction with other primary
keys (if applicable), are used to reference all
database records” (NTSB, n.d.-a, p. 1;
NTSB, n.d.-b, p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-c, p. 1;
NTSB, n.d.-d, p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1).
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Events_Sequence

The basic NTSB Aviation Accident Incident
Database Architecture with Key Fields
diagram “. . . shows the logical relationships
among data elements in the NTSB Aviation
Accident/Incident Database” (NTSB, n.d.-b.,
p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-c, p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1).
The Events Sequence is associated with
ev_id (event identification), Aircraft_Key
(aircraft key), Occurrence_No (occurrence
number), Occurrence_Code (occurrence
code), Occurrence_Description (occurrence
description), phase_no (phase number),
eventsoe_no (event operating experience
number), Defining_ev (defining event),
lchg_date (change date), and lchg_userid
(change user identification).

ev_id

“Unique Identification for Each Event; Each
event is assigned a unique 14-character
alphanumeric code in the database. This
code, used in conjunction with other primary
keys (if applicable), are used to reference all
database records” (NTSB, n.d.-a, p. 1;
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NTSB, n.d.-b, p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-c, p. 1;
NTSB, n.d.-d, p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1).
ev_state

The basic NTSB Aviation Accident Incident
Database Architecture with Key Fields
diagram “. . . shows the logical relationships
among data elements in the NTSB Aviation
Accident/Incident Database. At its highest
level, the database is organized around
EVENTS (i.e., accidents or incidents).
Associated with events are date, location,
weather, etc.” (NTSB, n.d.-b., p. 1; NTSB,
n.d.-c, p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1). Events is
also associated with ev_id (event
identification) and ev_state (event state).

ev_type

The basic NTSB Aviation Accident Incident
Database Architecture with Key Fields
diagram “. . . shows the logical relationships
among data elements in the NTSB Aviation
Accident/Incident Database. At its highest
level, the database is organized around
EVENTS (i.e., accidents or incidents).
Associated with events are date, location,
weather, etc.” (NTSB, n.d.-b., p. 1; NTSB,
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n.d.-c, p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1). Events is
also associated with ev_id (event
identification) and ev_type (event type).
Experience

“A pilot’s total flight hours, total solo hours,
actual IFR hours, total VFR cross-country
hours, and flight hours in the last 30 and 90
days” (Wiegmann, Goh, & O'Hare, 2002, p.
194).

far_part

The basic NTSB Aviation Accident Incident
Database Architecture with Key Fields
diagram “. . . shows the logical relationships
among data elements in the NTSB Aviation
Accident/Incident Database. At its highest
level, the database is organized around
EVENTS (i.e., accidents or incidents).
Associated with events are date, location,
weather, etc. Because an EVENT may
involve multiple AIRCRAFT (as would be
the case in collisions), the AIRCRAFT table
is logically structured under the EVENTS
table” (NTSB, n.d.-b., p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-c, p.
1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1). Associated with
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aircraft is the far_part (Federal Aviation
Regulation part).
FATL

The basic NTSB Aviation Accident Incident
Database Architecture with Key Fields
diagram “. . . shows the logical relationships
among data elements in the NTSB Aviation
Accident/Incident Database (NTSB, n.d.-b.,
p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-c, p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1).
Associated with injury are injury_level
(injury level) and FATL (fatal).

Federal Aviation Administration

“An agency of the United States Department
of Transportation with authority to regulate
and oversee all aspects of civil aviation in
the United States” (FAA, 2016, p. G-2).

General Aviation

“All flights other than military and
scheduled airline flights, both private and
commercial” (FAA, 2016, p. G-2).

Human behavior

“The product of factors that cause people to
act in predictable ways” (FAA, 2016, p. G3).

injury_level

The basic NTSB Aviation Accident Incident
Database Architecture with Key Fields
diagram “. . . shows the logical relationships
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among data elements in the NTSB Aviation
Accident/Incident Database (NTSB, n.d.-b.,
p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-c, p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1).
Associated with injury is the injury_level
(injury level).
Instrument Flight Rules

“Rules and regulations established by the
Federal Aviation Administration to govern
flight under conditions in which flight by
outside visual reference is not safe. IFR
flight depends upon flying by reference to
instruments in the flight deck, and
navigation is accomplished by reference to
electronic signals” (FAA, 2016, p. G-3).

Instrument Meteorological Conditions

The weather conditions given in relation to
visibility, distance from clouds, and ceiling
less than the minimums specified for visual
meteorological conditions that require
operations to be conducted under IFR (FAA,
2016, p. G-3).

light_cond

The basic NTSB Aviation Accident Incident
Database Architecture with Key Fields
diagram “. . . shows the logical relationships
among data elements in the NTSB Aviation
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Accident/Incident Database. At its highest
level, the database is organized around
EVENTS (i.e., accidents or incidents).
Associated with events are date, location,
weather, etc.” (NTSB, n.d.-b., p. 1; NTSB,
n.d.-c, p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1). Associated
with events is light_cond (light condition).
NBRT

The basic NTSB Aviation Accident Incident
Database Architecture with Key Fields
diagram “. . . shows the logical relationships
among data elements in the NTSB Aviation
Accident/Incident Database. At its highest
level, the database is organized around
EVENTS (i.e., accidents or incidents).
Associated with events are date, location,
weather, etc.” (NTSB, n.d.-b., p. 1; NTSB,
n.d.-c, p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1). Associated
with events are light_cond (light condition)
and NBRT (bright night).

NDRK

The basic NTSB Aviation Accident Incident
Database Architecture with Key Fields
diagram “. . . shows the logical relationships
among data elements in the NTSB Aviation
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Accident/Incident Database. At its highest
level, the database is organized around
EVENTS (i.e., accidents or incidents).
Associated with events are date, location,
weather, etc.” (NTSB, n.d.-b., p. 1; NTSB,
n.d.-c, p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1). Associated
with events are light_cond (light condition)
and NDRK (dark night).
ntsb_no

The basic NTSB Aviation Accident Incident
Database Architecture with Key Fields
diagram “. . . shows the logical relationships
among data elements in the NTSB Aviation
Accident/Incident Database. At its highest
level, the database is organized around
EVENTS (i.e., accidents or incidents).
Associated with events are date, location,
weather, etc. Because an EVENT may
involve multiple AIRCRAFT (as would be
the case in collisions), the AIRCRAFT table
is logically structured under the EVENTS
table” (NTSB, n.d.-b., p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-c, p.
1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1). Associated with
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events and aircraft is the ntsb_no (NTSB
number).
Pilot error

“An accident in which an action or decision
made by the pilot was the cause or a
contributing factor that led to the accident”
(FAA, 2016, p. G-4).

seq_of_events

The basic NTSB Aviation Accident Incident
Database Architecture with Key Fields
diagram “. . . shows the logical relationships
among data elements in the NTSB Aviation
Accident/Incident Database. At its highest
level, the database is organized around
EVENTS (i.e., accidents or incidents).
Associated with events are date, location,
weather, etc. Because an EVENT may
involve multiple AIRCRAFT (as would be
the case in collisions), the AIRCRAFT table
is logically structured under the EVENTS
table” (NTSB, n.d.-b., p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-c, p.
1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1). Associated with
events, aircraft, and occurrences is the
seq_of_events (sequence of events).
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Situational Awareness

“Knowledge of where the aircraft is in
regard to location, air traffic control,
weather, regulations, aircraft status, and
other factors that may affect the flight”
(FAA, 2016, p. G-4).

subj_code

The basic NTSB Aviation Accident Incident
Database Architecture with Key Fields
diagram “. . . shows the logical relationships
among data elements in the NTSB Aviation
Accident/Incident Database. At its highest
level, the database is organized around
EVENTS (i.e., accidents or incidents).
Associated with events are date, location,
weather, etc. Because an EVENT may
involve multiple AIRCRAFT (as would be
the case in collisions), the AIRCRAFT table
is logically structured under the EVENTS
table” (NTSB, n.d.-b., p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-c, p.
1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1). Associated with the
seq_of_events (sequence of events) is the
subj_code (subject code).

Title 14 CFR

“Includes what was formerly known as the
Federal Aviation Regulations governing the
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operation of aircraft, airways, and airmen”
(FAA, 2016, p. G-5).
Visual Flight Rules

“Flight rules adopted by the FAA governing
aircraft flight using visual references. VFR
operations specify the amount of ceiling and
visibility the pilot must have in order to
operate according to these rules. When the
weather conditions are such that the pilot
cannot operate according to VFR, he or she
must use instrument flight rules (IFR)”
(FAA, 2016, p. G-5).

Visual Meteorological Conditions

Meteorological conditions expressed in terms
of visibility, cloud distance, and ceiling
meeting or exceeding the minimums
specified for VFR (FAA, 2016, p. G-5).

List of Acronyms
AAR

Aviation Accident Report

AFSS

Automated Flight Service Station

AGL

Above ground level

AIRMET

Airmen’s Meteorological Information

AMSL

Above mean sea level

ANOVA

Analysis of variance
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AOG

Acts of God

ATC

Air Traffic Control

ATP

Air transport pilot

BFR

Biennial flight review

CAMI

Civil Aerospace Medical Institute

CFI

Certified flight instructor

CFIT

Controlled flight into terrain

CFR

Code of Federal Regulations

DOT

Department of Transportation

DUATS

Direct User Access Terminal Service

ERAU

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

FAA

Federal Aviation Administration

FBO

Fixed Base Operator

FSS

Flight service station

GA

General aviation

GMN

Gorman

GPS

Global Positioning System

GWIS

Graphical Weather Information System

HITS

Highway in the sky

HIWAS

Hazardous In-Flight Weather Advisory Service

HSV

High-speed videoendoscopic

IBM

International Business Machines

IFR

Instrument flight rules
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IFV

In-flight volitional

IMC

Instrument meteorological conditions

IRB

Institutional Review Board

METAR

Meteorological Aerodrome Report

MIS

Meteorological Impact Statement

NEXRAD

Next-Generation Radar

NDM

Naturalistic decision-making

NOAA

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

NTSB

National Transportation Safety Board

PABAK

Prevalence Adjusted Bias Adjusted Kappa

Part 91

14 CFR Part 91 General Operating and Flight Rules

PCE

Plan continuation error

PIC

Pilot in command

SA

Situational awareness

SBT

Situational based training

SPSS

Statistical Package for the Social Sciences

SVS

Synthetic Vision System

TAF

Terminal Aerodrome Forecast

VALI

Voice-Vibratory Assessment with Laryngeal Imaging

VFR

Visual flight rules

VIF

Variance inflation factor

VMC

Visual meteorological conditions

VOR

Very high frequency omni-directional range
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WSA

Weather situational awareness
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE
Continued flight from VFR-into-IMC has claimed the highest number of fatalities
every year in GA accidents (Nall, 2018). According to the most recent Nall (2018)
report, GA VFR-into-IMC events caused 21 (20 fatal) weather accidents in 2015. The
statistics for 2015 also reported a 95% fatality rate for this accident type. Baron (2011)
has also emphasized the greatest number of GA accidents with fatalities occurred because
of VFR-into-IMC events. Despite these grim statistics, industry has been lacking in
relevant, recent studies about this specific type of weather accident. Some factors
believed to be contributory to VFR-into-IMC flights were discovered roughly two
decades ago. There have been very few, if any, studies conducted after this time. VFRinto-IMC fatality statistics have remained steady. Orasanu and Martin (1998) and
Orasanu, Martin, and Davison (2001) have stated Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM),
or the context in which pilots make their decisions, must be better understood to learn
how to reduce GA VFR-into-IMC accidents.
VFR-into-IMC occurs when GA pilots, flying in accordance with VFR, fly into
IMC. VFR-into-IMC can be either intentional or unintentional. Accidents resulting from
such occurrences have taken place after pilots fly under controlled flight into terrain
(CFIT), or they have found themselves in unrecoverable low altitudes after experiencing
spatial disorientation (Wilson & Sloan, 2003). Studies investigating the VFR-into-IMC
phenomenon in GA Part 91, to this point, have focused on the pilot, the aircraft, and the
flight environment. The intention of this research has been to gain better understanding
of these contextual factors and accident type to potentially reduce related fatalities. The
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most recent research, while somewhat dated, has addressed the aforementioned areas.
However, the results of these studies showed more research is needed, including database
research, to understand the context of pilot actions resulting in VFR-into-IMC accidents.
There are gaps in understanding of decision-making, pilot characteristics, policy
violations, weather information assessment, training, and contextual factors in GA
weather and non-weather accidents identified in the literature.
Decision-Making
Simulation has been used to investigate the influence of motivation and
investment on the length of time pilots fly into degraded weather. A study conducted by
Saxton (2008) examined the influence financial motivation and time investment had on
the length of time a pilot would fly into degraded weather conditions. Sunk cost refers to
the financial aspects of what might motivate pilots to take greater risks by continuing
farther into adverse weather, when IMC was encountered later into a flight. Saxton’s
(2008) study found sunk cost to be a valid concept, as the participants of the study who
were financially motivated did, in fact, continue longer into poor weather conditions than
the participants who were not financially motivated and came upon hazardous weather
earlier in the flight. Saxton (2008) recognized the results of the research were in support
of both the situation assessment hypothesis and cognitive anchoring, suggesting the ways
pilots process information before flight has an impact on decisions during flight. It might
be argued this is congruent with an accelerating decision-making function, where a pilot
making a decision is more willing to divert earlier in the flight and less likely as the flight
progresses. The proposed accelerating decision-making function would be a decisionmaking process involving more than linear decision making where the GA pilot carries
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the decision through to the end without assessing circumstances as they arise, and less
than adjusting decisions accordingly, in a way that helps to best achieve the desired goal,
a process taking place in circular decision-making (Balog, 2013; Balog 2016).
Similar to sunk cost, based on a study by Wiegmann, Goh, and O’Hare (2002), it
seems, generally speaking, when adverse weather is encountered later in flights, pilots are
more likely to continue, as they might be more optimistic about the possibility of positive
outcomes than they are when they encounter poor weather early in flights. The
Wiegmann, Goh, and O’Hare (2002) study used simulation to expose different groups of
pilots to adverse weather early and late into flights. The results were consistent with
more optimism during poor weather encounters occurring later into flights, and less
optimism when hazardous weather was present earlier in flights.
In addition to identifying contributory factors, simulation has also been used to
improve pilot decision-making in IMC situations. Johnson and Wiegmann (2015)
endeavored to allow pilots the opportunity to develop decision-making experience and
improve their skills in navigating adverse weather conditions. The researchers used
weather simulation to re-create historical weather events, helping pilots to find
opportunities for better, weather-related training. The study used 16 VFR and 16
instrument-rated pilots in a simulation of a VFR cross-country flight in marginal weather
and IMC. They found the only statistically significant difference was for the group of
pilots who had previous experience with actual instrument weather were safer and more
likely to use in-cockpit weather information during flight, allowing them to detect and
avoid instrument weather.

34
Johnson, Wiegmann, and Wickens (2006) also used a simulation to study 12
pilots in a VFR cross-country flight with worsening weather. The pilots used either
control/standard instruments, synthetic vision system (SVS), or SVS highway-in-the-sky
(HITS)/electronic with a moving map display depicting weather. Somewhat contrary to
the Johnson and Wiegmann (2015) research, the participants in the Johnson, Wiegmann
and Wickens (2006) study, who were receiving in-cockpit weather information, did not
avoid hazardous weather conditions. In fact, 60% of both SVS conditions breached the
clouds and continued into conditions with zero visibility. The researchers noted there
was head-down scanning, accounting for the fact the participants did not notice
worsening weather conditions. The moving weather map did not seem to make a
difference in pilot attentional tunneling (focusing disproportionate attention or time on
one task or risk to the disadvantage of awareness of other risks). It might also be the case
the pilots did not trust the timeliness of the weather information, as it was not from
Hazardous In-Flight Weather Advisory Service (HIWAS) or Flight Watch.
Researchers have used simulation to test the ways new technology might enhance
or diminish pilot decision-making and behavior. Ahlstrom, Ohneiser, and Caddigan
(2016) assessed GA pilot use of portable weather applications. Participants were
separated into a control group and an experimental group. The experimental group flew a
simulated flight in VMC with a portable weather device, a receiver allowing in-flight
access to subscribed weather products viewable on the device. It was found the weather
device did improve situational awareness (SA), weather related decision-making in
diverting or continuing to the planned destination, and distances in route deviation from
the hazardous weather. Pilots in both groups still flew less than 20 statute miles from
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hazardous weather. However, those in the experimental group maintained greater
distances than those in the control group. While newer technologies can improve cockpit
performance, proper design can make the difference between helping and hindering
pilots. Beringer and Ball (2004) used simulation to study the effects of Next-Generation
Radar (NEXRAD) on pilot direct weather viewing, severity judgments, and willingness
to continue VFR-into-IMC flight. The delay between the occurrence of the actual
weather and when the radar image is displayed to the pilot in the cockpit can be
misleading due to the lag in obtaining the current weather conditions. The researchers
programmed heavy precipitation in the simulated flight, requiring participants to utilize
the data and display of NEXRAD to make the decision to divert or continue. It was
found pilots spent more time viewing the higher-resolution images, causing them to defer
their decisions longer than the other groups in the study. The findings support the idea
that higher-resolution images might encourage pilots to continue to fly in hazardous
weather based on posttest NEXRAD image judgements. No potential countermeasures
were discussed by the researchers. Fortunately, it was possible to conduct such a study in
the safety of a simulated environment.
Linear versus circular decision-making. Pilots can potentially commit to one
decision without reevaluation after actions have been implemented using linear decision
making. Current decision-making theory identifies two processes: circular decisionmaking and linear decision-making. Circular decision-making is comprised of
assessment, decision, and consolidation; consolidation being the point at which a person
evaluates the direction of implementation to determine if the action is working to achieve
the goal, and if not, corrections are made. Linear decision-making encompasses only
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assessment and decision. Once the decision is made, the action is implemented without
reevaluation. If the decision was poor, the goal will not be met, and there is no
opportunity to make corrections. Circular decision-making, then, is considered to be
superior to linear decision-making, especially when stakes are high (Bell & Mauro,
2000).
In an aviation environment, the potential exists for the necessity of the use of
linear, rather than circular, decision-making. Research has documented the tendency of
the novice pilot to utilize linear decision-making and the expert pilot utilization of
circular decision-making (Adams & Ericsson, 1992; Dogusoy-Taylan & Cagiltay, 2014;
Schriver, Morrow, Wickens, & Talleur, 2008). During the point at which a pilot chooses
to continue into questionable weather conditions, circumstances including invested time,
money, and energy; passenger pressure; and get-there-itis may influence a pilot to
continue, rather than divert. If the decision is made too late, there may not be time to
reevaluate and make corrections. Once a pilot is flying in poor weather, if an emergency
arises, depending on the time available to decide, the pilot might again be faced with only
one option: to choose a direction and commit to it. Without time for
consolidation/evaluation, if the linear decision made was not adequate, an accident or
incident might result.
Decision-making and judgement. Simulation studies have been used to explore
additional aspects of pilot decision-making regarding VFR-into-IMC events. Goh and
Wiegmann (2001) used a cross-country simulation to determine if participants chose to
continue or to divert from VFR-into-IMC, examining pilot situation assessment, risk
perception, and motivation. Their study found the aspects distinguishing the two groups
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were a matter of accuracy of visibility estimates, appraisal of personal skill, judgment,
and the frequency a given pilot was accustomed to participating in risky behavior. Pilots
who overestimated personal abilities and inaccurately diagnosed visibility were more
likely to continue into adverse weather.
Decision-making in flight does not begin the moment bad weather is encountered.
Walmsley and Gilbey (2016) explained anchoring (information processed before flight
affecting decision-making while in flight), adjustment, confirmation, and outcome could
contribute to the development of cognitive biases. It was further clarified by the
researcher, cognitive biases could potentially affect pilot weather-related decisionmaking in negative ways. The study used simulation to assess the possibility of
anchoring, adjustment, confirmation, and outcome leading to cognitive biases, potentially
negatively affecting pilot weather-related decision-making. The researchers conducted
three separate studies and found pilot anchoring occurred. Specifically, researchers
found in the first study the presence of anchoring and adjustment when weather reports
were reviewed by the pilot before the flight and discovered this affected how weather
cues were interpreted during the flight. In the second study, there was no evidence found
pilots favored disconfirmatory evidence over confirmatory evidence in the case of
environmental cues and confirmation when making the decision to continue the flight. In
the third study, researchers discovered pilots more heavily weighted other pilots’
decisions to continue into poor weather when their outcomes were successful than when
they experienced negative outcomes. In this part of the study, researchers provided flight
scenarios including current weather, area forecast, and outcome information from thirdparty flights to pilot study participants. Pilot participants in the negative outcome
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condition read a scenario ending where the pilot flew into a cloud resulting in aircraft loss
of control and crashing with serious injuries. The pilot participants in the positive
outcome condition read a scenario ending where the pilot landed safely at the intended
destination. The pilot participants in the control group read the common information
with no additional ending. The pilot participants were then asked to rate dimensions
based on the scenarios they had read using a nine-point scale, including if the pilot study
participants would conduct the same third-party flight given in the researcher-presented
outcome scenarios. The researchers discovered pilots interpreted the decisions of pilots
who flew into deteriorating weather conditions more favorably when the outcome was
positive than when the outcome was negative. The researchers suggested using the three
cognitive heuristics, anchoring and adjustment, confirmation, and outcome, may lead to
pilots continuing the flight into deteriorating weather conditions when it would have been
safer to divert to an alternate location or return to the departure point.
Flight simulation and pilot decision-making behavior. In order to learn more
about pilot behavior, Wiegmann, Goh, and O'Hare (2002) conducted research into GA
VFR-into-IMC accidents, focusing on flight time, distance, diversion, VFR-into-IMC,
experience, and situation assessment contextual factors. The researchers identified VFRinto-IMC as a major safety hazard in GA. The study utilized a cross-country flight
simulation to assess GA pilot decision-making to continue or divert from IMC during a
VFR flight. GA pilots were given simulation scenarios to fly where they encountered
IMC either early or later into the flight. The researchers documented the amount of time
and distance GA pilots flew into the IMC weather before deciding to divert. The study
findings identified pilots who encountered the deteriorating weather earlier in the flight
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flew longer into IMC before diverting and were more optimistic about the weather
conditions. The GA pilots who encountered the IMC weather later in the flight flew
shorter distances into IMC before diverting and were not optimistic about the weather
conditions. It was discovered the time and distance GA pilots flew into the weather
before deciding to divert were negatively correlated with previous flight experience. The
findings of the study suggested VFR flight into IMC may be caused, in part, by poor
situation assessment and experience rather than motivational judgment, encouraging risktaking behavior as the GA pilot invests more time in the flight. More research is needed
to improve understanding of pilot behavior and VFR-into-IMC accidents.
Decision error and cognition. According to Orasanu and Martin (1998),
Orasanu, Martin, and Davidson (1998), and Orasanu, Martin, and Davison (2001), the
focus of NDM is to become aware of the ways people, and in this case, pilots, use their
domain knowledge in their decision-making processes. The authors have studied
cognitive and contextual factors in aviation accidents using NDM, with the viewpoint
decision error may be unavoidable as people with extensive domain knowledge apply
their understanding while performing tasks. The researchers conducted their studies with
the objective of reducing the frequency of GA accidents by gaining a better
understanding of the factors leading up to the unfortunate outcomes. The study included
a broad review of NTSB accidents. The results found several cognitive and contextual
factors contributed to GA aviation accidents. These factors included (1) ambiguity, (2)
underestimating risk, (3) goal conflicts, and (4) unanticipated consequences (Orasanu, &
Martin, 1998; Orasanu, Martin, and Davidson (1998); Orasanu, Martin, & Davison,
2001).
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NDM and contextual factors. The consideration of context, or NDM, can be
used to understand pilots’ actions when investigating accidents (FAA, 2008; Klein, 2008;
Orasanu, Martin, & Davidson, 2001). The NDM framework developed as a way of
assessing how people make decisions and perform cognitively complex functions in
dynamic, real-world situations involving limited time, uncertainty, high stakes, team and
organizational constraints, unstable conditions, and varying amounts of experience. In a
general sense, NDM describes human intuition as based on large numbers of patterns
gained through experience, resulting in different forms of implied knowledge. In
retrospect, as O’Hare and Owen (2002) clarified, pilot contribution to cross-country VFR
crashes cannot be explained by flight-time alone. There are other factors at play,
ultimately comprising pilot circumstances, including but not limited to over-confidence,
faulty risk-perception, lack of awareness, flight circumstances leading to risky decisions,
decision-making, risk assessment, SA, proximity of the goal/planned destination, and
time already invested in the flight/sunk cost. Orasanu, Martin, and Davidson (2001) used
NDM to examine expertise and decision-making within context. The research topics
identified in the applicable literature addressed areas related to the pilot, aircraft, and
flight environment. Specifically, relevant studies to date have covered contextual factors
related to decision errors, cognition, historical accident analysis, PCE, flight simulation,
and pilot behavior. More research is needed to improve understanding of how NDM and
context impact VFR-into-IMC accidents. The results of these studies showed more
research is needed to understand the context of pilot actions resulting in VFR-into-IMC
accidents, as there are gaps in understanding between context and decision-making on the
following factors related to the length of time a pilot would fly into degraded weather
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conditions: (1) financial motivation, (2) time investment, (3) sunk cost, (4) situation
assessment, (5) cognitive anchoring, (6) novice and expert use of linear versus circular
decision-making, (7) when IMC weather is encountered during the flight, (8) use of incockpit weather information during flight, (9) moving weather map and attentional
tunneling, (10) timeliness of weather information and perceived reputable source, (11)
use of portable weather device/application and low versus higher-resolution weather
image, (12) lag in obtaining the current weather conditions, (13) accuracy of visibility
estimate, (14) appraisal of personal skill, judgment, comfort level participating in risky
behavior, (15) anchoring (information processed before flight affecting decision-making
while in flight), and (16) cognitive biases.
Pilot Characteristics
Studies utilizing simulation technology have addressed pilot factors likely
contributing to VFR-into-IMC events. It was observed passengers are on board in more
of these types of accidents than any other accidents in GA. Barron (2011) investigated
how pressure from passengers might have contributed to pilots’ decisions to continue into
adverse weather conditions by using passenger social pressure in flight. The study used
passenger social pressure in flight to convince pilots to continue or divert from hazardous
weather. The study found the pilot participants tended to concede to the pressure of the
passenger, whether they were positively or negatively motivated to continue into poor
weather conditions. At the conclusion of the study, pilot participants were informed of
the results. The participating pilots stated they were unaware of passenger influence on
their decision-making. The study results found private pilots who were instrument rated
were more likely to continue farther into IMC than their low time VFR, or high time
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commercial, and/or Air Transport Pilot (ATP) counterparts, a finding pertaining primarily
to the pilot’s ratings.
The Coyne, Baldwin, and Latrorella (2008) study used simulators to assess pilot
ability to determine ceiling and visibility. It was found there was no difference between
the abilities of instrument rated and non-instrument rated pilots to assess ceiling
accuracy, but when it came to visibility, the non-instrument rated pilots were more
accurate. However, all pilots assumed higher ceiling with better visibility. When
comparing these two studies, it seems to be the case, while instrument rated pilots are
more likely to continue into adverse weather, they are, according to Coyne, Baldwin, and
Latrorella (2008), less proficient in accurately determining true visibility.
Studies investigating the demographics of GA pilots who encounter VFR-intoIMC events were limited. Bazargan and Guzhva (2011) explored whether pilot age and
experience were factors in VFR-into-IMC occurrences. The results indicated male pilots
over 60 years of age with more experience were more likely than other pilots to be
involved in a fatal accident. There was no significant pilot gender difference for the
likelihood of an accident attributed to pilot error. The explanation for this result was
given by the researchers as “One plausible explanation for such a result could be older
pilots typically are more experienced and fly more difficult flights, where a mistake or
malfunction could have severe consequences” (Bazargan, & Guzhva, 2011, p. 967).
Huster et al. (2014) completed a study on the medical risks of older pilots. These
findings identified in-flight incapacitation of pilots occurring in 0.19-0.45 times/10(6)
flight hours. The study results also identified professional pilots older than 60 years
having an age-depending increase in incapacitation.
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Training with simulators has been found to be useful when helping VFR pilots
with anti-disorientation. Since spatial disorientation following VFR-into-IMC has been
shown to be a frequent cause of accidents, Tropper, Kallus, and Boucsein (2009)
evaluated pilot psychophysiological spatial orientation in a moving base simulator.
Following pilot exposure and training in simulation, the study found the groups with antidisorientation training performed better and experienced less psychological distress when
carrying out complex maneuvers to recover from unusual attitudes.
Wiggins, Hunter, O’Hare, and Martinussen (2012) studied pilot characteristics of
deliberate versus inadvertent-VFR-into-IMC events. For their study, the researchers
recruited pilots who shared recollections of deliberate and inadvertent-VFR-into-IMC
encounters. It was reported 145 of the 251 pilots entered IMC unintentionally during a
VFR flight, and 93 had continued into IMC intentionally. Those pilots who were
instrument-rated who also deliberately entered into hazardous weather were likely to
have experienced similar conditions in the past, tolerated risk well, reported low anxiety
during previous encounters, and believed the risks of VFR-into-IMC were low. More
research is needed to improve understanding of pilot characteristics related to deliberate
and inadvertent VFR-into-IMC. The results of these studies showed more research is
needed to understand the context of pilot actions resulting in VFR-into-IMC accidents, as
there are gaps in understanding between context and pilot characteristics on the following
factors related to the length of time a pilot would fly into degraded weather conditions:
(1) passenger social pressure, (2) ratings, (3) ceiling and visibility determination versus
rating, (4) pilot gender, (5) pilot age, (6) pilot flight experience, (7) spatial disorientation,
and (8) deliberate and inadvertent flight from VFR-into-IMC.
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Policy Violations
Jackman’s (2014) study investigated pilot policy violations to assess fatal VFRinto-IMC accidents in an ex post facto, quantitative analysis. Violations including flight
plan, ratings, flight currency, and medical status were reviewed. The need for training,
regulatory modifications, or enforcements was explored. Information between the years
of 1998 and 2013 for NTSB GA VFR-into-IMC accident data was analyzed using binary
logistic regression. The findings revealed flight plan violations and pilot medical status
violations were not statistically significant predictors of fatality. It was discovered
through the results of the binary logistic regression analysis, pilot ratings violations and
pilot currency violations were statistically significant predictors of fatality (Pilot Ratings
Violations, Wald statistic =13.824, SE = .050, df = 1, p = .000, OR = .832, 95% CI [.755,
.917] and Pilot Currency violations, Wald statistic = 15.065, SE = .185, df = 1, OR =
.488, p = .000, 95% CI [.339, .701]. The Jackman’s (2014) study recommendations
included not allowing non-instrument rated pilots to fly from VFR-into-IMC, and the
restricting of instrument rated pilots with inadequate flight time to fly from VFR-intoIMC. The study indicated stronger policy enforcement is needed. However, there are
difficulties in consistently and reliably detecting such violations. The results showed
more research is needed to understand the context of pilot actions resulting in VFR-intoIMC accidents, as there are gaps in understanding among context, policy violations, and
on the following factors related to the length of time a pilot would fly into degraded
weather conditions: (1) flight plan, (2) ratings, (3) flight currency, (4) medical status, and
(5) fatality prediction.
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Weather Information Assessment
The most recent literature has found some similarities in the way weather displays
might be affecting pilots’ assessment of the current weather. Weather information
assessment studies reviewed focused on GA pilot risk assessment and decision-making
leading to VFR-into-IMC accidents. A study conducted by Ahlstrom et al. (2015)
investigated weather display symbology and its effects on pilot behavior and decisionmaking. Twenty-four participants, who were instrument rated pilots, were instructed to
avoid hazardous weather in a simulator. The researchers manipulated the weather
displays, altering weather symbols and colors. It was found pilot behavior was affected
by the variations in symbols and colors presented on the weather displays, specifically,
these variations contributed to perceptual asymmetries affecting pilot behavior and
decision-making. These pilot perceptual asymmetries in weather display symbols and
colors could affect GA pilot behavior in the diversion to an alternate or continued VFRinto-IMC to the planned destination decision. It was suggested within the study
development of automated cockpit applications, tracking hazardous weather and warning
pilots of potential problems may help to mitigate the types of effects different displays
might have upon pilot decision-making, leading pilots into hazardous terrain.
Similarly, Ahlstrom et al. (2015) studied effects of weather state-change
notifications on GA pilots’ behavior, cognitive engagement, and weather situation
awareness. According to their results, the participants did not detect symbol changes
very well when it came to Meteorological Terminal Aviation Routine Weather Report, or
Meteorological Aerodrome Report (METAR) displays. This was attributed to the change
blindness phenomenon. The change blindness phenomenon has been defined as “…
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where human observers fail to perceive changes in their field of view, like when new
objects appear in an image or when objects change color and/or shape. This phenomenon
is particularly strong during multitasking situations, such as those experienced during
single pilot operations” (Ahlstrom et al., 2015, p. 1). The pilots in the study also flew
more closely to hazardous weather than what was suggested in the rules, indicating a
possible effect of the symbol changes on pilot behavior and decision-making. Rather
than the automation of weather alerts, it was recommended the optimization of visual
symbols through weather state-change notifications be used to help pilots discriminate
among them, reduce cognitive workload, and improve weather situational awareness
(WSA).
At the time of their study, Coyne, Baldwin, and Latrorella (2005) mentioned
VFR-into-IMC activity is responsible for over 10% of GA fatalities every year. The
researchers also explored GA pilots’ use of graphical METARS. Twenty-four
participants were asked to use a graphical weather information system (GWIS) to make
estimates regarding visibility and ceiling limits in different simulated weather conditions.
It was found the GWIS influenced the judgments of the participants; pilots tended to
overestimate weather conditions. Coyne, Baldwin, and Latrorella (2005) also explained,
on average, pilots overestimated visibility when ceilings were higher, and overestimated
ceilings when visibility was better. It was suggested by the researchers the interaction of
ceiling and visibility shows pilots may be inappropriately assessing weather conditions.
The researchers recommended disseminating information to help some pilots better
understand VFR-into-IMC. A recommendation was also given for utilization of decisionmaking modeling of the interaction between ceiling and visibility and the design of
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GWIS technology and GA pilot accurate weather assessment to improve understanding
of this accident type.
The studies all found pilots’ decision-making and behaviors were likely affected
by visual displays. It is well documented in the aviation community the limitations of
human perception, particularly visual sensory, are major contributors to human error.
Since environments tend to remain in unchanging states, they might believe something
not there has been seen, or something was not seen that was in plain sight. Humans may
not be able to fully process sudden changes in what they are seeing (Sternberg &
Sternberg, 2016). Visual displays are not always working to reduce human error in the
cockpit. There are limitations to the current visual display technology. There may be a
delay in reception of weather information from the source to the cockpit, combined with
the weather depiction on the visual display may not be to the correct scale. This situation
may lead the pilot to believe the weather is good along the selected flight path when in
reality it is deteriorating, contributing to pilot continue to destination decision-making
errors and a potential fatality. Coupled with linear decision-making, where pilots commit
to one decision without reevaluation after actions have been implemented, industry still
relies heavily upon visual displays, when pilots are making life and death decisions based
on their ability to interpret the weather at any given time (Balog, 2013; Balog, 2016).
The results of these studies showed more research is needed to understand the context of
pilot actions resulting in VFR-into-IMC accidents, as there are gaps in understanding
between context and weather information assessment and on the following factors related
to the length of time a pilot would fly into degraded weather conditions: (1) weather
display symbology and color and the perceptual asymmetry effects on pilot behavior and
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decision-making, (2) risk assessment, (3) decision making, (4) weather state-change
notifications/symbol change detection on GA pilots’ behavior, (5) cognitive engagement,
(6) weather situation awareness, (7) change blindness, (8) ceiling and visibility
determination, (9) use of graphical METARs, (10) delay in reception of weather
information from the source to the cockpit, and (11) weather depiction on the visual
display may not be to the correct scale.
Training
Nicolai et al. (2017) endeavored to discover accident trends and perceptions of
deficiencies in training, by examining VFR-into-IMC accident reports between 2003 and
2012. The researchers also sought current information through a survey. The study
found there remains a lack of proper training in the areas of weather and weather
technology concepts. The authors argued it is difficult for pilots to improve their SA and
decision-making because of this insufficient training. Whitehurst et al. (2017) conducted
a study to identify causal factors and gaps in training leading to VFR-into-IMC aircraft
accidents. A mixed methods approach with NTSB VFR-into-IMC accidents between
2003 and 2012 was used. A national survey was also disseminated to obtain data on pilot
self-identified training deficiencies. The results reported SA is connected to decisionmaking.
A possibility for training to improve pilot decision-making, suggested by Nicolai
et al. (2017), might be found in a study conducted by Wiggins and O’Hare (2003). The
research utilized a computer-based training system for VFR pilots, and provided a cuebased training program, designed to teach pilots how to recognize deteriorating weather
conditions while in flight. The cueing variables used in the study were associated with
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deteriorating weather conditions during flight and included darkening clouds, terrain
clearance, cloud base, visibility, concentration, rain, cloud type, wind direction, and wind
velocity. The training system helped pilots to practice skills necessary for recognizing
and responding to declining weather cues in VFR-into-IMC conditions during flight. The
study found self-reporting pilots were more likely to respond to weather cues following
the training program. Performance-wise, it was evident cue-based training may improve
the speed of pilot weather-related decision-making. In order to improve SA in training,
Ball (2008) sought to understand why pilots fly too closely to hazardous weather. Using
a graphical weather display and instructional training, the study found training improved
pilots’ ability to maintain safe distances from poor weather conditions. It might not be,
necessarily, an ability to maintain safe distances, but rather, a conscious choice
influenced by level of experience and quality of training. Sawyer and Shappell (2009)
investigated the ways experience and training affect the weather identification accuracy,
response bias, and visual scan paths of pilots. Their results found training did not
improve decision accuracy, but it did indicate there was a shift in bias toward a decision
to not continue into IMC.
Keller (2015) found VFR pilots who flew into IMC did so because they
misperceived the severity of the weather and the associated risks. Pilots who turned, or
diverted, did so because they became aware of the danger and sought to return to safety.
Additionally, O’Hare and Smitheram (1995) found pilots who viewed risk from a gain
standpoint were less likely to continue into IMC, and those who considered risk from a
loss viewpoint were more likely to continue. The difficulty to train for accuracy found in
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the Sawyer and Shappell (2009) study might indicate it is also difficult to improve the
accuracy of pilot risk assessment with training.
The Knecht, Ball, and Lenz (2010) study utilized video weather training, webbased preflight weather briefing, and pilot weather knowledge/flight behavior of local
versus non-local pilots. Participants were given pre-tests and post-tests to measure
knowledge acquisition because of the training. It was found both video trainings
significantly improved pilot scores. However, both the online preflight weather briefing
and the weather knowledge of local versus non-local pilots had no important differences,
implying Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI) studies could be generalizable to the
United Stated population of GA pilots. These studies emphasized the deficiency in
adequate training for weather and weather technology concepts. This creates a difficult
situation for pilots to acquire the needed knowledge, skills, and abilities during flight
training and experience acquiring flight hours.
Historical GA adverse weather accident studies have utilized comprehensive
statistics to help discover possible factors contributing to VFR-into-IMC events. Ison
(2014a) used logistic regression to investigate potential pilot-related, and situational
factors including accident time of day, terrain, receipt of weather briefing,
communication with air traffic control, filing of a flight plan, pilot certification, pilot
experience, and pilot age. It was found two factors were significant contributors to VFRinto-IMC accidents: terrain and weather briefing. Three significant relationships were
also found: accident type and flight plans, terrain and pilot flight time, and terrain and
flight plan. The study indicated a need for improvement in pilot training, including flying
into mountainous areas and the proper interpretation of weather data.
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The Ison (2014b) study found similar and additional information. The research
concluded safety benefits could be achieved if lower-certification pilots completed
situational-based training (SBT), received specific training prior to flying in mountainous
terrain, and were provided with better weather briefing training including an emphasis on
warnings and hazards. The results of these studies showed more research is needed to
understand the context of pilot actions resulting in VFR-into-IMC accidents, as there are
gaps in understanding among context, training, and on the following factors related to the
length of time a pilot would fly into degraded weather conditions: (1) lack of proper
training in the areas of weather and weather technology concepts, (2) situational
awareness and weather-related decision-making, (3) cue-based training, (4) flight
distance from poor weather conditions, (5) level of flight experience, (6) quality of
training, (7) weather identification accuracy, (8) response bias, (9) visual scan paths, (10)
decision accuracy, (11) perception of the severity of the weather and the associated risks,
(12) gain versus loss risk perception, (13) risk assessment, (14) video, web-based
preflight weather briefing, and weather knowledge, (15) accident time of day, (16)
terrain, (17) receipt of weather briefing, (18) communication with air traffic control, (19)
filing of a flight plan, (20) pilot certification, (21) pilot experience, (22) pilot age, (23)
mountainous areas flight training, (24) proper interpretation of weather data, (25)
situational-based training, and (26) weather briefing training including an emphasis on
warnings and hazards.
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Contextual Factors GA Weather/Non-Weather Accidents
O'Hare and Owen (2002) researched GA cross-country VFR crashes and
contextual factors. The research involved the study of database historical archives of
cross-country weather-related accidents in New Zealand from 1988 to 2000. A total of
1,308 records were retrieved for the time frame, and 77 accidents were identified as
cross-country flights. A primary comparison found several contextual factors
contributing to the accidents including the following:
Visibility. There was a marginally significant difference (F [1, 28] = 8.3, p =
0.07) in the estimated visibility at the time of the crash. The visibility was reported as 20
km for all the Acts of God (AOG) crashes and 5 to 20 km for In-Flight Volitional (IFV)
crashes (seven IFV crashes occurred below 5 km visibility).
Altitude. There was a statistically significant difference in the height above sea
level of the crash site for IFV crashes at a mean 2,970 feet above mean sea level (AMSL)
and 150 feet AMSL for the AOG crashes (F [1,20] = 6.3, p = .02).
Pilot characteristics. The pilot mean age in IFV crashes was 37.8 years. The
AOG pilots were 47 years of age. It was determined the difference of 9.2 years between
the groups was statistically significant (F [1, 43] = 3.9, p = .05). The mean hours flown
in the IFV group during the previous 90 days was determined to be 59.8 hours. It was
also determined the AOG group flew a total of 31.9 hours. No statistically significant
relationship was found for the flight hours of the two groups (F [1, 54] = 3.7, p = .06).
Additionally, no statistically significant differences were found for any of the other pilot
characteristics assessed in the study.
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A second comparison of weather-related and non-weather-related crashes
revealed weather-related crashes took place later into cross-country flights and closer to
planned destinations than other types of GA accidents. Additionally, the second
comparison found age and flight to be contextual, contributing factors to weather-related
GA accidents. GA pilots who were involved in weather-related accidents tended to be
younger and possessed more recent flight time than other pilots. The results showed
more research is needed to understand the context of pilot actions resulting in VFR-intoIMC cross-country accidents, as there are gaps in understanding for contextual factors
derived from accident analysis related to the length of time a pilot would fly into
degraded weather conditions: (1) visibility, (2) altitude, (3) age, (4) hours flown, (5) time
into cross-country flights and distance to planned destinations, and (6) flight.
Summary of GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC Contextual Factors
The 46 contextual factors identified in the literature and used in the study are
provided in Appendix D (Table D1). This table provides each of the 46 contextual factor
names, descriptions, and sources for the factors identified in the research literature. The
46 contextual factors selected for the study were taken from a limited number of dated
Part 91, GA studies exploring the contextual factors contributing to VFR-into-IMC
accidents. These studies have identified the presence of contextual factors occurring for
this accident type, as well as the existence of unsafe pilot behaviors negatively affecting
judgment and increasing the probability for error.
Expert raters and inter-rater reliability
Inter-rater reliability studies, in fields such as medicine and the social sciences,
have used models rated by experts with the guidance published by Cohen (1960) and
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Fleiss (1971) to determine the degree of rater agreement for nominally scaled data (Gwet,
2008; Joslin, 2014; Oakleaf, 2009; Stemler, 2004). Applicable, statistical literature
included research for rating categorical data using multiple raters, although no required
number of raters was specified, and measuring inter-rater reliability using Fleiss’ kappa.
Inter-rater reliability has also been examined and determined with other measures
including Cohen’s kappa, Cohen’s weighted kappa and the equivalent Intraclass
Correlation Coefficient (ICC), and the particular inter-rater reliability measure chosen by
the researcher depends on the number of raters and whether the data is nominal, ordinal,
or continuous (Fleiss, 1971; Fleiss & Cohen, 1973; Joslin, 2014). The statistics kappa
and weighted kappa apply only to Cohen’s kappa measuring the extent two raters agree
on rating a sample of subjects on a nominal scale, and Fleiss’ kappa is a generalization of
unweighted kappa measuring the degree three or more raters agree on rating a sample of
subjects on a nominal scale (Fleiss, 1971). Cohen’s kappa can only be used in assessing
agreement for one rater against himself and two raters against each other, and the Fleiss’
kappa measure is a variation of Cohen’s kappa (Fleiss, 1971). Fleiss’ kappa has been
used in studies where any number of raters assign categorical ratings to a fixed number of
items (Fleiss, 1971; Singendonk et al., 2016). Fleiss’ kappa can only be used with binary
or nominal scale ratings. Cohen’s kappa has the same two raters rating a set of items and
Fleiss’ kappa allows a fixed number of raters to rate different items (Fleiss, 1971).
Agreement among raters has been determined through a fixed number of raters assigning
numerical ratings to several items. The kappa (κ) is a measure of the rating consistency
among raters and specifies the amount of agreement beyond what is expected by chance
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(Kiliç, 2015). The κ measure has been defined as the following in equation 1 (Fleiss,
1971):
(1)

The denominator identifies the level of agreement achievable above chance. The
numerator provides the level of agreement actually achieved above chance. If all raters
are in total agreement, then the κ measure will be equal to one. If there is no agreement
among raters, other than expected by chance, then the k measure will be less than or
equal to zero. The specified number of raters, n, assign subjects, N, to a determined
number of categories, c. The value of P (bar) is calculated by determining the sum of all
data rows and then multiplying by one over the total number of rows for the entire
spreadsheet. The value of Pe (bar) is calculated by determining the sum of each column,
dividing by N multiplied by n assignments, then squaring and summing the result of each
column. Fleiss’ kappa (κ) can then be determined by completing the calculation using
the equation given in equation 1.
The value of N is the total number of accidents. The value of n is the number of
raters identifying the presence of the particular contextual factor from the 46 research
identified contextual factors. The value of k is the 46 contextual factors used by the
raters for identification of the presence of the individual contextual factors (1 through 46)
in the 85 accident sample. The accidents are indexed by i = 1 to N, and the 46 contextual
factors are indexed by j = 1 to k. The value nij represent the number of raters who
assigned the ith accident to the jth contextual factor. The first step is to calculate pj, the
proportion of all accidents assigned by the raters to the jth contextual factor. The second
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step is to calculate Pi, the extent the raters agree on the ith accident. The second step
involves determining the number of rater pairs who agree out of the total number of all
possible rater pairs. The third step is to compute P (bar), the mean of the Pis, and Pe (bar)
to calculate Fleiss’ kappa (κ).
The four raters (pilot study) and three raters (main study) (n) assign 9 (pilot study)
and 85 (main study) GA VFR-into-IMC accidents (N) to a total of 46 contextual factor
categories (k). The 46 contextual factor categories (k) are presented in columns, and the
GA VFR-into-IMC accidents are presented in rows. Each cell identifies the number of
raters who assigned the particular accident (row) to the presence of a particular
contextual factor (column) (i.e. 0, 1, 2, 3 or 4 in the pilot study or 0, 1, 2 or 3 in the main
study). The example shown in Table 1 (not actual data) illustrates how the data is used to
determine Fleiss’ kappa for the main study using three raters (Fleiss, 1971; Gwet, 2014;
Landis & Koch, 1977; Scott, 1955; Sim & Wright, 2005).
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Table 1
Determination of Fleiss’ Kappa
NTSB GA VFR-into-IMC
Contextual
Contextual
Accident Number
… … …
Pi
Factor 1
Factor 46
nij
A1 - ANC12FA009
3
… … …
2
Pi1
A2 - ANC12FA066
2
… … …
2
Pi2
A3 - ATL07FA038
0
… … …
3
Pi3
A4 - ATL03FA062
3
… … …
0
Pi4
A5 - ATL07FA081
1
… … …
3
Pi5
A6 - ATL91FA043
2
… … …
1
Pi6
…
…
… … …
…
…
A80 - SEA96FA021
3
… … …
1
Pi80
A81 - WPR10FA142
0
… … …
0
Pi81
A82 - WPR11FA147
1
… … …
2
Pi82
A83 - WPR11FA241
2
… … …
1
Pi83
A84 - WPR12FA031
3
… … …
3
Pi84
A85 - WPR14FA172
2
… … …
2
Pi85
Total
22
… … …
20
Pj
Pj1
… … …
Pj46
Note. Adapted from “The kappa statistic in reliability studies: Use, interpretation, and
sample size requirements,” by J. Sim and C.C. Wright, 2005, Journal of the American
Physical Therapy Association, 85(3), 257-268.
The calculation to determine Fleiss’ kappa (κ) uses the data in Table 1, including
N = 85 (accidents), n = 3 (raters), and k = 46 (contextual factors), the sum of all cells, and
the sum of Pi. The value of Pj is calculated using the number of total N accidents
multiplied by the number of total raters. In the main study, the value of Pj is calculated to
be 85 accidents multiplied by 3 raters = 255 total accident ratings made by the three raters
to the jth contextual factor. The values for Pj and Pi are then calculated. The value of Pj is
determined for each column by calculating the sum of the column and then dividing by
255. The value of Pi is then determined for each row by dividing one by the sum of the
column multiplied by the sum minus one then multiplying the value by the squared value
of each rater rating in the row and then subtracting the total number of 3 raters. The
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value of P (bar) is then calculated by taking the sum of all Pi values and then dividing by
85, the total number of accidents in the main study sample. The Pe (bar) value is then
calculated by taking the squared value of each Pj value and then calculating the sum of all
values. Fleiss’ kappa (κ) is then calculated by subtracting the Pe (bar) value from the P
(bar) value and then dividing by the Pe (bar) value subtracted from one.
Landis and Koch (1977) developed a table to enable the interpretation of κ values
(Table 2). The κ values are identified from -1.0 to +1.0. A κ value of -1.0 should be
interpreted as the agreement between the raters was worse than expected by chance. A κ
value of zero should be interpreted as the agreement between the raters was no better than
by change. A κ value of 1.0 should be interpreted as the agreement between the raters
was perfect (i.e. the raters all agreed the contextual factor was present in the accident).
The table appears to be the most widely accepted for κ agreement.

Table 2
Generally accepted standards of agreement for kappa (κ)
Kappa (κ)

Interpretation

<0

Poor agreement

0.01 – 0.20

Slight agreement

0.21 – 0.40

Fair agreement

0.41 – 0.60

Moderate agreement

0.61 – 0.80

Substantial agreement

0.81 – 1.00

Almost perfect agreement

Note. Adapted from “Measuring nominal scale agreement among many raters,” by J.
Fleiss, 1971, Psychological Bulletin, 76(5), 378-382.
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The research literature has identified various κ values and the associated
interpretation of acceptable levels of agreement. McCoul et al. (2012) used unweighted
Fleiss’ Kappa statistic (Kf) and the prevalence-adjusted bias-adjusted kappa (PABAK) to
report interrater agreement of nasal endoscopy in patients with a prior history of
endoscopic sinus surgery. Researchers reported interrater agreement values of excellent
(Kf = 0.886), moderate (Kf = 0.543; Kf = 0.443; Kf = 0.593; Kf = 0.429), fair (Kf = 0.314;
Kf = 0.257; Kf = 0.229), and poor (Kf = 0.148; Kf = 0.126). Smith et al. (2012) used the
Fleiss’ kappa test and PABAK for categoric data to report interrater reliability of
endoscopic parameters following sinus surgery. The researchers also reported interrater
agreement values of strong agreement (kappa = 0.499, prevalence index = 0.925; kappa =
0.364, prevalence index = 0.829). Green (1997) identified interrater agreement values for
kappa statistics using multiple raters and categorical classifications of high agreement
(kappa = greater than 0.75), low agreement (kappa = below 0.40), and fair to good level
of agreement (kappa = 0.40 to 0.75). It has been explained kappa corrects for chance
agreement and reports lower interrater agreement values where classification of
agreement levels are opinions of the researchers and are therefore arbitrary (Landis &
Koch, 1977). The Landis and Koch (1977) table was used to determine the κ values for
the four raters (pilot study) and three raters (main study) as it appears to be the most
widely accepted for κ agreement.
Percentage agreement and Fleiss’ kappa for four (pilot study) and three (main
study) raters was used to measure inter-rater consistency as the consensus in the reviewed
research literature was a recommendation to use a minimum of two measures due to the
advantages and disadvantages of the available measures. The percentage agreement is
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the simplest measure of inter-rater reliability but does not consider the agreement
expected by chance alone and is strengthened by using measures indicating proportion of
agreement beyond chance including Fleiss’ kappa for multiple raters rating nominal data.
The use and reporting of the Fleiss’ kappa statistic for the pilot and main studies
is the only statistic needed if the totals from the four (pilot study) and three (main study)
raters do not vary by large amounts. Falotico and Quatto (2015) emphasized the Fleiss'
kappa statistic is a well-known index for assessing the reliability of agreement for raters
used in the psychological and psychiatric fields. The study used IBM© SPSSTM software
to determine Fleiss’ kappa. It has been determined, through a review of the Sim &
Wright (2005) research, if all the raters respond to the presence of a particular contextual
factor, it is possible the Fleiss’ kappa statistic could show a low level of interrater
reliability despite a high observed agreement. In order to reduce bias, some researchers
recommend using a prevalence-adjusted bias-adjusted kappa (PABAK) to adjust for
prevalence and bias (Byrt, Bishop, & Carlin, 1993; Sim & Wright, 2005). The PABAK
takes into consideration the prevalence index (PI), high chance rater agreement on
presence of contextual factors leading to low Fleiss’ kappa values/low chance rater
agreement on presence of contextual factors leading to increased Fleiss’ kappa values.
The PABAK also considers the bias index (BI), large rater disagreement on presence of
contextual factors leading to a higher Fleiss’ kappa value/low rater disagreement on
presence of contextual factors leading to lower Fleiss’ kappa value. The PI and BI were
used in the study to adjust the Fleiss’ kappa interrater agreement statistic to account for
the described potential biases by calculating average values and substituting the results
for the actual values.
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The use of more than two raters providing nominal ratings and measuring
agreement with the Fleiss’ kappa statistic has been identified in the reviewed research.
Zapf et al. (2016) measured inter-rater reliability for nominal data using percentage
agreement and Fleiss’ kappa using a simulation study investigating the influence of four
factors including number of observations, number of raters, number of categories, and the
strength of agreement (low, moderate, and high). In order to show what was learned
from the simulation study, the findings were applied to a case study consisting of 81
scenarios of histopathological assessment of patients with mamma carcinoma rated by
four raters focusing on the interrater agreement. Researchers produced nominal data
using the multinomial distribution with N subjects, n raters, and k categories due to
utilization of the unweighted Fleiss’ kappa being only appropriate for nominal data. The
researchers identified, through observed agreement, considerable differences between the
parameters investigated ranging from 10% (MIB-1 proliferation rate) to 96% (estrogen
receptor group). The corresponding Fleiss’ kappa values ranged from 0.20 (low rater
agreement) to 0.74 (medium rater agreement). It was concluded, when considering
nominal data with no missing values, the Fleiss’ kappa is recommended for use in
determining interrater reliability. Poburka, Patel, and Bless (2016) investigated the interjudge and intra-judge reliability of raters using the Voice-Vibratory Assessment with
Laryngeal Imaging (VALI) rating form developed for assessing video stroboscopy and
high-speed videoendoscopic (HSV) recordings. Researchers used nine raters trained to
use a data collection form for rating a sample of 66 voice disorders. The study assessed
nominal data factors including glottal closure, vertical level, and free edge contour using
percentage agreement and Fleiss’ kappa. Nominal parameter results included
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correlations ranging from 0.18 to 0.35 for stroboscopy and from 0.13 to 0.33 for HSV
and percentage of concordance ranged from 44% to 78% for stroboscopy and from 52%
to 89% for HSV. It was concluded the rating form developed for the study incorporating
visual-perceptual ratings of both stroboscopy and HSV can be used to make reliable
visual-perceptual judgments related to features of vibratory motion from stroboscopy and
HSV. McCoul et al. (2012) completed a study using 14 endoscopic nasal examinations
recorded using digital video capture software. A total of five raters reviewed the
inflammatory and anatomic video findings. The study compared the results between the
Kf and the PABAK. The research specifically used the Kf and PABAK to report
interrater agreement of nominal inflammatory and anatomic attributes examined in
patients with a prior history of endoscopic sinus surgery. The study reported interrater
agreement values of excellent (Kf = 0.886), moderate (Kf = 0.543; Kf = 0.443; Kf = 0.593;
Kf = 0.429), fair (Kf = 0.314; Kf = 0.257; Kf = 0.229), and poor (Kf = 0.148; Kf = 0.126).
It was concluded, due to the interrater agreement variability for the rater nominal
inflammatory and anatomic attributes assessed in the study examined, additional
standardization of nasal endoscopy interpretation could increase procedure reliability in
clinical practice. Smith et al. (2012) completed a study on the interrater reliability of
endoscopic parameters following sinus surgery. A total of 120 video‐endoscopic
evaluations for 20 subjects were rated by four sinus surgeons. The nominal categories
used by the raters were related to adhesion formation and middle turbinate position. The
researchers used Fleiss’ kappa and PABAK to report interrater reliability of endoscopic
parameters following sinus surgery. The results showed interrater values of strong
agreement (kappa = 0.499, PABAK = 0.925; kappa = 0.364, PABAK = 0.829). It was
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concluded middle turbinate position and adhesions have acceptable reproducibility
appropriate for evaluating endoscopic sinus surgery (ESS) postsurgical period outcomes.
Metric Reliability and Validity
The usefulness of any measure depends on the demonstrated benefit determined
by valid metrics (Joslin, 2014). Zapf et al. (2016) explained validity is defined in terms
of how well a study captures the interested measure, and high reliability means a measure
is reproducible over time in changing settings and by different raters. The quality of a
rater opinion can be measured using credibility, dependability, transferability, and
confirmability testing (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Velázquez, 2016). Similarly, the quality
of a rater opinion on the presence of the 46 research identified contextual factors in the
NTSB GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC accident sample can be measured using these four
tests. Credibility was achieved by using a recognized authoritative source of NTSB
database descriptions of the accidents selected for the pilot and main study samples as
well as using expert rater opinions for the presence of the 46 research-identified
contextual factors (Appendix M). Dependability was achieved during communication
between the raters when assessing the pilot study materials including the data collection
form, contextual factor definitions, and NTSB database sample of AARs. Transferability
was achieved by providing detailed descriptions of the research methodology and
procedures so other researchers could complete studies using the information (Creswell,
2005; Velázquez, 2016). Confirmability was achieved through utilization of objective
NTSB AAR data and rater data meaning agreement. All of the raters identified the
presence of the 46 research-identified contextual factors from the same GA Part 91 VFRinto-IMC accident sample narratives selected from the NTSB AARs. The raters were
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provided drop down selections for the 46 research-identified contextual factors on the
data collection form during the pilot study. During the pilot study, the raters
communicated with each other and the researcher and identified discrepancies with the
drop down menus of the factors to the researcher for correction before the main study
was disseminated.
Summary
Continued flight from VFR-into-IMC accident statistics have consistently
identified GA with the highest number of yearly fatalities. Historical research has
focused on improved understanding and reducing the fatality causes and statistics for this
pilot group and accident type. The review of relevant literature identified dated GA
research concentrating on pilot characteristics, policy violations, weather information
assessment, perception of display information, training, accident analysis, and associated
decision-making. An assessment of the pertinent literature also identified dated GA
contextual factor research focusing on decision errors, cognition, historical accident
analysis, PCE, flight simulation, and pilot behavior. The dated studies identified
knowledge gaps and the need for additional research, including database research, to
improve understanding among context, pilot characteristics, policy violations, weather
information assessment, perception of display information, training, accident analysis,
and associated decision-making. The current research improved on deficiencies in
previous research by utilizing four raters in the pilot study, and ultimately three raters in
the main study due to one rater being unable to participate. These improvements were
based on the most frequently used raters in the reviewed similar studies rating
nominal/categorical data. Raters identified the presence and frequencies of the 46
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reviewed research-identified contextual factors and manifestations of the contextual
factors in recently completed GA VFR-into-IMC AARs archived in the NTSB online
safety database. The researcher examined and determined the statistically significant
relationships between the contextual factors present in the NTSB AARs and other factors
including pilot age, flight experience, weather, flight conditions, time of day, and
certification level using point biserial and phi correlations. Contextual factor effects were
also examined and determined for the crash distance from departure and crash distance
from planned destination using multiple regression. A review of the literature also
specified precedents in research for utilizing multiple raters and measuring inter-rater
reliability using Fleiss’ kappa (κ).
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
A total of four SME pilot raters (hereafter referred to as raters) were used in the
pilot study and three raters in the main study. Four raters were originally chosen for the
pilot and main studies based on the most frequently used number of raters identified in
similar studies rating nominal/categorical data. The pilot study was completed by four
raters. It was anticipated the same four raters would be used in the pilot and main studies
in adherence to the recommendations given by Thabane et al. (2010) and van Teijlingen
and Hundley (2001). However, three of the four raters ultimately completed the main
study due to one rater being unable to participate. The guidance was given from the
Committee Chair to complete the study reporting the four raters’ data for the pilot study
and three raters’ data for the main study. Raters were used to standardize the
classification of the 46 research-identified contextual factors during the pilot study and
determine the presence of the factors in the sample of 85 NTSB AARs in the main study.
The raters assessed pilot actions representative of the contextual factors and identified the
presence of the contextual factors in the accident sample. The selected raters are
experienced pilots (Appendix M). Results were reported from the aviation perspective.
This standardized classification of the contextual factors reduced the possibility of
misperception when studying contextual factors with similar definitions, as the findings
could be used in the aviation industry for future investigations.
The NTSB archival AARs of GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC accidents, and the
associated final probable cause report data, were reviewed by four expert raters (pilot
study) and three raters (main study). Although the raters may have been acquainted with
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the VFR-into-IMC accidents assessed, the focus was on identifying the presence,
frequency, and manifestation of 46 research-identified contextual factors in these types of
accidents. Definitions of the contextual factors and sources of these definitions were
given to the four (pilot study) and three (main study) expert raters to review in
completing the study. Raters were instructed to use the contextual factor definitions to
aid them in their task. Therefore, any previous familiarity with these types of accidents
would likely be mitigated. Definitions of 46 research-identified contextual factors were
applied by the raters to determine if any of the factors were present in a sample of 85
accidents. The raters were instructed to indicate whether the factors were present for
those factors with a yes/no outcome. Some of the factors did not have binary outcomes,
including time of day, altitude, height of crash site, light condition, passengers on board,
and terrain. Non-binary options for these factors were able to be selected by the raters.
Where possible, contextual factors were converted to yes/no outcomes. The ‘time of day’
was converted to ‘day’ and ‘night,’ and ‘passengers on board’ converted to ‘yes’ and ‘no’
so these contextual factors could be incorporated into the previously described analyses.
Frequencies among the altitude, height of crash site, terrain, ‘time of day/light condition’
and passengers on board/total number of passengers contextual factors where a yes/no
conversion was not possible were reported separately from the point-biserial and phi
correlations and multiple regression analyses. The first part of the study was completed,
utilizing a qualitative approach with the raters, to identify the presence of these
contextual factors, frequencies, and how the factors were manifest in the accident sample.
Percentage agreement, PABAK, and Fleiss’ kappa (κ) were used to determine inter-rater
reliability for the raters. The second part of the study was accomplished utilizing a
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quantitative approach to examine the relationships between the contextual factors and the
selected variables including pilot age, flight experience (total flight hours), weather
(inclement/non-inclement), flight conditions (VMC/IMC), time of day (day/night), and
certification level (instrument-rater/non-instrument rated). Quantitative analysis included
the use of point biserial and phi correlations to determine if there was a statistically
significant relationship between the contextual factors and pilot age, flight experience,
weather, flight conditions, time of day, and certification level. A determination was
made as to the specific contextual factors, if any, associated with what effects on Part 91
GA VFR-into-IMC pilot weather-related decision-making error. The researcher used the
crash distance from departure and crash distance from planned destination as outcomes in
the multiple regression analyses. The approach of using expert raters to identify accident
contextual factors, frequencies, and manifestations is generalizable to other fields of
study.
Research Approach
Qualitative research methods on secondary data were utilized to examine and
determine the contextual factors present in GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC accidents. The
research assessed a sample of 85 NTSB United States aviation accidents from the
population of 691 NTSB aviation accidents attributed to GA pilot error from 1991 to
2014. NTSB AARs were used to explore exclusively GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC pilotrelated accidents. Forty-six research-identified contextual factors were identified and
correlated within the sample of 85 NTSB AARs to explore the relationships between the
contextual factors and other factors involved in these events. The other factors involved
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in the VFR-into-IMC accidents included pilot age, flight experience, weather, flight
conditions, time of day and certification level.
NTSB GA VFR-into-IMC AAR narratives were reviewed by four expert raters
for the pilot study and three expert raters for the main study. All four raters are
recognized flight instructor subject matter experts with GA VFR-into-IMC accidents
(Appendix M). Raters identified the presence of 46 research-identified contextual factors
in a pilot study sample of nine accidents and main study sample of 85 accidents. Expert
opinions were provided by the raters about how the factors were manifested in the pilot
study and main study accident samples. Research-identified contextual factor definitions
were applied to each accident in the pilot study and main study by all raters (Table D1).
The researcher reported the presence, frequency, and manifestation of the contextual
factors in the sample of pilot and main study NTSB AARs as identified by the expert
raters.
The selected four raters for the pilot study and three raters for the main study were
samples representative of the experienced pilot population. Raters were selected based
on precedent research conducting similar studies and using similar numbers of raters
(Smith et al., 2012; Zapf et al., 2016). Criteria used to determine the qualifications for
rater selection to participate in the study included GA flight instruction experience, flight
experience level, and demographics. Selection criteria included the possession of the
FAA Certified Flight Instructor (CFI) and ATP certificates. Raters were selected based
on their respective possession of these qualifications. This flight instruction experience,
combined with flight experience level, indicated the raters were proficient in VFR-intoIMC flight operations, as well as instructing GA pilots, and gave them an ideal
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background for being receptive to the 46 research-identified contextual factors connected
to this accident type. It was assumed the rater training and instruction by the researcher
provided adequate familiarization with the 46 research-identified contextual factors to be
used in the study. All raters possessed significant flight time in GA and commercial
aircraft as well as expert level knowledge related to VFR-into-IMC. The raters were
recruited through professional affiliation.
Pilot Study. A pilot study, or feasibility study, was completed to establish data
collection instrument validity and inter-rater reliability. The pilot study sample included
nine NTSB AARs from fatal GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC accidents. A sample size of nine
was determined to be the minimum required sample size for inter-rater reliability as
explained by Connelly (2008). The sample of nine NTSB AARs for the pilot study, as
well as 85 separate NTSB AARs for the main study, were taken from the population of
691 accidents previously described (Appendix K; Table K1; Appendix L; Table L1).
The data from the pilot study were consolidated to compare the respective
contextual factor selections for each of the four raters. This data was used to develop a
table including descriptive statistics. The pilot study was used to check the provided
instructions for understanding by the raters, confirm all four raters were able to view the
NTSB AAR narratives through the provided hyperlinks, ensure the documentation was
accessible, and evaluate the instruction form, data collection database file, procedures,
and data analysis approach to determine if any modifications were needed. It was
anticipated the same four raters would be used in the pilot and main studies in adherence
to the recommendations given by Thabane et al. (2010) and van Teijlingen and Hundley
(2001). However, one of the raters was able to complete the pilot study but not the main
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study. Guidance was given by the Committee Chair to complete the study reporting the
four rater’s data for the pilot study and three rater’s data for the main study. A Human
Subjects Protocol application was not submitted to the Embry-Riddle Aeronautical
University (ERAU) Institutional Review Board (IRB) for study exemption since the
research used existing secondary data from deceased individuals. A determination was
made using the IRB Decision Tree #1 and Decision Tree #2 (Appendix A; Figure A1;
Figure A2). The pilot study has been utilized in research to determine statistical
significance and main study sample size (Thabane et al., 2010). Main study sample size
was calculated to be 85 cases (Appendix I; Figure I1). The main study sample size of 85
out of a total of 691 VFR-into-IMC cases was determined using the percentage of VFRinto-IMC accidents occurring in each of the NOAA defined climate regions (NOAA,
2018; Figure 1; Figure 2). Guidance by Connelly (2008) established the pilot study
sample should be at least 10% of the sample for the actual study. The pilot study sample
size was calculated to be 8.5 or 9 cases.
The raters were emailed the instructions, contextual factor definitions and
references, and Microsoft® AccessTM database collection form (Table D1; Appendix B,
Figure B1; Appendix F; Figure F1; Appendix J). Four raters then rated the nine VFRinto-IMC accidents one at a time. All raters were permitted to complete the ratings at a
time and place of their respective choosing. Each rater completed the Microsoft®
AccessTM database collection form within two weeks and returned his respective ratings
of the nine pilot study accidents via email to the researcher. Modifications were made to
the main study Microsoft® AccessTM database collection form from data received from
the four raters in the pilot study (Appendix B; Figure B1; Appendix C; Figure C1). The
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pilot study was assessed to ensure the contextual factors were consistently rated and any
discrepancies corrected. In some of the accidents, the raters were unsure of selecting a
particular contextual factor due to confusion with some of the definitions, such as with
Contextual Factor 23, Flight Plan Policy Violation, if filing IFR when required was part
of the definition. The raters were referred to the detailed definitions of the contextual
factors, including the sources of the definitions, and provided a copy of the definitions for
reference in rating the 46 research-identified contextual factors in the pilot and main
studies (Appendix D; Table D1).

Figure 1. NOAA defined climate regions (NOAA, 2018). Adapted from the NOAA
website (https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/monitoring-references/maps/us-climate-regions.php)
Design and Procedures. A Human Subjects Protocol Application was not
submitted to the ERAU IRB for approval as the researcher used existing secondary data
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from not living individuals. The ERAU IRB guidance provided in Decision Trees #1 and
#2 was used by the researcher to determine use of existing secondary data does not
constitute human subject research and does not require approval (Appendix A; Figure
A1; Figure A2). Guidance from the decision trees was to proceed with the research. The
raters were not required to complete an Informed Consent Form per guidance given to the
researcher directly from the ERAU IRB.
The four raters (pilot study) and three raters (main study) were provided the
instructions, contextual factor definitions and references, and Microsoft® AccessTM
database collection form (Table D1; Appendix B, Figure B1; Appendix C; Figure C1;
Appendix F; Figure F1; Figure F2; Appendix J). The Microsoft® AccessTM database
collection form provided the raters with hyperlinks to the NTSB AARs. Raters reviewed
the instructions, contextual factor definitions, and references. Individual GA VFR-intoIMC NTSB AARs were then reviewed by each rater one at a time. The 46 researchidentified contextual factors were then reviewed one at a time by each rater to examine
and determine if any of the contextual factors were present in the sample of NTSB AARs.
Raters identified the presence of each contextual factor by selecting the appropriate
option from the provided drop-down menu in the Microsoft® AccessTM database
collection form (Appendix B; Figure B1; Appendix C; Figure C1). Results for each
accident were saved in the respective rater’s Microsoft® AccessTM database collection
form for review by the researcher. Instructions in Appendix F were given to the three
raters for the pilot study and four raters for the main study (Appendix F; Figure F1;
Figure F2). The following instructions were also provided to each rater:
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1. Each rater will receive an email including study completion instructions from
the researcher, the GA VFR-into-IMC contextual factor definitions, the NTSB
AARs for the accident sample, and a Microsoft© AccessTM data collection form.
The rater will review the GA VFR-into-IMC contextual factor definitions and
then identify the presence of the contextual factors in the GA Part 91 VFR-intoIMC fatal accident sample and return the data collection form to the researcher
when completed.
2. The rater will not reproduce or share any of the items and will return them to
the researcher along with a completed rater Microsoft® AccessTM database
collection form.
3. The rater will identify the 46 literature-identified contextual factors
independently using the provided definitions without discussion with any other
person or reference to any other information.
4. The rater will not be expected to travel to any location but will require a
personal computer with word processing (.doc and .docx) and the ability to view
textual files.
5. The Main Study is provided in the attached Microsoft® AccessTM database
under the ‘Main’ table. Once you are in the program, click on the ‘Main’ table
from the list of tables located on the left of the screen. The ‘Main’ table has 9 GA
VFR-into-IMC fatal accidents selected from the NTSB Aviation Accident
Database (pilot study). The ‘Main’ table has 85 GA VFR-into-IMC fatal
accidents selected from the NTSB Aviation Accident Database (main study). The
respective NTSB AAR numbers are given as well as hyperlinks to the NTSB
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Aviation AARs that can be clicked when the pointing hand icon appears while
hovering over the respective links. Once clicked, the respective NTSB final
reports will open at this point for your review.
6. After reviewing the final reports and definition sheet for the 46 researchidentified contextual factors, please identify the applicable contextual factors
present for each of the 9 GA VFR-into-IMC accidents (pilot study)/85 GA VFRinto-IMC accidents (main study). This action can be accomplished by clicking
the down arrow on the right side of each cell for each of the 46 contextual factors
in moving from left to the right in the ‘Main’ table. If none of the drop-down list
of options applies to the particular contextual factor, then select the NA (Not
Applicable) option. If, in your opinion, there is not enough information provided
in the NTSB factual report to identify a specific contextual factor, select the ‘Not
enough information provided to identify the contextual factor’ in the drop-down
options (select this option if there is a narrative to review and after reviewing, you
feel there is not enough information to select a specific contextual factor). The
NTSB report may lack a narrative to decide. If this is the case, select the
‘Unknown’ option in the drop down list (select this option if there is no narrative
to review).
7. The hyperlink is provided for skyvector.com (https://skyvector.com/). This
publicly available website includes United States sectional charts for rater
determination of the accident site from the departure and destination points for
DDLCF14 and DDLCF15.
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8. Also, provide any comments in the rater comments cell related to how, in your
opinion, the contextual factors were manifested considering the presence of the
specific contextual factor(s) identified in the last cell of the Microsoft® AccessTM
‘Main’ table.
9. These instructions should be completed for each of the 9 accidents (pilot
study)/85 accidents (main study) one at a time.
Apparatus and materials. The researcher familiarized the raters with the 46
contextual factors identified in the reviewed research to correctly identify the presence of
the factors in the accident sample through review of contextual factor definitions and
reviewed literature sources (Table D1; Appendix J). Familiarization developed the
rater’s skill in recognizing the presence and manifestation of the contextual factors in GA
Part 91 VFR-into-IMC flight scenarios in NTSB AARs. Raters were provided the
instructions, contextual factor definitions and references, and Microsoft® AccessTM
database collection form including the sample of NTSB AARs to review (Table D1;
Appendix B, Figure B1; Appendix C; Figure C1; Appendix F; Figure F1; Figure F2;
Appendix J; Appendix K; Appendix L). An example of an NTSB GA VFR-into-IMC
AAR from the NTSB database website is depicted in Appendix E (Figure E1; Figure E2).
Population/Sample
The source of the data for the study was the NTSB AARs and factual reports.
These documents provided the information needed for the exploratory study of the 46
research-identified contextual factors contributing to GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC
accidents. NTSB AARs and factual reports between 1991 and 2014 were selected as
these reports were completed with NTSB investigator’s final probable cause
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determinations given. The identified timeframe was selected because the NTSB began
including investigator-determined probable causes in the AARs on January 1, 1991. This
timeframe stopped at December 31, 2014, because the researcher was informed by NTSB
personnel it takes five or more years to complete an accident investigation. The NTSB
AARs and factual accident reports were downloaded from the NTSB website (Appendix
E; Figure E2). These reports were then analyzed by the raters for the presence of the 46
research-identified contextual factors.
The sample set used for the main study was comprised of 85 GA Part 91 VFRinto-IMC accidents involving the 46 research-identified contextual factors reported by the
identified authors. This 85 accident sample set was representative of the GA Part 91
VFR-into-IMC accidents occurring in the United States, including Alaska, Guam,
Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands (Figure 1; Figure 2). A minimum sample
size of 85 was determined using stratified random sampling and taken from the
population of 691 NTSB GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC AARs and factual accident reports.
The sample set was retrieved using NTSB filter codes 401 and 24015 specifically for this
accident type from the NTSB database between January 1, 1991, and December 31, 2014
(Appendix E; Figure E1: Figure E2; NTSB, n.d.-d., p. 49). The sampling frame was all
691 NTSB GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC accidents for this period, and relevant
stratification was the specific GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC accident type. All 691 GA Part
91 VFR-into-IMC accidents in the NTSB database were retrieved and identified with
completed AARs and factual accident reports including final probable cause
determinations. A consecutive number was assigned to each of the GA Part 91 VFRinto-IMC accidents occurring in the specific NOAA defined climate region stratum
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(Figure 1). A proportionate stratification was calculated from the 691 accident cases.
Systematic random sampling was used to select accidents directly from the sample frame.
In order to ensure the number of accidents randomly selected for the sample from each
NOAA defined climate region stratum was proportionate to the number of accidents in
the population, the sample size was multiplied by the proportion of accidents occurring in
each stratum (Figure 2). Therefore, the number of accidents required in the sample was
calculated by multiplying the total number of GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC accidents
occurring in each NOAA defined climate region by the percentage of GA Part 91 VFRinto-IMC accidents occurring in each region (i.e., 34 Alaska GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC
accidents (AK total) x 0.049% GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC accidents (AK proportion) =
1.66 or 2 accidents). A total of two accidents was randomly selected from the 34 total
accidents occurring in Alaska. This process was followed to determine the sample set of
85 accidents randomly selected from each of the NOAA defined climate regions
(Appendix I; Table I1). This sampling frame and method ensured the generalizability of
the study as a United States representative sample of GA VFR-into-IMC accidents.
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Figure 2. NOAA defined climate regions including percentage of accidents (NOAA,
2018). Adapted from the NOAA website (https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/monitoringreferences/maps/us-climate-regions.php).
Sources of the Data
The research data source was taken from the January 1, 1991, to December 31,
2014, population of completed NTSB United States AARs attributed to VFR-into-IMC
pilot error where an investigator final probable cause ruling was established. The
identified timeframe was selected because the NTSB began including investigatordetermined probable causes in the AARs on January 1, 1991. This timeframe stopped at
December 31, 2014, because the researcher was informed by NTSB personnel it takes
five or more years to complete an accident investigation. Accidents occurring between
January 1, 2015, and the present may not yet be completed and may not yet include
NTSB investigator final probable cause determinations. Therefore, accidents occurring
during this timeframe were not selected for use in the study. The number of qualifying
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reports meeting the GA Part 91 pilot entry into VFR-into-IMC criteria for the specified
date range totaled 691. As this number of qualifying reports was abundant, the number
of NTSB AAR reports used in the study was methodically narrowed down by selecting
the 85 cases representative of all United States where the GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC
accident type occurred. NTSB AAR accident reports were used to explore exclusively
GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC accidents. Accident reports were downloaded from the
NTSB Aviation Accident Database and Synopses online archives of AARs (Appendix E;
Figure E1; Figure E2). These reports were analyzed by the raters to determine the
presence and manifestation of the 46 research-identified contextual factors. The sample
list creation involved the following seven steps:
1. The NTSB’s complete aviation accident dataset was downloaded onto a
computer as a Microsoft® AccessTM file from the NTSB website at
https://app.ntsb.gov/avdata/ (Appendix E; Figure E2). The file "avall.zip" (in the
Access folder) contained all records for NTSB aviation investigations from 1982
to present, updated on the first day of each month.
2. After the avall database was downloaded, unzipped, and opened in Microsoft®
AccessTM , the following tables were identified:
a. Events (one record per accident; contains accident date, fatalities,
weather conditions, etc.)
b. Aircraft (one record per accident aircraft; contains CFR part that aircraft
was operated under)
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c. Events_Sequence (one record per event in the accident sequence per
aircraft for accidents occurring in 2008 or later as the NTSB changed its
database structure and coding scheme during this timeframe)
3. A query was created in Microsoft® AccessTM joining these tables on the ev_id
and aircraft_key fields, which uniquely identified each accident and accident
aircraft, respectively.
4. The query was filtered for the following attributes:
a. Events.ev_type = ‘ACC’ (just accidents)
b. Aircraft.far_part (just Part 91 and Part 91K)
c. Events_Sequence.eventsoe_no = ‘401’ (The post-2008 accidents were
retrieved using the Events_Sequence, and filtered for the eventsoe_no =
‘401’ (the NTSB code for VFR encounter with IMC in the post-2008 new
coding schema)
5. The pre-2008 accidents were retrieved by repeating the above steps but using
the seq_of_events table instead of Events_Sequence, and filtered for
seq_of_events.subj_code = ‘24015’ (the NTSB code for VFR encounter with IMC
in the pre-2008 old coding schema).
6. The specific Part 91, GA accident reports were then reviewed by searching for
the desired report on the NTSB website (using the value in Events.ntsb_no) and
going directly to the report with a Universal Resource Locator (URL) in the
following format:
https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.ashx?EventID=20080521
X00707&AKey=1&RType=Final&IType=FA
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a. Replaced the value after “EventID=” with Events.ev_id
b. Replaced the value after “AKey=” with Aircraft.aircraft_key
c. Replaced the value after “IType=” with the 6th and 7th characters of
Events.ntsb_no
7. Any additionally available Part 91, GA VFR-into-IMC accident information
was obtained through the NTSB accident docket system containing electronic
copies of supporting materials for investigation reports such as photos, transcripts,
and specialist reports. The public accident docket was accessed through the
NTSB website at https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/ and was searched using the
Events.ntsb_no.
The data collected from the NTSB Aviation Accident Database and Synopses
online AARs conformed to the following seven criteria:
1. United States GA Part 91 accidents attributed to VFR-into-IMC pilot decision
error.
2. The accident involved the death of the pilot.
3. Accidents attributed to unknown causes were excluded from the study.
4. Only those Part 91 GA VFR-into-IMC accidents where the investigation was
completed and accident cause determined were included in the analysis.
5. The GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC accidents were sorted out of the entire list of
all accidents in the NTSB database using the following codes:
a. ev_date
i. January 1, 1991 to December 31, 2014
b. ev_type
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i. ACC
1. Accident
c. eventsoe_no
i. 401
1. VFR encounter with IMC from 2008 to 2014 in the new
post-2008 NTSB coding schema
d. subj_code
i. 24015
1. VFR encounter with IMC from 1991 to 2007 in the old
pre-2008 NTSB coding schema
e. ntsb_no
i. NTSB accident number assigned to each case
f. far_part
i. 091
1. Part 91, GA
g. ev_state
i. The specific state in the United States where the accident type
occurred
h. light_cond
i. DAYL
1. daylight
ii. DUSK
1. dusk
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iii. NDRK
1. dark night
iv. NBRT
1. bright night
v. DAWN
1. dawn
i. injury_level
i. FATL
1. fatal
6. The total number of GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC accidents retrieved from the
entire NTSB database was 691 cases.
7. The final 85 cases were determined by selecting from the NOAA climate
regions in defined United States geographic areas (Figure 1; Figure 2;
Appendix I: Figure I1). Cases were selected for identified lighting conditions
from the 691 GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC accident occurrences. A total of 52
United States and territories had these qualifying NTSB VFR-into-IMC
AARs, including Alaska, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
Data Collection Device
Several data collection devices were used to complete the study. These devices
included various forms the researcher and raters used to collect responses. The
researcher provided the raters with documentation explaining the 46 research-identified
contextual factor concepts. Raters became familiar with the 46 contextual factors
through instruction provided by the researcher before the data was coded and analyzed
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(Appendix J). The rater familiarization included review of the researcher-prepared list of
definitions for the 46 research-identified contextual factors taken directly from the
reviewed research articles (Appendix D; Table D1). Raters used the aforementioned
researcher-prepared list of definitions document for the 46 research-identified contextual
factors to aid in identifying the presence of the specific contextual factor(s) in the nine
NTSB AARs for the pilot study and 85 NTSB AARs for the main study (Appendix K;
Table K1; Appendix L; Table L1). The raters were evaluated by the researcher on their
individual understanding of identifying the presence of the 46 research-identified
contextual factors and manifestations of these factors during the pilot study (Appendix J).
A Microsoft® AccessTM database collection form was given to each of the raters
(Appendix B; Figure B1; Appendix C; Figure C1). The Microsoft® AccessTM database
form was used by the researcher to collect the raters’ identification of the presence of the
46 research-identified contextual factors and manifestation of the factors in the
representative sample of 9 NTSB AARs for the pilot study and 85 NTSB AARs for the
main study. Other factors related to the GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC accidents were also
evaluated by the researcher pertaining to the pilot and main study NTSB AARs including
pilot age and flight experience, as well as weather, flight conditions, time of day, and
certification level. The results were reported in tables.
At the conclusion of instruction and evaluation provided by the researcher, the
main study representative sample of 85 NTSB AARs was assigned to each of the three
raters so all three raters were able to independently analyze each accident (all three raters
reviewed and rated all 85 AARs). The three raters were given a Microsoft® AccessTM
database collection form to record the presence of the 46 research-identified contextual
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factors and manifestations of the factors in the representative sample of 85 NTSB AARs
(Appendix C; Figure C1). The researcher then entered the completed Microsoft®
AccessTM database collection form information from the raters into the International
Business Machines (IBM®) Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS™) software
for contextual factor analyses.
Instrument reliability. Instrument reliability is defined as the extent an
instrument consistently measures what it is supposed to measure. The Microsoft®
AccessTM database collection form was filled out based on the rater examination and
determination of the presence of the 46 research-identified contextual factors in the
representative sample of 85 NTSB AARs. The layout of the data collection form
contributed to the instrument reliability, as it guided each of the raters through the same
data input process each time. Reliability of the instrument for the study was determined
through a pilot study. The pilot study asked the raters to identify the presence of the 46
research-identified contextual factors and their opinion about how these factors were
manifested in the accident sample.
The pilot study established whether or not an acceptable inter-rater agreement
with percentage agreement and Fleiss’ kappa (κ) was achieved. A standard score (Zscore) for Fleiss's kappa was also calculated and converted into a P-value. This P value
indicated whether the agreement for the four raters was significantly better or not
significantly better than would be expected by chance. The Z-score and P-value were
reported (Table D2). The reliability of the data collection form for the main study was
tested in the pilot study and established a percentage agreement of 86% and statistically
significant (p ≤ .000) inter-rater reliability (k = 0.519; PABAK = 0.422). As the pilot
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study Fleiss’ kappa (κ) was in the moderate agreement range between 0.41 and 0.60 on
the Fleiss (1971) scale of agreement, modifications were made to the main study
Microsoft® AccessTM database collection form based on rater feedback from the pilot
study Microsoft® AccessTM database collection form (Appendix B; Figure B1; Appendix
C; Figure C1).
Instrument validity. Instrument validity is defined as the extent to which an
instrument measures what it is supposed to measure. Raters completed the Microsoft®
AccessTM database collection form by applying the researcher instruction and
demonstration to the main study representative sample of 85 Part 91, GA VFR-into-IMC
accidents retrieved from the archived accidents in the NTSB database (Appendix C;
Figure C1; Appendix L). The layout of the Microsoft® AccessTM database collection
form contributed to the instrument validity as it identified all of the 46 research-identified
contextual factors and the respective NTSB AAR numbers identifying the representative
sample of 85 Part 91, GA VFR-into-IMC accidents. This layout identified all
information needed by the researcher from the three raters. An identical Microsoft®
AccessTM database collection form was given to all three raters as each rater evaluated all
85 Part 91, GA VFR-into-IMC accidents in the representative sample. Consistency in
each of the three raters using the same Microsoft® AccessTM database collection form
increased the probability of collecting the correct data from each rater. This consistency
increased the validity of the data collection form. The pilot study was completed to
establish the Microsoft® AccessTM database collection form instrument validity.
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Treatment of the Data
The raters were selected using specific experience criteria. Each of the raters was
selected for their possession of the FAA CFI and ATP certificates. These ratings
indicated each rater’s possession of the requisite VFR-into-IMC knowledge and flight
experience needed to successfully complete the identification of the 46 researchidentified contextual factors and manifestations of these factors in the representative
sample of 85 NTSB AARs. The 46 contextual factors were derived from the established
research literature. The three raters identified the presence and manifestations of these
factors in a sample of 85 fatal Part 91 accidents for the main study.
The following instructions involving nine steps were given to the three raters for
the main study:
1. The rater will not reproduce or share the information contained in the e-mailed
rater package and will return all identified documentation, including the
completed data collection form, to this researcher via e-mail at
hartmaj7@my.erau.edu when completed.
2. The rater will complete the required actions for each NTSB AAR one at a
time until all 85 NTSB AARs have been assessed. The rater will not begin the
required actions for a new NTSB AAR until all actions are completed for the
currently assessed NTSB AAR.
3. The rater will first read, one at a time, the narrative provided in the NTSB
AAR, including the analysis, factual information, and probable cause and
findings.
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4. The rater will identify the presence of the 46 contextual factors taken from the
reviewed literature in the sample of 85 NTSB AARs after reviewing all
provided instructions and documentation and return to the researcher when
completed via e-mail at hartmaj7@my.erau.edu.
5. The rater should only rate whether or not the 46 research-identified contextual
factors are present in the currently assessed NTSB AAR.
6. The rater will identify the presence of the 46 research-identified contextual
factors in the currently assessed NTSB AAR by recording the identified
contextual factor(s) and manifestation(s) of these factors on the data collection
form (Appendix C; Figure C1).
7. The rater will identify the 46 research-identified contextual factors in the
representative sample of 85 NTSB AARs without discussion with anyone else
or reference to any additional information other than provided in the rater
package.
8. The rater will require a personal computer with word processing ability.
9. The rater will repeat steps one through nine for each of the representative
sample of 85 NTSB AARs.
The following is a chronological order of the five steps that were taken:
1. The researcher provided the raters instruction on definitions of the 46
research-identified contextual factors taken directly from the respective
reviewed research articles, examples of identification of the 46 researchidentified contextual factors in NTSB AARs not used in the main study, and

90
showed the raters an example of how to complete the Microsoft® AccessTM
database collection form based on the example NTSB AARs.
2. The researcher provided the raters a testing session using an NTSB AAR not
used in the main study. Each rater was required to demonstrate a minimum 80
percent proficiency in correctly identifying the applicable 46 researchidentified contextual factors in the provided NTSB AAR. A total of 46
questions were asked corresponding to the presence or absence of the 46
contextual factors. Therefore, a total of 40 correct responses out of a total of
50, or 80% accuracy, were required for each rater. In the event a rater did not
pass with the required accuracy, remediation and retesting sessions would
have been conducted between the rater and researcher until a passing score
had been achieved.
3. The three raters were first asked to read the narratives provided for each of the
85 NTSB AARs, including the analysis, factual information, and probable
cause and findings.
4. The three raters were then asked to identify the 46 research-identified
contextual factors and manifestations of the factors in each of the 85 NTSB
AARs.
a. The rater coding process included a complete review of the NTSB
AAR for significant text identifying GA pilot errors where one or
more of the 46 research-identified contextual factors applied. The
NTSB AARs were independently coded and cross-checked by the
researcher to ensure coding consistency between raters. This process
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involved confirming with each rater their provided responses were
accurate to ensure the data coding was correct.
b. The results for each accident were recorded on a Microsoft® AccessTM
database collection form (Appendix C; Figure C1).
5. The three raters determined which of the 46 research-identified contextual
factors, if any, were present in the representative sample of 85 NTSB AARs.
The researcher determined the contextual factor frequencies and the way these
factors manifested reported by the raters from the Microsoft® AccessTM
database collection form drop down menu selections and comments. The
researcher then entered the contextual factor data provided by the raters into
the IBM® SPSS™ program. The IBM® SPSS™ program was used to
generate the frequencies of the 46 research-identified contextual factors in the
sample of 85 AARs reported by the raters. The researcher then reported the
contextual factor presence, frequency, and rater reported manifestation of the
contextual factor in the sample of 85 AARs.
The data collected from the three raters was coded as part of the process of
converting the 46 research-identified contextual factors, pilot age, flight experience,
weather, flight conditions, time of day, and certification level qualitative information into
frequency of occurrence quantitative information that was analyzed by IBM® SPSS™.
Treatment of the data included descriptive statistics establishing the frequency of each of
the 46 research-identified contextual factors and contextual factors manifestations present
in the representative sample of 85 NTSB AARs. Frequency data, along with the rater
provided comments, was used by the researcher to determine how the 46 research-

92
identified contextual factors were manifested in the representative sample of 85 NTSB
AARs. Statistical analysis was performed using IBM® SPSS™ computer software. The
Microsoft® AccessTM database collection form containing the aforementioned qualitative
data for each of the raters was transferred to a Microsoft® ExcelTM spreadsheet. Raters’
data was imported into IBM® SPSS™ from the Microsoft® Excel™ spreadsheet. A rater
frequency table was generated in IBM® SPSS™ for the completed Microsoft® AccessTM
database collection form information submitted by each of the three raters for the
presence of contextual factors, pilot age, flight experience, weather, flight conditions,
time of day, and certification level in the representative sample of 85 NTSB AARs by
running the frequencies procedure (Analyze > Descriptive Statistics > Frequencies). The
IBM® SPSS™ frequencies were then reported in tables. The reported IBM® SPSS™
point biserial correlation, phi correlation, and multiple regression data utilizing dummy
variables was then used by the researcher to examine and determine any significant
relationships between the contextual factors and other factors in the representative sample
of NTSB AARs. Contextual factor manifestation results were then reported in tables.
The percentage agreement was manually calculated and reported. The Fleiss’ kappa (κ)
was computed with IBM® SPSS™. A computed Fleiss’ kappa (κ) statistic for the
agreement among the raters beyond what was expected by chance was reported. The Zscores and P-values were also reported to identify the agreement among the raters beyond
what was expected by chance. PABAK was calculated and reported to determine interrater reliability.
Descriptive statistics. The three raters determined which of the 46 researchidentified contextual factors were present in the 85 NTSB AAR main study representative
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sample. Frequencies of the 46 research-determined contextual factors, pilot age, flight
experience, weather, flight conditions, time of day, and certification level were
determined and reported using the aforementioned IBM® SPSS™ frequency table
procedure. The most prevalent research-identified contextual factors present in the
representative sample of 85 NTSB AARs were also calculated. Contextual factor
manifestations, determined by rater provided comments and contextual factor
frequencies, were then determined. Overall percentage agreement between raters was
calculated for pilot study and main study identification of the 46 research-determined
contextual factors. The results were reported in tables.
Reliability testing. Inter-rater reliability for the categorical variables of the
presence or absence of the 46 literature-identified, GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC contextual
factors was used to determine the consistency between the four raters (pilot study) and
three raters (main study) by using overall percentage agreement and then by Fleiss’ kappa
statistic to calculate agreement beyond chance expectation (Fleiss, 1971; Gwet, 2014;
Kiliç, 2015; Landis & Koch, 1977; Scott, 1955; Sim & Wright, 2005; Singendonk et al.,
2016). In order to determine if the magnitude of Fleiss’ kappa was influenced by
prevalence of the presence for the 46 research-identified contextual factors in the sample
of GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC accidents and bias for the degree the raters disagreed on
the proportion of accidents where the contextual factors were present or absent, the
PABAK was calculated (Byrt, Bishop, & Carlin, 1993; Sim & Wright, 2005).
Qualitative data. The Microsoft® AccessTM database collection form identified
the 46 research-identified contextual factors for each GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC
accident (Appendix B; Figure B1; Appendix C; Figure C1). A drop down menu was
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provided for each contextual factor including all possible choices for the raters to select.
The last column in the Microsoft® AccessTM database collection form allowed the raters
to provide their respective opinions of how contextual factors were manifested.
Quantitative data. Descriptive statistics were used to report pilot age, flight
experience, weather, flight conditions, time of day, and certification level for the
identified sample of NTSB AARs. Point biserial and phi correlations were calculated
using IBM® SPSS™ software to identify statistically significant relationships between
the contextual factors and pilot age, flight experience, weather, flight conditions, time of
day, and certification level (Field, 2009). A Point-biserial correlation coefficient was
used to examine the statistically significant relationships among the contextual factors,
pilot age, and flight experience. A phi correlation coefficient was used to examine the
statistically significant relationships among the contextual factors, certification level,
weather, flight conditions, and time of day. A determination was made as to which of the
contextual factors were associated with what effects for GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC
decision-making error. The multiple regression analyses using dummy variables
determined which of the 46 research-identified contextual factors (independent variables)
had any effect(s) on the crash distance from departure and crash distance to planned
destination (dependent variables) in the multiple regression analyses.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
The research data source was taken from the January 1, 1991, to December 31,
2014, population of completed NTSB United States AARs attributed to VFR-into-IMC
pilot error where an investigator final probable cause ruling was established. The number
of qualifying reports meeting the GA Part 91 pilot entry into VFR-into-IMC criteria for
the specified date range totaled 691. A proportionate stratification was calculated from
the 691 accident cases. Systematic random sampling was used to select accidents directly
from the sample frame. As this number of qualifying reports was abundant, the number
of NTSB AAR and probable cause reports was methodically narrowed down by selecting
the 85 cases representative of all United States where the GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC
accident type occurred. The selection of this representative sample ensured the
generalizability of the study results. The percentage of accidents selected by NOAA
defined climate region stratum and demographic information for the 85 selected cases are
given in Appendices I and N, respectively.
The qualitative and quantitative data from the pilot study (nine accident sample)
were put into a table to analyze the results. The table of pilot study qualitative and
quantitative data from the four raters was used to generate a table of frequency and
descriptive statistics. Modifications were made to the main study (85 accident sample)
Microsoft® Access™ database collection form from the results obtained from the pilot
study data. Qualitative and quantitative results obtained from the main study data
generated by the three raters were used to create frequency and descriptive statistics
tables for data analysis. Pilot and main study statistics and reliability testing were
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reviewed for agreement. The pilot and main study qualitative and quantitative data were
analyzed to identify the presence and frequencies of the research-identified contextual
factors in Part 91, GA pilot VFR-into-IMC accidents in the reviewed NTSB AARs. The
relationships between the 46 research-identified contextual factors and age, flight
experience, weather, flight conditions, time of day, and certification level as well as crash
distance from departure and crash distance from planned destination were also explored.
Pilot Study
The percentage agreement, Fleiss’ kappa (κ), and PABAK calculations were used
to determine rater agreement between the four raters in the pilot study beyond what was
expected by chance. This study used percentage agreement and Fleiss’ kappa to measure
inter-rater consistency, as the consensus in the reviewed research literature was a
recommendation to use a minimum of two measures due to the advantages and
disadvantages of the available measures. The percentage agreement is the simplest
measure of inter-rater reliability but does not consider the agreement expected by chance
alone and is strengthened by using measures indicating proportion of agreement beyond
chance including Fleiss’ kappa for multiple raters rating nominal data. Percentage
agreement of 86% was manually calculated. An overall Fleiss’ kappa (κ) for the pilot
study was calculated using IBM® SPSS™ software and showed there was moderate
agreement between the four raters, κ = 0.50 (95% CI, .46 to .54), p < .01 (Appendix D;
Table D2). The individual Fleiss’ kappa (κ) categories were also calculated using IBM®
SPSS™ software (Appendix D; Table D3). The PABAK was also manually calculated
(PABAK = 0.42). The calculated pilot study Fleiss’ kappa, κ = 0.50 was between 0.41
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and 0.60 for moderate agreement on the generally accepted standards of agreement for
kappa (κ) shown in Table 2 (Fleiss, 1971).
The feedback from the raters gave the researcher insight into the reasons for the
differences in identification of the presence of the contextual factors in the nine NTSB
GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC accidents selected for the pilot study. In some of the cases,
there was minimal data provided in the NTSB AARs for the raters to make an informed
decision as to the presence or absence of the 46 research-identified contextual factors. It
was noted by the raters a more in-depth analysis reported by the NTSB investigators in
the AARs would have likely revealed more contextual factors. The feedback from the
raters obtained from the pilot study was used to modify the methodology including the
main study Microsoft® Access™ database collection form.
The following modifications were made based on the pilot study feedback: (a)
include a general definition of contextual factors at the beginning of the main study
instructions; (b) add pilot study sample size selection information and reference into the
dissertation methodology section; (c) add an "Unknown" option in the main study; (d)
change meters to feet for the Contextual Factor 25: ‘Height of crash site’ category; (e)
include installed weather equipment verbiage for Contextual Factor 45: ‘Use of incockpit weather information’ in the main study; (f) re-word last question to make it
clearer the researcher is asking the raters to provide their opinions about how the
identified contextual factors were manifested in each accident; (g) change times to 24hour, and ‘seal’ level should be corrected in drop downs for altitude/elevation; (h) amend
the CF23 to include verbiage to “file IFR to the maximum extent possible”; (i) change the
altitudes to include all possible values and put in numerical order; (j) add an option in the
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drop down menu to include “not enough information provided to make a determination
regarding contextual factor”; (k) include the hyperlink to skyvector.com (a publicly
available website) for United States sectional charts so the raters can determine the
accident site using the departure and destination points, as well as the latitude and
longitude coordinates for the crash site location provided in the NTSB AARs in the main
study instructions to raters document: https://skyvector.com/; (l) include only the final
report for the main study to reduce the workload on the raters; (m) add an option in the
drop down menu to include “Not Applicable, N.A.”.
The reliability of the data collection form for the main study was tested in the
pilot study and established a percentage agreement of 86% and statistically significant (p
≤ .000) inter-rater reliability (k = 0.50; PABAK = 0.42) as shown in Appendix D (Table
D2; Table D3). As the pilot study Fleiss’ kappa (κ) was in the moderate agreement range
between 0.41 and 0.60 on the Fleiss (1971) scale of agreement, modifications were made
to the main study Microsoft® AccessTM database collection form based on the described
rater feedback from the pilot study Microsoft® AccessTM database collection form
(Appendix B; Figure B1; Appendix C; Figure C1). This process validated the Microsoft
AccessTM database collection form using the established guidance (Cohen, 1960; Fleiss,
1971; Gwet, 2014). The following results were from the data collected from the three
raters for the main study.
Descriptive Statistics
The three raters determined the presence of specific contextual factors out of the
46 research-identified factors in the main accident sample of 85 NTSB AARs from fatal
GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC accidents (Appendix H; Table H1). Rater’s identification of
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the presence of the contextual factors in the 85 GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC cases used in
the main study were assessed for specific factors, frequencies of occurrence, and
manifestations. Tables were developed to show the main study descriptive and frequency
statistics (Table 3; Table 4; Table 5). Tables were also developed to show the specific
contextual factors and frequencies (Appendix H; Table H1). The tables show the specific
contextual factors and frequencies present in the 85 accidents used in the main study as
identified by the three raters. The manifestations were reported separately in the analysis.
The relationships between the 46 research-identified contextual factors and age, flight
experience, weather, flight conditions, time of day, and certification level were explored.
The main study descriptive statistics were given in Table 3 and obtained from the
SPSSTM analysis. Accident pilot ages ranged from 17 to 82 (M = 52.20, SD = 13.35).
The pilot flight experience (total flight hours) ranged from 35 to 15,000 hours (M =
2,191.34, SD = 3,208.93). Number of passengers on board ranged from 0 to 5 (M = 1.01,
SD = 1.06). Time of day when the accidents occurred ranged from 0100 to 2300 hours
(M = 14.05, SD = 6.17).

Table 3
Accident Descriptive Statistics
Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Pilot Age

17

82

52.20

13.35

Pilot Flight Experience

35

15,000

2,191.34

3,208.93

Passengers

0

5

1.01

1.06

Time of Day (24 Hour)

1

23

14.05

6.17

Variable
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Main study frequency statistics were provided in Table 4 and obtained from the
SPSSTM analysis. Highest to lowest frequencies were identified. Flight conditions and
inclement weather were identified with the highest frequencies of 97.6% occurrences in
the main study. Non-instrument rated pilots had the second highest frequency of 62.4%
occurrence in the 85 accident sample. Time of Day (Night) had the third highest
frequency at 56.5% occurrence. The Time of Day Light Condition (Day) had the fourth
highest frequency at 43.6% occurrence. Time of Day (Day) had the fifth highest
frequency at 43.5% occurrence. The Time of Day Light Condition (Night) had the sixth
highest frequency at 39.9% occurrence. Instrument-rated pilots had the seventh highest
frequency at 37.6% occurrence. Time of Day Light Condition (Dusk) had the eighth
highest frequency at 7.1% occurrence. Time of Day Light Condition (Dark) and (Dawn)
had the nineth highest frequencies at 4.7% occurrence. Flight Conditions (VMC) and
Weather (Non-Inclement) had the lowest frequencies at 2.4% occurrence.
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Table 4
Accident Frequency Statistics
Variable

Percent

Flight Conditions (IMC)

97.6

Weather (Inclement)

97.6

Non-Instrument Rated Pilot

62.4

Time of Day (Night)

56.5

Time of Day (Light Condition) - Day

43.6

Time of Day (Day)

43.5

Time of Day (Light Condition) - Night

39.9

Instrument Rated Pilot

37.6

Time of Day (Light Condition) - Dusk

7.1

Time of Day (Light Condition) - Dark

4.7

Time of Day (Light Condition) - Dawn

4.7

Flight Conditions (VMC)

2.4

Weather (Non-Inclement)

2.4

Main study GA pilot crash distance descriptive statistics were provided in Table 5 and
obtained from the SPSSTM analysis. Crash distance from departure to the midpoint of the
planned route as a percentage of planned course completion, 0% to 50%, identified from
the provided latitude and longitude of the crash site in the NTSB AARs ranged from 0%
to 49% (M = 7.51, SD = 14.47). The crash distance from the midpoint to the planned
destination of the planned route as a percentage of planned course completion, 51% to

102
100%, identified from the provided latitude and longitude of the crash site in the NTSB
AARs, ranged from 51% to 99% (M = 82.53, SD = 15.46).

Table 5
Crash Distance Descriptive Statistics (Main Study)
Variable

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Crash Distance from
Departure (0% to
50%)

0

49

7.51

14.47

Crash Distance to
Destination (51% to
100%)

51

99

82.53

15.46

Reliability Testing
The percentage agreement, Fleiss’ kappa (κ), and PABAK calculations were used
to determine rater agreement between the three raters in the main study beyond what was
expected by chance. The percentage agreement of 57% was manually calculated.
Overall Fleiss’ kappa (κ) for the main study was calculated using IBM® SPSS™ software
and showed there was fair agreement between raters, κ = 0.25 (95% CI, .24 to .25), p <
.01 (Appendix D; Table D4). The individual Fleiss’ kappa (κ) categories were calculated
using IBM® SPSS™ software (Appendix D; Table D5). The PABAK was also manually
calculated (PABAK = 0.50). The calculated main study overall Fleiss’ kappa, κ = 0.25,
was between 0.21 and 0.40 for fair agreement on the generally accepted standards of
agreement for kappa (κ) shown in Table 2 (Fleiss, 1971). The fair agreement between the
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three raters for the overall main study Fleiss’ kappa was a lower score on the scale of
generally accepted standards of agreement. The overall Fleiss’ kappa (κ) agreement was
calculated for all ratings and six possible responses available for the 46 researchidentified contextual factor questions answered by each rater for the 85 accident sample
dataset. Although the overall Fleiss’ kappa (κ) score was in the fair range of agreement κ
= 0.25, the individual Fleiss’ kappa (κ) score for the 1 response, indicating rater
agreement for the presence of the contextual factor, was calculated to be κ = 0.51 and in
the moderate range of agreement (Table 2). The individual Fleiss’ kappa (κ) score for the
0 response, indicating rater agreement for the absence of the contextual factor, was
calculated to be κ = 0.38 and was on the high end of the fair range of agreement (Table
2). The overall Fleiss’ kappa (κ) score in the fair range of agreement κ = 0.25 was due to
such reasons as inconsistency among the three raters in selecting the same response for
the reason the contextual factor was not present, as there were several responses available
to the raters for selection (i.e., Not Applicable, NA, Not enough information provided to
identify the contextual factor, unknown, or providing no rating (blank) response). The
response of ‘Not enough information provided to identify the contextual factor’ was
inconsistently but repeatedly used by the three raters as a reason for being unable to
identify the presence of the contextual factors in the accident sample dataset (Appendix
D; Table D5). It is possible if the AARs and probable cause reports had contained more
detailed information, a higher number of contextual factors could have been identified by
the raters resulting in a higher overall Fleiss’ kappa (κ) score.
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Qualitative Data
The 46 research-identified contextual factors present in the main study sample of
85 accidents, as identified by the three raters, was sorted to identify the specific
contextual factors and associated frequencies, from the results obtained from SPSSTM
(Appendix H; Table H1). Three raters identified a total of 37 out of 46 researchidentified contextual factors in the 85 accident sample used in the main study. The
presence of the specific contextual factors identified by the raters is as follows:
1. Passengers on board (CF29) - 53 out of 85 accidents
2. Accident time of day (Day) (CF1) - 51 out of 85 accidents
3. Crash distance from planned destination (CF15) - 46 out of 85 accidents
4. Not filing a flight plan (CF21) - 42 out of 85 accidents
5. Underestimating risk (CF43) - 42 out of 85 accidents
6. IFR flight without clearance or ratings (CF26) - 41 out of 85 accidents
7. Crash distance from departure (CF14) - 39 out of 85 accidents
8. Situation assessment (CF39) - 35 out of 85 accidents
9. Accident time of day (Night) (CF1) - 34 out of 85 accidents
10. Crash distance from planned destination (CF15) - 29 out of 85 accidents
11. Goal conflicts (CF24) - 27 out of 85 accidents
12. Pilot briefer communication (CF33) - 25 out of 85 accidents
13. Medical status policy violation (CF28) - 23 out of 85 accidents
14. Receipt of weather briefing (CF36) - 22 out of 85 accidents
15. Mountainous terrain (CF42) - 22 out of 85 accidents
16. Adverse weather encountered late in the flight (CF3) - 22 out of 85 accidents
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17. Plan continuation error (CF34) - 21 out of 85 accidents
18. Adverse weather encountered early in the flight (CF2) - 20 out of 85 accidents
19. Communication with air traffic control (CF12) - 18 out of 85 accidents
20. Time/distance flown into IMC before the accident occurred - less than or
equal to half the time and distance required to reach the destination before the
accident occurred (CF6) - 17 out of 85 accidents
21. Height of crash site (0 to 999 feet mean sea level) (CF25) - 16 out of 85
accidents
22. Currency policy violation (CF16) - 15 out of 85 accidents
23. Decision to continue VFR-into-IMC to the planned destination (CF17) - 15
out of 85 accidents
24. Pilot briefer communication (not present) (CF33) - 14 out of 85 accidents
25. Scud running (CF37) – 13 out of 85 accidents
26. Filing a flight plan (CF21) - 12 out of 85 accidents
27. Ratings policy violation (CF35) - 12 out of 85 accidents
28. Self reported weather cues (CF38) - 12 out of 85 accidents
29. Source of weather information (good source) (CF41) - 12 out of 85 accidents
30. Adverse weather encountered early in the flight (CF2) - 11 out of 85 accidents
31. Communication with air traffic control (CF12) – 11 out of 85 accidents
32. Number of passengers on board (2) (CF29) – 9 out of 85 accidents
33. Receipt of weather briefing (CF36) – 9 out of 85 accidents
34. Medical status policy violation (CF28) – 7 out of 85 accidents
35. Ratings policy violation (CF35) – 7 out of 85 accidents
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36. Ambiguity (CF5) – 6 out of 85 accidents
37. Time/distance flown into IMC before the accident occurred - greater than half
the time and distance required to reach the destination before the accident
occurred (CF6) – 6 out of 85 accidents
38. Flight into known icing conditions (CF22) – 5 out of 85 accidents
39. Decision to divert from VFR-into-IMC to an alternate destination (CF18) – 4
out of 85 accidents
40. Height of crash site 2,000 to 2,999 feet mean sea level (CF25) – 4 out of 85
accidents
41. Terrain (Hill) (CF42) – 4 out of 85 accidents
42. Unrecoverable low altitude (CF44) – 4 out of 85 accidents
43. Cruising altitude 0 to 999 feet mean sea level (CF4) – 3 out of 85 accidents
44. Cruising altitude 10,000 to 10,999 mean sea level (CF25) – 3 out of 85
accidents
45. Height of crash site 3,000 to 3,999 mean sea level (CF25) – 3 out of 85
accidents
46. Height of crash site 4,000 to 4,999 feet mean sea level (CF25) – 3 out of 85
accidents
47. Height of crash site 5,000 to 5,999 feet mean sea level (CF25) – 3 out of 85
accidents
48. Height of crash site 6,000 to 6,999 feet mean sea level (CF25) – 3 out of 85
accidents
49. Passengers on board (3) (CF29) – 3 out of 85 accidents
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50. Permission seeking behaviors (CF32) - 3 out of 85 accidents
51. Social (CF40) - 3 out of 85 accidents
52. Cruising altitude 13,000 to 13,999 feet mean sea level (CF4) – 2 out of 85
accidents
53. Cruising altitude 6,000 to 6,999 feet mean sea level (CF4) – 2 out of 85
accidents
54. Cruising altitude 7,000 to 7,999 feet mean sea level (CF4) – 2 out of 85
accidents
55. Height of crash site 1,000 to 1,999 feet mean sea level (CF25) – 2 out of 85
accidents
56. Height of crash site 8,000 to 8,999 feet mean sea level (CF25) – 2 out of 85
accidents
57. Passengers on board (5) (CF29) – 2 out of 85 accidents
58. Organization (CF31) – 2 out of 85 accidents
59. Terrain (Ocean) (CF42) – 2 out of 85 accidents
60. Cruising altitude 11,000 to 11,999 feet mean sea level (CF4) – 1 out of 85
accidents
61. Cruising altitude 12,000 to 12,999 feet mean sea level (CF4) – 1 out of 85
accidents
62. Cruising altitude 14,000 to 14,999 feet mean sea level (CF4) – 1 out of 85
accidents
63. Cruising altitude 2,000 to 2,999 feet mean sea level (CF4) – 1 out of 85
accidents

108
64. Cruising altitude 4,000 to 4,999 feet mean sea level (CF4) – 1 out of 85
accidents
65. Cruising altitude 5,000 to 5,999 feet mean sea level (CF4) – 1 out of 85
accidents
66. Cruising altitude 9,000 to 9,999 feet mean sea level (CF4) – 1 out of 85
accidents
67. Amount of time/distance the GA pilot flew into the IMC weather before
diverting (CF7) – 1 out of 85 accidents
68. Time/distance into IMC before diverting to an alternate - flight time and
distance in IMC were less than or equal to half the time and distance to reach
the destination before diverting (CF7) – 1 out of 85 accidents
69. Circular decision making (CF10) – 1 out of 85 accidents
70. Consequences not anticipated (CF13) – 1 out of 85 accidents
71. Height of crash site 10,000 to 10,999 feet mean sea level (CF25) – 1 out of 85
accidents
72. Height of crash site 7,000 to 7,999 feet mean sea level (CF25) – 1 out of 85
accidents
73. Obtaining an online preflight weather briefing (CF30) – 1 out of 85 accidents
74. Self reported weather cues (CF38) – 1 out of 85 accidents
75. Terrain (Forest) (CF42) – 1 out of 85 accidents
76. Unrecoverable low altitude (CF44) – 1 out of 85 accidents
The three raters provided their respective opinions about how the 46 researchidentified contextual factors were manifested in the 85 accident sample. Comments
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provided by the raters for each accident were reviewed for their opinions on how the 46
contextual factors were manifested. Rater contextual factor manifestation results for the
main study are as follows:
Accident time of day (CF1). Three raters identified the time of day when the 85
accidents occurred. There were a total of 70 accidents occurring during the day, and 15
accidents took place at night. The particular lighting conditions varied and included six
accidents taking place at dusk, 37 during daylight conditions, 33 during night light
conditions, five during dark light conditions, and four during dawn light conditions. Two
accidents occurred at 0000, one at 0100, two at 0400, five at 0500, three at 0600, four at
0700, three at 0800, four at 0900, five at 1000, four at 1100, five at 1200, one at 1300,
five at 1400, two at 1500, three at 1600, four at 1700, seven at 1800, ten at 1900, five at
2000, four at 2100, three at 2200, and three at 2300.
Adverse weather encountered early in flight (CF2). In a particular accident,
the rater commented adverse weather existed, possibly the whole way. In another
accident, the pilot filed IFR, then near the destination cancelled IFR and flew VFR-intoIMC back to the point of origin. A rater commented for a particular accident adverse
weather was encountered before and after the mid flight point since the pilot was IMC
from the departure point to the crash site which was a distance almost as great as that of
the destination.
Adverse weather encountered late in flight (CF3). A rater commented for a
particular accident adverse weather existed, possibly the whole way. In another accident
the rater commented the pilot filed IFR, then near the destination, cancelled IFR and flew
VFR into IMC back to point of origin. A rater commented for a particular accident
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adverse weather was encountered before and after the mid flight point since the pilot was
IMC from the departure point to the crash site which was a distance almost as great as
that of the destination.
Altitude (CF4). The cruising altitudes of the aircraft in the 85 accident sample
included the following: (1) 0 - 999 feet mean sea level, (2) 1,300 - 1,399 feet mean sea
level, (3) 5,000 - 5,999 feet mean sea level, (4) 6,000 - 6,999 feet mean sea level, (5)
7,000 - 7,999 feet mean sea level, (6) 9,000 - 9,999 feet mean sea level, (7) 10,000 10,999 feet mean sea level, (8) 11,000 - 11,999 feet mean sea level, (9) 12,000 - 12,999
feet mean sea level, and (10) 13,000 - 13,999 feet mean sea level.
Ambiguity (CF5). A rater commented for a particular accident ambiguity
deterioration was gradual since the open VFR channel, as perceived by the pilot, may
have been misleading. In a particular accident, the rater commented the radio call
indicated cues were clear to the pilot. A rater commented for one of the accidents a
discussion of cloud cycle with another pilot was not considered relevant by the pilot. A
rater commented for one of the accidents cues were clear to the pilot as explained by the
surviving rear seat passenger. In another accident, the rater commented a pilot stated the
pilot-in-command descended to maintain contact with the ground. A rater commented
for a particular accident ambiguity determination was based on the pilot reports to air
traffic control. In another accident, the rater commented the cues were clear to the pilot,
as the pilot-in-command advised air traffic control prior to frequency change the field
was not in sight and he may need to call them again. A rater commented for one of the
accidents the pilot could have seen cues and was trying to descend or did not see cues and
thought he had enough holes to descend.
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Amount time/distance GA pilot flew into IMC before accident occurred
(CF6). A rater commented the plane was not in IMC conditions a long time. In another
accident, the rater commented there was no way of knowing if the pilot was diverting to
an alternate or just trying to get below clouds to continue the flight.
Amount time/distance GA pilot flew into IMC before diverting (CF7). A
rater commented for a particular accident the plane was not in IMC conditions a long
time. Another rater commented there was no way of knowing if the pilot was diverting to
an alternate or just trying to get below clouds to continue the flight.
Attentional tunneling (CF8). One rater commented attentional tunneling was
unknown. The rater made an additional comment a handheld global positioning system
(GPS) was onboard but its use was unknown, and there was not enough information
provided in the report. In another accident, one of the raters commented there was a
moving map onboard; however, there was no information provided in the report on how
it was used. One of the raters commented for a particular accident there was not enough
information provided in the report, although the pilot had a handheld Garmin GPSMAP
196 onboard. Another rater commented for another accident a handheld GPS was found,
but there was no way to know if the pilot became overly absorbed in its use.
Ceiling and visibility determination (CF9). A rater commented for a particular
report the pilot overestimated the ceiling most likely due to rapid changes in ceiling and
conditions of darkness. Another rater commented for a particular accident the pilot radio
call at 1931 for weather at Lafayette to transition perhaps caused an overestimation for
the destination ceiling and visibility. In another accident, the rater commented the pilot
thought he could stay above and get below clouds. A rater commented for another
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accident the pilot overestimated ceiling; otherwise he would not have cruised at 7,500
becoming stuck on top. One rater commented for another accident the pilot may have
flown VMC above a fog layer. In another accident, the rater commented the pilot
overestimated clouds. One of the raters commented for a particular accident the pilot
misinterpretation of ceiling and visibility led to getting caught above the clouds (ruling
out intentional self-harm). A rater commented for one of the accidents the pilot thought
he could get on top of clouds.
Circular decision-making (CF10). A rater commented for a particular accident
no circular decision making was apparent, since no changes were made (no divert
decision). In another accident, the rater commented circular decision making was
apparent when the pilot changed the flight path to try and exit IMC. In another accident,
the rater commented, although better decisions could have been made, the pilot used new
information from the controller to update his plan, based on the level of risk he was
willing to accept.
Cognitive anchoring (CF11). A rater commented cognitive anchoring was
present due to the VFR channel and may have been misleading. In another accident, the
rater commented there was not enough information to make a definite decision but since
the weather was fine at the departure point, it is likely the pilot "anchored" this
information and applied it to the destination. A rater commented for a particular
accident, even though the weather was not formally checked, the pilot was likely aware
of clear sky conditions and was misled with a rapidly changing ceiling in darkness. In
another accident, a rater commented cognitive anchoring was attributable to the 1931
radio call. A rater commented for a particular accident since the earlier legs were trouble
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free, even with new information, the pilot thought it would hold. Another rater
commented for one of the accidents cognitive anchoring was apparent since fog was
moving into the area but had not yet arrived. In another accident, the rater commented
there was no cognitive anchoring because the pilot was trying to pull information out of
the second briefer to update his information. A rater commented for a particular accident
cognitive anchoring was apparent as the pilot relied heavily on briefer information,
suggesting VFR. In another accident, the rater commented cognitive anchoring was
apparent when the pilot likely used his earlier experience on the inbound flight as a
picture of the weather on the return, not checking weather for the return flight. A rater
commented for another accident cognitive anchoring was apparent because the briefer
said things would get better by 1000 and then he stated if the pilot waited until 1000 to
depart then he could avoid the fog. A rater commented for another accident cognitive
anchoring was apparent after addressing the radio failure, the pilot did not change his
plan. In another accident the rater commented cognitive anchoring was apparent because
the pilot left the departure point with marginal VFR. In another accident, the rater
commented cognitive anchoring was possible due to the pilot latching on to the
destination Terminal Aerodrome Forecast (TAF) and not giving as much consideration to
the Airmen’s Meteorological Information (AIRMET). A rater commented for a
particular accident cognitive anchoring was apparent as the pilot was probably
comfortable with the normal VMC of the area and used it to proceed; however, it is
unclear why he navigated to Gorman (GMN) Very High Frequency Omni-Directional
Range (VOR) which is near high terrain. In another accident, the rater commented
cognitive anchoring was apparent due to predominantly VMC and the multiple crossings
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through the pass several times that day. A rater commented for another accident
cognitive anchoring was apparent because the pilot, prior to the flight, indicated he would
fly through the pass via route 95, and the plan was followed precisely until the crash.
The rater made an additional comment the pilot likely had a belief this would avoid IMC.
Another rater commented cognitive anchoring was apparent because the initial weather
briefing, 11 hours prior, was acceptable for VFR flight. The rater made an additional
comment the pilot never received an updated briefing, and it is likely the pilot maintained
VFR flight to the destination was possible. A rater commented for a particular accident
cognitive anchoring was apparent because the briefer and pilot concluded if he could get
to the destination in about 45-50 minutes, the pilot could avoid the weather with the
briefer, adding if he did need to get back to VFR he could head south. In another
accident, the rater commented cognitive anchoring was apparent by continuing the flight
and descending rather than turning around and finding an alternate. A rater commented
for a particular accident cognitive anchoring was apparent as the pilot was told by another
pilot at the destination he could see the stars and the runway lights. The rater made an
additional comment, it appeared this convinced the pilot to make the flight rather than
cancel or wait. In another accident, the rater commented the pilot imposed self-induced
pressures to make flight. A rater commented for a particular accident cognitive
anchoring was apparent due to nice weather on departure. In another accident, the rater
commented cognitive anchoring was apparent as the weather at the departure point was
acceptable; however, the pilot's wife called him to let him know she was encountering
heavy fog, but he continued to the destination with no regard to the updated weather
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information. In another accident, the rater commented cognitive anchoring was apparent
as the pilot must have been convinced the weather would improve at the destination.
Communication with air traffic control (CF12). A rater commented for a
particular accident the pilot communicated with the automated flight service station
(AFSS) but not air traffic control. A rater commented for one of the accidents the pilot
communicated with air traffic control before the accident but then lost communication,
although some communication relay was conducted. In another accident, the rater
commented the pilot communicated with air traffic control, but the communication was
very brief, and he did not respond to the assigned squawk and frequency change for
transit through Memphis Class B airspace. In another accident, the rater commented the
pilot was not in communication with Air Traffic Control (ATC). A rater commented for
a particular accident the pilot was told services were terminated about nine minutes prior
to the accident. In another accident, the rater commented the pilot was in communication
with ATC prior to the accident but made the frequency change off of air traffic control
before the actual accident.
Consequences not anticipated (CF13). A rater made a comment for one of the
accidents the pilot was under stress because the left fuel cap was left off. In another
accident, the rater commented the pilot was under stress and may or may not have
considered IMC consequences. A rater commented for one of the accidents the pilot was
under stress due to previous cancellations. A rater commented for one of the accidents
the pilot was under stress due to a spinal condition and treatment. In another accident,
the rater commented the pilot was under stress due to medications. A rater commented
for another accident the underlying condition requiring the antihistamine likely stressed
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the pilot. In another accident, the rater commented the pilot was under stress due to the
antihistamines in his system. A rater commented in one of the accidents the pilot was
under stress due to his business work schedule. In another accident, the pilot was under
stress due to a medical condition related to back pain. In another accident, the rater
commented the pilot was under stress as he had a passenger onboard, and the purpose of
the flight was to make an appointment, specifically soaring instruction. In another
accident, the rater commented the pilot was under stress due to a medical condition. A
rater commented for one of the accidents the pilot was under stress due to the weather
environment. Another rater commented for a particular accident the pilot was under
stress due to the long flight activity.
Crash distance from departure (CF14). The aircraft crash distances occurring
between 0% and 50% of the planned route distance from the departure were calculated by
the researcher based on the latitude and longitude coordinates provided by the NTSB
investigators completing the AARs. The crash distances from the departure location to
the midpoint as a percentage of the planned route of flight course completion included the
following: (1) 0% (12 accidents), (2) 1% (3 accidents), (3) 2% (2 accidents), (4) 3% (1
accident), (5) 10% (2 accidents), (6) 11% (1 accident), (7) 13% (1 accident), (8) 18% (1
accident), (9) 19% (1 accident), (10) 20% (1 accident), (11) 23% (1 accident), (12) 24%
(1 accident), (13) 25% (1 accident), (14) 29% (1 accident), (15) 33% (1 accident), (16)
35% (1 accident), (17) 41% (3 accidents), (18) 45% (1 accident), (19) 46% (1 accident),
(20) 47% (1 accident), (21) 48% (1 accident), and (22) 49% (2 accidents).
Crash distance from planned destination (CF15). The aircraft crash distances
occurring between 51% and 100% of the planned route distance from the planned
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destination were calculated by the researcher based on the latitude and longitude
coordinates provided by the NTSB investigators completing the AARs. The crash
distances from the midpoint to the planned destination as a percentage of the planned
route of flight course completion included the following: (1) 51% (12 accidents), (2) 56%
(1 accident), (3) 59% (1 accident), (4) 60% (1 accident), (5) 62% (1 accident), (6) 66% (1
accident), (7) 69% (1 accident), (8) 70% (2 accidents), (9) 71% (1 accident), (10) 73% (1
accident), (11) 74% (2 accidents), (12) 77% (3 accidents), (13) 84% (1 accident), (14)
86% (1 accident), (15) 89% (1 accident), (16) 90% (1 accident), (17) 94% (1 accident),
(18) 95% (1 accident), (19) 96% (1 accident), (20) 97% (1 accident), (21) 98% (1
accident), and (22) 99% (9 accidents).
Currency policy violation (CF16). One of the raters commented the pilot's
passenger carrying currency was exceeded. In another accident, the rater commented
there was not enough information on night landing currency with passengers to determine
if CF16 was present. A rater commented for a particular accident the pilot’s biennial
flight review was expired. In another accident, the rater commented currency was
assumed ok for night landings with passenger by assuming the reported night hours in the
last 90 days included the three night takeoffs and landings. In another accident, the rater
commented the currency policy was ok as 31 hours was obtained in the last 90 days and
allowed for the three takeoffs and landings needed for passenger carry. A rater
commented for a particular accident the student pilot took a passenger on the flight and
was prohibited. One of the raters commented for a particular accident there was a
currency policy violation because the last pilot logbook entry was greater than six months
prior and would preclude 90 takeoffs and landings currency for passenger carrying. One
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of the raters commented for a particular accident the pilot was current due to pilot recent
time, night passenger carrying currency was assumed, and the recent biennial flight
review (BFR) was valid.
Decision to continue VFR-into-IMC to the planned destination (CF17). A
rater commented for a particular accident the pilot overflew the destination field saying
he saw lights, but the observation was not visual on the field. In another accident, the
rater commented the pilot decided to continue VFR-into-IMC to the planned destination
possibly due to communication with the controller. A rater made the comment for
another accident the pilot decided to continue into IMC since the briefer said VFR was
not recommended in the obscuration areas, but the pilot went anyway. In another
accident, the rater commented the pilot decided not to divert based on descent and course.
Decision to divert from VFR-into-IMC to an alternate destination (CF18). A
rater made the comment for a particular accident the pilot did not continue VFR-intoIMC because the report concluded the pilot turned to exit IMC. In another accident, the
rater commented the pilot did not continue to the planned destination but tried to return to
the point of origin. A rater made the comment for another accident, the pilot turned to
the North and could have been disorientation or tried to divert to an alternate location. In
another accident, the rater commented the pilot may have decided to divert based on the
pilot statement to his wife and may have attempted to divert to the point of origin. In
another accident, the rater commented the pilot decided to divert from IMC because the
report concluded the pilot turned to exit IMC.
Delay in obtaining the current weather conditions (CF19). A rater made the
comment for a particular accident, the pilot delayed obtaining the current weather
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conditions. In another accident, the rater commented the pilot did not get any weather
information.
Descent below weather minimums (CF20). A rater commented for a particular
accident, the pilot descended below weather minimums and encountered rising terrain. In
another accident, the rater commented the pilot descended below VFR weather
minimums, and likely IFR weather minimums, in an attempt to land at the desired airport.
Filing of a flight plan (CF21). One of the raters made the comment for a
particular accident, the pilot did not file a flight plan. In another accident, the rater
commented the flight plan was input via computer but did not go through due to
incomplete information input by the pilot. A rater made the comment for another
accident, the pilot filed IFR, through a malformed request to air traffic control, but was
not rated to do so. In another accident, the rater commented the pilot filed a flight plan,
although the NTSB investigator completing the report incorrectly and indicated no on the
form. In another accident, the rater commented it was possible an instrument rated pilot
opted to not file IFR. A rater commented for a particular accident, the pilot filed IFR,
then near the destination, cancelled the IFR flight plan and flew VFR-into-IMC back to
the point of origin. In another accident, the rater commented the pilot received a weather
briefing and filed via the Direct User Access Terminal Service (DUATS), but the report
did not say that a briefing was obtained from DUATS. In another accident, the rater
commented, the pilot filing IFR was technically true, but practically, if the pilot was
trying to avoid icing, filing IFR was not a practical option. In another accident, the rater
commented the IFR pilot in Class G airspace was not in violation of needing to file a
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flight plan. A rater commented for one of the accidents, the pilot should have filed IFR
and flown IFR procedures.
Flight into known icing conditions (CF22). A rater made the comment for a
particular accident, the pilot flew into forecast icing at night. In another accident, the
rater commented, the pilot flew into icing conditions, since IMC was above the freezing
level. Another rater commented in one of the accidents, the pilot flew into known icing
based on the Meteorological Impact Statement (MIS).
Flight plan policy violation (CF23). A rater made the comment for one of the
accidents, the pilot had a ratings policy violation, since he lied on his application. In
another accident, the rater commented the flight plan policy was a key factor. Another
rater commented on a particular accident, while the flight was conducted under Part 91
flight rules, the flight was operated by a Part 135 operator and is unlike most of the other
accidents conducted as personal flights.
Goal conflicts (CF24). One of the raters commented in a particular accident, the
pilot took a risk, since the co-owner advised him not to make the flight. In another
accident, the rater commented it was not possible to determine if the pilot took a safety
risk, as he thought he was getting good information. A rater made the comment in one of
the accidents there was a goal conflict related to a 0930 appointment.
Height of crash site (CF25). The height of the crash sites were reported as the
following: (1) 0 - 999 feet mean sea level, (2) 1,000 - 1,999 feet mean sea level, (3) 2,000
- 2,999 feet mean sea level, (4) 3,000 - 3,999 feet mean sea level, (5) 4,000 - 4,999 feet
mean sea level, (6) 5,000 - 5,999 feet mean sea level, (7) 6,000 - 6,999 feet mean sea
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level, (8) 7,000 - 7,999 feet mean sea level, (9) 8,000 - 8,999 feet mean sea level, and
(10) 10,000 - 10,999 feet mean sea level.
IFR flight without clearance or ratings (CF26). A rater made the comment for
a particular accident, the pilot conducted the flight without clearance because the NTSB
stated Class E airspace was the location for the accident.
Linear decision - making (CF27). One of the raters made the comment for a
particular accident, the pilot exhibited linear decision making, since even though the
forecast was for IFR along route of flight, the pilot waited for IMC to occur.
Medical status policy violation (CF28). One of the raters made the comment for
a particular accident, the pilot's medical policy violation was severe since he lied on his
medical application. In another accident, the rater commented the pilot was not in
violation, but postmortem medical status was an interesting factor. A rater made the
comment for one of the accidents, the pilot exhibited several medical status policy
violations, as numerous impairing drugs seemed central and/or indicative of the pilot’s
hazardous attitude. One of the raters commented for another accident, medical status
policy violation was apparent due to the pilot’s use of antihistamine. In another accident,
the rater made the comment, the pilot exhibited a medical policy violation due to drugs
with a sedating side effect in his system. One of the raters made the comment for one of
the accidents, the pilot exhibited a medical status violation due to an expired medical. In
another accident, one of the raters made the comment a medical status violation was
apparent since the coroner obtained the pilot’s medical data and the NTSB investigator
provided the information in the AAR.
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Number of passengers on board (CF29). A total of 32 out of the 85 accident
sample occurred with no passengers on board the aircraft. A total of 36 accidents had
one passenger on the aircraft. A total of 11 accidents had two passengers. A total of
three accidents had three passengers on board the aircraft. A total of one accident had
four passengers on board the aircraft. A total of two accidents had five passengers on
board the aircraft.
Obtaining an on-line preflight weather briefing (CF30). One of the raters
made the comment for a particular accident, the pilot was unable to get an online
preflight weather briefing, though he tried. In another accident, the rater commented the
pilot failed to get an online preflight weather briefing. One of the raters made the
comment for a particular accident, the pilot obtained an online preflight weather briefing.
Organization (CF31). A rater made the comment for one of the accidents, the
pilot was concerned about leaving the aircraft at the hospital and may have been a
concern related to aircraft exposure to a storm. In another accident, the rater commented
organizational conflict factored into an experienced pilot's decision to continue VFRinto-IMC. One of the raters made the comment for a particular accident, the
organizational conflict affected the pilot's decision-making to conduct the flight.
Permission-seeking behaviors (CF32). One of the raters commented for a
particular accident, the group flight contributed to permission seeking behavior. In
another accident, the rater commented the pilot's permission-seeking also seemed at play,
with multiple calls to the Flight Service Station (FSS); although, FSS never gave
"permission" and advised against the flight, as did another IFR-rated pilot. In another
accident, the rater commented the briefer aided the pilot's permission-seeking behavior.
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Pilot-briefer communication (CF33). A rater commented in one of the
accidents, the pilot-briefer communication was a factor. In another accident, the rater
commented the co-owner advised the pilot about the weather. A rater made the comment
in one of the accidents, the pilot-briefer communication may have contributed to pilot
weather misdiagnosis by the briefer saying no adverse weather. In another accident, the
rater commented the weather briefing for the accident segment was misleading and
incomplete. A rater made the comment in one of the accidents, despite the adverse
weather briefing, the pilot decided to conduct the flight.
Plan continuation error (PCE) (CF34). One of the raters made the comment for
a particular accident, PCE was a factor contributing to the accident due to business plans
discussed in the report. In another accident, the rater made the comment PCE behavior
was assumed based on action and outcome. One of the raters made the comment for a
particular accident, PCE was a possible contextual factor as the pilot seemed to go with
his plan and ignore fog assuming he could punch through. In another accident, the rater
commented PCE was likely, given the proximity to the airport. A rater made the
comment in a particular accident, PCE was apparent based on the descent and flight
course and affected the pilot's decision making. In another accident, the rater made the
comment, the pilot exhibited poor decision-making skills combined with PCE to attempt
the flight. One of the raters made the comment in a particular accident, PCE was likely
because the pilot proceeded even with an airborne briefing in addition to a briefing during
preflight. In another accident, the rater made the comment this was a preflight decisionmaking accident, not only for IMC but for thunderstorms. One of the raters made the
comment in a particular accident, despite the weather briefing, the pilot conducted the
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flight anyway. In another accident, one of the raters made the comment PCE was a factor
by the pilot continuing the flight and descending rather than turning around and finding
an alternate. One of the raters made the comment for a particular accident, PCE led the
pilot to underestimate the risk of conducting the flight. In another accident, the rater
commented the pilot imposed self-induced pressures to complete the flight contributing
to PCE.
Ratings policy violation (CF35). One of the raters made the comment the pilot
filed IFR, through a malformed request to air traffic control, but was not rated to do so
and was a key factor. In another accident, the rater made the comment a non-instrument
rated pilot flying into IMC is a rating violation. One of the raters made the comment in a
particular accident, the pilot was in violation of the ratings policy, as the pilot-incommand was a student pilot, because he was carrying passengers with no endorsement.
In another accident, the rater commented there was a ratings policy violation since the
pilot lied on his medical application. In another accident, the rater commented there was
no instrument recency met. One of the raters commented for a particular accident, there
was inadequate instructor supervision, as the instructor was obliged to provide better
supervision to student pilot. In another accident, the rater commented the ratings policy
violation was the primary contextual factor related to a student pilot with a passenger on
a twice a week greater than 25 nm flight at night. One of the raters made the comment
for a particular accident, many IMC flights were logged by the pilot without the proper
rating. In another accident, the rater commented the pilot was not authorized to fly at
night.
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Receipt of weather briefing (CF36). One of the raters made the comment for a
particular accident, the pilot did not receive a weather briefing. In another accident, the
rater commented, given the resources at the field, the pilot likely obtained a weather
briefing using electronic means at the Fixed Base Operator (FBO). One of the raters
commented for a particular accident, the pilot did not receive a full weather briefing. In
another accident, the rater commented the pilot received a weather briefing, but the
weather briefing was incomplete and was not factored into the risk estimation. A rater
made the comment in one of the accidents, the pilot did not receive a preflight weather
briefing. In another accident, the rated commented the weather briefing for the accident
segment was misleading and incomplete. One of the raters made the comment in a
particular accident, the pilot received a weather briefing, presumably by DUATS. The
rater made an additional comment the pilot filed via DUATS, but the report did not say a
weather briefing was obtained from DUATS. In another accident, the rater commented
despite the adverse weather briefing, the pilot decided to conduct the flight anyway. One
of the raters commented in a particular accident, the pilot did receive a weather briefing,
but it was not timely. In another accident, the rater commented the pilot did not get a
weather brief from an FAA-approved source. The rater made an additional comment it is
unknown if the pilot got a brief from another source.
Scud running (CF37). A rater made the comment in one of the accidents, it is
assumed the pilot was scud running due to the 700 foot above ground level (AGL) cruise
altitude. In another accident, the rater commented it is assumed the pilot was scud
running due to the altitude prior to the accident. In another accident, the rater commented
scud running was likely due to a transition, at some point, from 7,500 feet cruise altitude
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to 1,300 feet. One of the raters made the comment in a particular accident, the pilot was
not scud running, as a witness said he was flying above the base of the clouds and was
intentional IMC. In another accident, the rater commented scud running was assumed
based on the aircraft altitude. One of the raters commented in a particular accident, the
pilot was scud running based on a witness account. In another accident, the rater
commented, the pilot was scud running based on weather and transit through controlled
airspace. One of the raters commented in a particular accident, scud running was the
primary cause of the accident.
Self-reported weather cues (CF38). One of the rater’s commented in a
particular accident, the squawked 7700 transponder code suggested the pilot recognized
the deteriorating weather conditions but did not know how or what action to take to exit
such conditions. In another accident, the rater commented the pilot recognized the selfreported weather cues, as the flight path near the crash site indicated he recognized the
visibility. One of the raters commented in a particular accident, the pilot's inability to
recognize self-reported weather cues led to getting caught above the clouds, ruling out
intentional self-harm. In another accident, the rater commented the pilot was not able to
recognize weather cues.
Situation assessment (CF39). One of the raters commented in a particular
accident, the situation was underestimated by the pilot leading to inadvertent IMC. In
another accident, the rater commented the pilot did assess the situation and return. One
of the raters commented in a particular accident, the pilot misdiagnosed the situation
using bad weather information. In another accident, the rater commented the pilot
misdiagnosed the weather situation of fog forming, and night conditions contributed to
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the misdiagnosis. One of the raters made the comment in a particular accident, the pilot's
poor decision-making let to poor situation assessment. In another accident, the pilot
exhibited poor decision-making skills to attempt the flight. One of the raters commented
in a particular accident, the accident was a preflight decision-making accident, not only
for IMC but for thunderstorms. In another accident, the rater commented the pilot
conducted a poor situation assessment, ruling out intentional self-harm. One of the raters
made the comment in a particular accident, the pilot’s poor situation assessment led to
getting caught above the clouds, ruling out intentional self-harm. In another accident, the
rater commented the pilot misdiagnosed weather cues, and night was a factor including
possible fatigue resulting from five flights, nine to ten hours of duty time, lack of risk
assessment for positioning the flight, and lack of night vision goggles. One of the raters
made the comment in a particular accident, the pilot imposed self-induced pressures to
make the flight leading to poor situation assessment.
Social (CF40). One of the raters commented on a particular flight, the group
flight contributed to permission seeking behavior. In another accident, social pressures
were at play with business plans discussed in the report. One of the raters made the
comment in a particular accident, social pressures factored into the experienced pilot's
decision to continue VFR-into-IMC. In another accident, social pressure was apparent
and based on the pressure to attend a meeting in Aspen. One of the raters made the
comment in a particular accident, social pressures adversely affected the pilot's decision
making. In another accident, the rater commented social pressure was apparent due to
expectations at work, arriving by conducting a flight to different work locations. One of
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the raters made the comment in a particular accident, social pressures led to the pilot
underestimating risk to conduct the flight.
Source of weather information (CF41). One of the raters commented for a
particular flight, there was no record of a weather briefing. In another accident, the pilot
selected a good source of weather information, but the weather information was not
complete. One of the raters made the comment in a particular accident, the source of
weather information provided to the pilot by the briefer was bad. In another accident, the
rater commented the pilot should not have completed the long flight with only an outlook
briefing, resulting in VFR-into-IMC and icing. One of the raters commented in a
particular accident, the pilot did not update the weather information soon enough,
resulting in his weather information being poor and leading to underestimating the risk in
conducting the flight.
Terrain (CF42). The raters identified the physical characteristics of the land
where the accidents occurred included the following: (1) marsh based on the chart; (2)
mountains; (3) hills; (4) forest; and (5) swamp.
Underestimating risk (CF43). One of the raters commented, after the adverse
weather briefing, the pilot filed VFR, indicating an underestimation of risk in conducting
the flight. In another accident, the rater commented the pilot underestimated the risk in
conducting the flight, given the time of day, night conditions, and mountainous terrain.
One of the raters made the comment in a particular accident, the pilot exhibited poor
decision-making in underestimating the risk in conducting the flight. In another accident,
the rater commented the instructor-rated passenger presence and bad decision-making
factors contributed to the pilot underestimating the risk in conducting the flight. One of
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the raters commented in a particular accident, the accident was a preflight decisionmaking accident, not only for IMC but for thunderstorms. In another accident, the rater
commented the lighting conditions contributed to the accident. One of the raters
commented in a particular accident, the pilot received a weather briefing, but it was
incomplete and not factored into the risk estimation of flying in mountainous terrain. In
another accident, the rater commented the weather briefing for the accident segment was
misleading and incomplete, combined with an incomplete pilot risk assessment. One of
the raters commented in a particular accident, the pilot was flying in night conditions. In
another accident, the rater commented the NTSB report emphasized the pilot had next
day work-related obligations. The rater made an additional comment stating these factors
contributed to the pilot's bad decision-making, contributing to underestimating the risk in
conducting the flight. The rater made another comment stating it is also possible an
intentional self-harm act on the part of the pilot may have been a factor contributing to
the accident. In another accident, the rater commented the pilot's underestimation of risk
led to getting caught above the clouds. The rater made an additional comment stating it
is also possible intentional self-harm may have also been a factor in the accident. In
another accident, the rater commented the pilot underestimated the risk of clouds and
thunderstorms. One of the raters made the comment in a particular accident, the pilot
underestimated the risk of flying low to avoid IMC. In another accident, the rater
commented social pressures led the pilot to underestimate risk in conducting the flight.
One of the raters commented in a particular accident, the pilot imposed self-induced
pressures on himself to make the flight, leading to an underestimation of risk resulting in
the accident. In another accident, the rater commented an underestimation of risk by the
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pilot was a key factor resulting in the accident. One of the raters made the comment in a
particular accident, it is possible the pilot did not recognize there was fog. In another
accident, the rater commented the equipment failure, many unknowns, and probable
cause faulting air traffic control could have contributed to the pilot's underestimation of
risk in completing the flight. A rater made the comment in a particular accident, the pilot
underestimated the risk in conducting the flight at night, considering the pilot’s lack of
experience flying at night.
Unrecoverable low altitude (CF44). One rater made the comment in a particular
accident, the pilot was flying VFR at low altitude. In another accident, the rater
commented the rear seat passenger survived and provided an account of the accident.
One of the raters commented in a particular accident, a pilot stated the accident pilot
descended to maintain contact with the ground. The rater made an additional comment
stating this also applies to scud running and unrecoverable low altitude. In another
accident, the rater commented the pilot was scud running and at an unrecoverable low
altitude, based on the pilot's transmission to air traffic control indicating he was trapped
beneath the layer.
Use of in-cockpit weather information (CF45). No use of in-cockpit weather
information contextual factor manifestations were reported by the raters.
Use of portable weather applications (CF46). One of the raters commented in a
particular accident, a handheld GPS was onboard, but its use was unknown. In another
accident, the rater commented the pilot had a handheld Garmin GPSMAP 196 onboard,
but its use was unknown. One of the raters commented in a particular accident, a
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handheld GPS was found, but there was no way to know if the pilot became overly
absorbed in its use.
Quantitative Data
A point-biserial correlation coefficient was used to examine the statistically
significant relationships among the contextual factors, pilot age, and flight experience in
the 85 accident main study sample of NTSB AARs. Results identified several
statistically significant relationships among specific contextual factors, pilot age, and
flight experience. Point-biserial results between the 46 contextual factors and pilot age
are given in Table 6.

Table 6
Point-biserial Correlations Contextual Factors/Pilot age

Contextual Factor
Accident time of day (Day)
(CF1)
Accident time of day (Night)
(CF1)
Adverse weather encountered
before mid flight point
reached (CF2)
Adverse weather not
encountered after mid flight
point was reached (CF3)
Less than or equal to half the
time and distance required to
reach the destination before
the accident occurred (CF6)
The pilot did not exhibit
circular decision-making
(CF10)

Age
r = -.377, p = .000
r = -.277, p = .000
r = -.140, p = .025
r = -.148, p = .018

r = -.139, p = .026

r = -.140, p = .026
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Table 6 continued
Point-biserial Correlations Contextual Factors/Pilot age

Contextual Factor
The pilot exhibited cognitive
anchoring (CF11)
The aircraft crash site was
closer to the departure
location than the planned
destination (CF14)
The aircraft crash site was not
closer to the departure
location than the planned
destination (CF14)
The aircraft crash site was
closer to the planned
destination than the departure
location (CF15)
The pilot flew into known
icing conditions (CF22)
The pilot did not experience
an organizational conflict
between productivity and
safety (CF31)
The pilot was in violation of
FAA ratings policy (CF35)
The pilot was not in violation
of FAA ratings policy (CF35)
The pilot was able to
recognize self-reported
weather cues (CF38)
The pilot was not able to
recognize self-reported
weather cues (CF38)
The pilot did not decide to
obtain and use weather
information through use of incockpit installed weather
equipment information
(CF45)

Age
r = -.133, p = .034
r = -.158, p = .012

r = .123, p = .050

r = .139, p = .026
r = .164, p = .009
r = -.141, p = .025
r = -.141, p = .024
r = .164, p = .009
r = .191, p = .002
r = -.191, p = .002

r = -.277, p = .000
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Table 6 continued
Point-biserial Correlations Contextual Factors/Pilot age

Contextual Factor
The pilot did not decide to
use weather information
obtained through portable
weather smart phone
applications (CF46)

Age

r = -.174, p = .005

A point-biserial correlation coefficient was also used to examine the statistically
significant relationships between the contextual factors and flight experience in the 85
accident main study sample of NTSB AARs. Results identified several statistically
significant relationships between specific contextual factors and flight experience. Pointbiserial results between the 46 contextual factors and flight experience are given in Table
7.

Table 7
Point-biserial Correlations Contextual Factors/Flight Experience
Contextual Factor
The pilot did not
communicate with air
traffic control at the time
of the VFR-into-IMC
accident (CF12)

Flight Experience
r = .131, p = .037
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Table 7 continued
Point-biserial Correlations Contextual Factors/Flight Experience
Contextual Factor
The pilot was
communicating with air
traffic control at the time
of the VFR-into-IMC
accident (CF12)
The pilot was not under
stress and did anticipate
the consequences of
flying in IMC (CF13)
The pilot did not descend
below weather minimums
(CF20)
The pilot flew into known
icing conditions (CF22)
The pilot was not in
violation of organizational
flight plan policy - filing
IFR when required
(CF23)
The pilot did not exhibit
linear decision-making
(CF27)
The pilot did not exhibit
permission-seeking
behaviors (CF32)
The pilot was in
communication with a
briefer (CF33)
The pilot was in violation
of FAA ratings policy
(CF35)
The pilot was not in
violation of FAA ratings
policy (CF35)

Flight Experience
r = -.156, p = .012

r = .153, p = .015

r = -.149, p = .018
r = .148, p = .018

r = .209, p = .001

r = .200, p = .001
r = -.239, p = .000
r = -.178, p = .004
r = -.231, p = .000
r = -.231, p = .000

A phi correlation coefficient was used to examine the statistically significant
relationships among the contextual factors, certification level (instrument/noninstrument), weather (inclement/non-inclement), flight conditions (VMC/IMC) and time
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of day (day/night) in the 85 accident main study sample of NTSB AARs. Results
identified statistically significant relationships between the contextual factors, and these
identified other factors. Phi correlation results between the 46 contextual factors and the
identified other factors are given in Tables 8, 9, 10, and 11.

Table 8
Phi Correlations Contextual Factors/Certification Level

Contextual Factor
Adverse weather
encountered before mid
flight point reached (CF2)
Adverse weather not
encountered before mid
flight point reached (CF2)
Adverse weather
encountered after mid
flight point was reached
(CF3)
Cues signaling problem
clear to pilot (CF5)
Less than or equal to half
the time and distance
required to reach the
destination before the
accident occurred (CF6)
The pilot overestimated
ceiling and/or visibility
weather conditions (CF9)
The pilot did not
communicate with air
traffic control at the time
of the VFR-into-IMC
accident (CF12)

Certification
r = -.165, p = .007
r = -.126, p = .040

r = -.161, p = .009
r = -.126, p = .040

r = -.163, p = .008

r = -.122, p = .048

r = -.159, p = .010
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Table 8 continued
Phi Correlations Contextual Factors/Certification Level

Contextual Factor
The pilot was
communicating with air
traffic control at the time
of the VFR-into-IMC
accident (CF12)
The aircraft crash site was
closer to the departure
location than the planned
destination (CF14)
The aircraft crash site was
not closer to the departure
location than the planned
destination (CF14)
The aircraft crash site was
closer to the planned
destination than the
departure location (CF15)
The aircraft crash site was
not closer to the planned
destination than the
departure location (CF15)
The pilot was not in
violation of the FAA
flight time currency
policy (CF16)
The pilot decided to
continue VFR-into-IMC
to the planned destination
(CF17)
The pilot did not submit a
flight plan to flight
service (CF21)
The pilot took a safety
risk to fly in IMC
conditions to planned
destination (CF24)

Certification

r = -.124, p = .044

r = -.160, p = .009

r = -.164, p = .008

r = -.186, p = .002

r = -.139, p = .024

r = -.153, p = .013

r = -.156, p = .011

r = .377, p = .000

r = -.222, p = .000
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Table 9
Phi Correlations Contextual Factors/Weather

Contextual Factor
Adverse weather
encountered before mid
flight point reached (CF2)
Adverse weather not
encountered before mid
flight point reached (CF2)
Adverse weather
encountered after mid
flight point was reached
(CF3)
The pilot was in violation
of conducting an IFR
flight without proper
clearance or ratings
(CF26)
The pilot was not in
violation of FAA medical
status policy (CF28)
The pilot was in
communication with a
briefer (CF33)
The pilot was not in
communication with a
briefer (CF33)
The pilot exhibited Plan
Continuation Error
behavior (CF34)
The pilot was in violation
of FAA ratings policy
(CF35)
The pilot was not in
violation of FAA ratings
policy (CF35)
The pilot did not receive a
weather briefing (CF36)

Inclement Weather
r = -.165, p = .007
r = -.126, p = .040

r = -.161, p = .009

r = .230, p = .000

r = -.293, p = .000
r = -.143, p = .020
r = -.132, p = .032
r = -.306, p = .000
r = -.150, p = .015
r = -.154, p = .012
r = -.122, p = .048
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Table 9 continued
Phi Correlations Contextual Factors/Weather

Contextual Factor
The pilot received a
weather briefing (CF36)
The pilot was able to
recognize self-reported
weather cues (CF38)
The pilot misdiagnosed
the changes in or severity
of the weather (CF39)
The pilot underestimated
the level of risk associated
with cues that should have
signaled a change in
course of action (CF43)

Inclement Weather
r = -.147, p = .017
r = -.136, p = .027
r = -.322, p = .000

r = -.332, p = .000

Table 10
Phi Correlations Contextual Factors/Flight Conditions

Contextual Factor
Adverse weather
encountered before mid
flight point reached (CF2)
Adverse weather not
encountered before mid
flight point reached (CF2)
Adverse weather
encountered after mid
flight point was reached
(CF3)

Flight Conditions
r = -.165, p = .007
r = -.126, p = .040

r = -.161, p = .009
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Table 10 continued
Phi Correlations Contextual Factors/Flight Conditions

Contextual Factor
Cues signaling problem
clear to pilot (CF5)
Less than or equal to half
the time and distance
required to reach the
destination before the
accident occurred (CF6)
The pilot overestimated
ceiling and/or visibility
weather conditions (CF9)
The pilot did not
communicate with air
traffic control at the time
of the VFR-into-IMC
accident (CF12)
The pilot was
communicating with air
traffic control at the time
of the VFR-into-IMC
accident (CF12)
The aircraft crash site was
closer to the departure
location than the planned
destination (CF14)
The aircraft crash site was
not closer to the departure
location than the planned
destination (CF14)
The aircraft crash site was
closer to the planned
destination than the
departure location (CF15)
The aircraft crash site was
not closer to the planned
destination than the
departure location (CF15)

Flight Conditions
r = -.126, p = .040

r = -.163, p = .008

r = -.122, p = .048

r = -.159, p = .010

r = -.124, p = .044

r = -.160, p = .009

r = -.164, p = .008

r = -.186, p = .002

r = -.139, p = .024
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Table 10 continued
Phi Correlations Contextual Factors/Flight Conditions

Contextual Factor
The pilot was not in
violation of the FAA
flight time currency
policy (CF16)
The pilot decided to
continue VFR-into-IMC
to the planned destination
(CF17)
The pilot did not submit a
flight plan to flight
service (CF21)
The pilot took a safety
risk to fly in IMC
conditions to planned
destination (CF24)

Flight Conditions

r = -.153, p = .013

r = -.156, p = .011

r = -.322, p = .000

r = -.332, p = .000

Table 11
Phi Correlations Contextual Factors/Time of Day

Contextual Factor
Adverse weather
encountered before mid
flight point reached (CF2)
Adverse weather not
encountered before mid
flight point reached (CF2)
Adverse weather
encountered after mid
flight point was reached
(CF3)

Time of Day
r = .177, p = .004
r = -.146, p = .018

r = -.155, p = .012
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Table 11 continued
Phi Correlations Contextual Factors/Time of Day

Contextual Factor
Less than or equal to half
the time and distance
required to reach the
destination before the
accident occurred (CF6)
The aircraft crash site was
closer to the departure
location than the planned
destination (CF14)
The aircraft crash site was
closer to the planned
destination than the
departure location (CF15)
The aircraft crash site was
not closer to the planned
destination than the
departure location (CF15)

Time of Day

r = .133, p = .030

r = .168, p = .006

r = -.130, p = .034

r = .189, p = .002

A multiple regression analysis was completed on the 85 NTSB GA Part 91, VFRinto-IMC accident sample to determine if any of the 46 contextual factors
(independent/predictor variables) had any effects on the crash distance from the departure
point to the midpoint of the planned route of flight (dependent/outcome variable). The 46
research-identified contextual factors were entered into the independent/predictor
variable field and the crash distances from departure to the midpoint of the planned route
of flight were entered into the dependent/outcome variable field of SPSSTM as a
percentage from 0% to 50% of planned route completion, as determined by the provided
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latitude and longitude of the departure point to the crash site in the NTSB AARs (Table
12).
The six multiple regression assumptions were checked for each of the analyses
completed by the researcher to ensure the correct data was reported. The relationship
between the independent/predictor variables and dependent/outcome variable was
assessed for linearity through review of scatterplots (Assumption 1). No multicollinearity
in the data was determined by all variance inflation factor (VIF) scores below 10 and all
tolerance scores above 0.2 (Assumption 2). Independent values of the residuals were
determined through review of the Durbin-Watson statistic to ensure the number was close
to the value of 2 (Assumption 3). Constant variance of the residuals was determined
through a review of standardized residuals versus standardized predicted values showing
no indication of funneling, suggesting the assumption of homoscedasticity had been
accomplished (Assumption 4). Values of the residuals were determined to be normally
distributed through review of the P-P plot for the model (Assumption 5). A check was
made to ensure no influential cases were biasing the model as determined through review
of Cook’s Distance values being under 1, suggesting the individual cases were not unduly
influencing the model (Assumption 6).
The multiple regression results were reviewed. A value of .609 for the multiple
correlation coefficient, R, was observed and indicated a relatively strong level of
prediction. The R Square coefficient of determination value is the proportion of variance
in the dependent/outcome variable explained by the independent/predictor variables. The
value of .371 indicated the independent/predictor variables explained 37.1% of the
variability of the dependent/outcome variable (Table 12).
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Table 12
Crash Distance from Departure Model Summary
Model Summaryb
R
Adjusted R
Std. Error of the
DurbinSquare
Square
Estimate
Watson
1
.609a .371
.123
13.57626
1.013
a. Predictors: CF1, CF2, CF3, CF5, CF6, CF7, CF8, CF9, CF10, CF11, CF12,
CF13, CF16, CF17, CF18, CF19, CF20, CF21, CF22, CF23, CF24, CF26, CF27,
CF28, CF29, CF30, CF31, CF32, CF34, CF35, CF37, CF38, CF39, CF40, CF41,
CF43, CF44, CF45
b. Dependent Variable: Crash Distance from Departure to Midpoint of Planned
Route of Flight (0% to 50% of Planned Route Completion)

Model

R

The F-ratio in the analysis of variance (ANOVA) table tests whether the overall
regression model is a good fit for the data (Table 13). The table shows the
independent/predictor variables statistically significantly predict the dependent/outcome
variable, F (72, 182) = 1.494, p < .017. Therefore, the regression model is a good fit for
the data. Statistical significance for each of the contextual factors (independent/predictor
variables) was tested for whether the unstandardized or standardized coefficients were
equal to zero in the population. It was determined the flight time and distance in IMC
were less than or equal to half the time and distance required to reach the destination, p =
.033 (CF7), the pilot submitted a flight plan to flight service, p = .040 (CF21), the pilot
did not fly into known icing conditions, p = .027 (CF22), and the pilot was conducting
scud running flight operations at the time of the accident, p = .054 (CF37) added
statistically significantly to the prediction of the crash distance from departure to the
midpoint of the planned route of flight (0 to 50 Percent), F(72, 182) = 1.494, p < .017, R2
= .371.
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Table 13
Crash Distance from Departure ANOVA
ANOVAa
Sum of
Squares

Model

df

Mean
Square

F

Sig.

275.312
1.494
.017b
Regression 19822.441 72
184.315
Residual 33545.300 182
53367.741 254
Total
a. Dependent Variable: Crash Distance from Departure to Midpoint of Planned Route of
Flight (0% to 50% of Planned Route Completion)
b. Predictors: CF1, CF2, CF3, CF5, CF6, CF7, CF8, CF9, CF10, CF11, CF12, CF13,
CF16, CF17, CF18, CF19, CF20, CF21, CF22, CF23, CF24, CF26, CF27, CF28, CF29,
CF30, CF31, CF32, CF34, CF35, CF37, CF38, CF39, CF40, CF41, CF43, CF44, CF45
1

A multiple regression analysis was also completed on the 85 NTSB GA Part 91,
VFR-into-IMC accident sample to determine if any of the 46 contextual factors
(independent/predictor variables) had any effects on the crash distance from the midpoint
to the destination of the planned route of flight (dependent/outcome variable). The 46
research-identified contextual factors were entered into the independent/predictor
variable field, and the crash distances from midpoint to destination of the planned route
of flight were entered into the dependent/outcome variable field of SPSSTM as a
percentage from 51% to 100% of planned route completion as determined by the
provided latitude and longitude of the midpoint to the crash site in the NTSB AARs
(Table 14).
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Table 14
Crash Distance from Midpoint Model Summary
Model Summaryb
Model

R

R
Adjusted R
Std. Error of the
DurbinSquare
Square
Estimate
Watson
1
.746a .557
.382
32.73822
1.327
a. Predictors: CF1, CF2, CF3, CF5, CF6, CF7, CF8, CF9, CF10, CF11, CF12, CF13,
CF16, CF17, CF18, CF19, CF20, CF21, CF22, CF23, CF24, CF26, CF27, CF28,
CF29, CF30, CF31, CF32, CF34, CF35, CF37, CF38, CF39, CF40, CF41, CF43,
CF44, CF45
b. Dependent Variable: Crash Distance from Midpoint to Destination of Planned Route
of Flight (51% to 100% of the Planned Route Completion)

The multiple regression results were reviewed. A value of .746 for the multiple
correlation coefficient, R, was observed and indicated a strong level of prediction. The R
square coefficient of determination value is the proportion of variance in the
dependent/outcome variable that can be explained by the independent/predictor variables.
A value of .557 indicated the independent/predictor variables explained 55.7% of the
variability of the dependent/outcome variable (Table 14). The F-ratio in the ANOVA
table tests whether the overall regression model is a good fit for the data (Table 15). The
table shows the independent/predictor variables statistically significantly predict the
dependent variable, F (72, 182) = 3.178, p < .01. Therefore, the regression model is a
good fit for the data. Statistical significance for each of the contextual factors
(independent/predictor variables) was tested for whether the unstandardized or
standardized coefficients were equal to zero in the population. It was determined the
adverse weather encountered before mid flight point reached, p = .009 (CF2), adverse
weather encountered after mid flight point was reached, p = .000 (CF3), the flight time
and distance in IMC were greater than half the time and distance required to reach the
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destination before diverting, p = .003 (CF7), the pilot was not fixated on visually
compelling head down displays, p = .021 (CF8), the pilot was under stress and did not
anticipate the consequences of flying in IMC, p = .017 (CF13), the pilot decided not to
continue VFR-into-IMC to the planned destination, p = .018 (CF17), the pilot decided to
continue VFR-into-IMC to the planned destination, p = .032 (CF17), the pilot submitted a
flight plan to flight service, p = .002 (CF21), the pilot flew into known icing conditions, p
= .027 (CF22), the pilot exhibited linear decision-making, p = .004 (CF27), and the pilot
did not exhibit permission-seeking behaviors, p = .011 (CF32), added statistically
significantly to the prediction of the crash distance from the midpoint to the destination of
the planned route of flight (51 to 100 Percent), F(72, 182) = 3.178, p < .01, R2 = .557.

Table 15
Crash Distance from Midpoint ANOVA
ANOVAa

Model

Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

F

Sig.

Regression 245217.019 72
3405.792
3.178
.000b
Residual 195065.946 182
1071.791
Total
440282.965 254
a. Dependent Variable: Crash Distance from Midpoint to Destination of Planned Route
of Flight (51% to 100% of the Planned Route Completion)
b. Predictors: CF1, CF2, CF3, CF5, CF6, CF7, CF8, CF9, CF10, CF11, CF12, CF13,
CF16, CF17, CF18, CF19, CF20, CF21, CF22, CF23, CF24, CF26, CF27, CF28,
CF29, CF30, CF31, CF32, CF34, CF35, CF37, CF38, CF39, CF40, CF41, CF43,
CF44, CF45
1
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Discussion
The fair agreement inter-rater reliability Fleiss’ kappa value of κ = 0.25 was
determined for the main study rater agreement on the presence of the 46 researchidentified contextual factors in the GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC sample of 85 NTSB
AARs. This fair agreement value was determined to be between 0.21 and 0.40 on the
generally accepted standards of agreement (Fleiss, 1971). A percentage agreement of
57% percent was calculated between the three raters for the main study presence of the
contextual factors. The Fleiss’ kappa statistic was adjusted for prevalence and calculated
to be a PABAK value of 0.50. Although the overall Fleiss’ kappa (κ) score was in the
fair range of agreement κ = 0.25, the individual Fleiss’ kappa (κ) score for the 1 response,
indicating rater agreement for the presence of the contextual factor, was calculated to be
κ = 0.51 and in the moderate range of agreement (Table 2). The individual Fleiss’ kappa
(κ) score for the 0 response, indicating rater agreement for the absence of the contextual
factor, was calculated to be κ = 0.38 and was on the high end of the fair range of
agreement (Table 2). The overall Fleiss’ kappa (κ) score in the fair range of agreement κ
= 0.25 was due to such reasons as inconsistency in the raters selecting the same response
for the reason the contextual factor was not present, as there were several responses
available to the rater for selection (i.e., Not Applicable, N.A., Not enough information
provided to identify the contextual factor, unknown, or providing no (blank) rating). The
response of ‘Not enough information provided to identify the contextual factor’ was
inconsistently but repeatedly used by the three raters as a reason for being unable to
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identify the presence of the contextual factors in the accident sample dataset (Appendix
D; Table D5). It is possible if the AARs and probable cause reports had contained more
detailed information, a higher number of contextual factors could have been identified by
the raters resulting in a higher overall Fleiss’ kappa (κ) score.
The study utilized expert raters to identify the presence and frequency of 46
research-identified contextual factors and manifestations from the pilot perspective in 85
GA VFR-into-IMC NTSB accident AARs. Rater-identified contextual factors were
assessed with multiple regression analysis using dummy variables to determine any
statistically significant effects from the 46 contextual factors on crash distance from
departure to midpoint of the planned route (0% to 50% of planned course completion)
and crash distance from midpoint to planned destination (51% to 100% of planned course
completion). Relationships between the 46 contextual factors and pilot age and total
flight experience were assessed for any statistically significant interactions using a point
biserial correlation. The relationships between the 46 contextual factors and pilot
certification level (instrument/non-instrument rated), weather (inclement/non-inclement),
flight conditions (VMC/IMC), and time of day were assessed for any statistically
significant interactions using a phi correlation.
Three raters identified the presence for 37 out of 46 (80%) of the researchidentified contextual factors in the 85 accident sample used in the main study. The
presence of the contextual factors was identified by the raters in the majority of the 85
GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC NTSB accident sample. Identified contextual factors were
assessed by comparing study findings with the research literature in reviewing the
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presence, frequency, and manifestation results from the raters, as well as findings from
the correlation and multiple regression analyses.
The highest presence and frequencies of the top five rater-identified contextual
factors in the sample of 85 GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC NTSB AARs included the
following: (1) number of passengers on board (CF29-62%), (2) accident time of day
(Day) (CF1-60%), (3) crash distance from planned destination (CF15-54%), (4) not filing
a flight plan (CF21-49%), and (5) underestimating risk (CF43-49%). Number of
passengers on board the aircraft has been investigated by Barron (2011) in how pressure
from passengers might have contributed to pilots’ decisions to continue into adverse
weather conditions by using passenger social pressure in flight. The study used
passenger social pressure in flight to convince pilots to continue or divert from hazardous
weather. It was found the pilot participants tended to concede to the pressure of the
passenger, whether they were positively or negatively motivated to continue into poor
weather conditions. At the conclusion of the study, pilot participants were informed of
the results. The participating pilots stated they were unaware of passenger influence on
their decision-making. Study results found private pilots who were instrument rated were
more likely to continue farther into IMC than their low time VFR or high time
commercial and/or ATP counterparts, a finding pertaining primarily to the pilot’s ratings.
In the current study, as the contextual factor number of passengers on board (CF29) was
identified by the raters as the highest frequency factor present in the sample of 85
accidents, it could be the case the passengers were influencing the decision-making of the
GA pilot to fly farther into IMC than he would if there were no passengers on board the
aircraft, confirming the Barron (2011) findings.
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The accident time of day has been investigated by Ison (2014a) and Ison (2014b).
These studies used logistic regression to investigate potential pilot-related, and situational
factors including accident time of day, terrain, receipt of weather briefing,
communication with air traffic control, filing of a flight plan, pilot certification, pilot
experience, and pilot age. No significant findings were identified pertaining to accident
time of day. The results of these studies showed more research is needed to understand
the context of pilot actions resulting in VFR-into-IMC accidents, as there are gaps in
understanding among context, training, and on the factors related to the length of time a
pilot would fly into degraded weather conditions including accident time of day. In the
current study, the raters identified accident time of day (Day) as the second highest
frequency (60%) contextual factor and accident time of day (Night) as the ninth highest
frequency (40%) contextual factor. A total of 7.1% of the 85 accidents occurred during
dusk light conditions, 4.7% occurred during dark light conditions, and 4.7% occurred
during dawn light conditions. There was a spike in accidents occurring during the 1800and 1900-time frame, accounting for the greater number of accidents taking place at
night. Although the Ison (2014a) and Ison (2014b) studies did not provide any specific
research findings on accident time of day (Day/Night), it could be the case the time of
day (Day) when the accidents are occurring take place with the added lighting condition
difficulties associated with dawn and dusk. It could also be the case the time of day
(Night) when the accidents are occurring take place with the added lighting condition
difficulties associated with darkness.
The crash distance from planned destination has been investigated by O’Hare and
Owen (2002). Researchers have clarified, pilot contribution to cross-country VFR
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crashes cannot be explained by flight-time alone. There are other factors at play,
ultimately comprising pilot circumstances, including but not limited to over-confidence,
faulty risk-perception, lack of awareness, flight circumstances leading to risky decisions,
decision-making, risk assessment, situational awareness, proximity of the goal/planned
destination, and time already invested in the flight/sunk cost. A related research study
has been conducted by Wiegmann, Goh, and O’Hare (2002) by assessing when adverse
weather is encountered during the flight. It was discovered when adverse weather was
encountered later in the flight, pilots were more likely to continue as they might be more
optimistic about the possibility of positive outcomes than they were when they encounter
poor weather early in a flight. The results were consistent with more optimism during
poor weather encounters occurring later into flights, and less optimism when hazardous
weather was present earlier in flights. A primary comparison found several contextual
factors contributing to the accidents including a marginally significant difference (F [1,
28] = 8.3, p = 0.07) in the estimated visibility at the time of the crash. The visibility was
reported as 20 km for all the AOG crashes and 5 to 20 km for IFV crashes (seven IFV
crashes occurred below 5 km visibility). There was a statistically significant difference in
the height above sea level of the crash site for IFV crashes at a mean 2,970 feet AMSL
and 150 feet AMSL for the AOG crashes (F [1,20] = 6.3, p = .02). Pilot mean age in IFV
crashes was 37.8 years. The AOG pilots were 47 years of age. It was determined the
difference of 9.2 years between the groups was statistically significant (F [1, 43] = 3.9, p
= .05). Mean hours flown in the IFV group during the previous 90 days was determined
to be 59.8 hours. It was also determined the AOG group flew a total of 31.9 hours. No
statistically significant relationship was found for the flight hours of the two groups (F [1,
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54] = 3.7, p = .06). Additionally, no statistically significant differences were found for
any of the other pilot characteristics assessed in the study. A second Wiegmann, Goh,
and O’Hare (2002) comparison of weather-related and non-weather-related crashes
revealed weather-related crashes took place later into cross-country flights and closer to
planned destinations than other types of GA accidents. Additionally, the second
comparison found age and flight to be contextual, contributing factors to weather-related
GA accidents. The GA pilots who were involved in weather-related accidents tended to
be younger and possessed more recent flight time than other pilots. Saxton (2008) found
sunk cost to be a valid concept, as the participants of the study who were financially
motivated did, in fact, continue longer into poor weather conditions than the participants
who were not financially motivated and came upon hazardous weather earlier in the
flight. The Ball (2008) research investigated why pilots fly too closely to hazardous
weather. Researchers explained it might not be, necessarily, an ability to maintain safe
distances, but rather, a conscious choice influenced by level of experience and quality of
training. Ahlstrom, Ohneiser, and Caddigan (2016) found the use of a weather device did
improve situational awareness, weather related decision-making in diverting or
continuing to the planned destination, and distances in route deviation from the hazardous
weather. In the current study, the findings of the Wiegmann, Goh, and O’Hare (2002)
study are supported for time and distance the pilot flew into adverse weather. As the
raters identified the contextual factor crash distance from the planned destination (CF15)
with the third highest frequency (54%), crash distance from the departure (CF14) with the
eighth highest frequency (46%), adverse weather encountered early in the flight (CF2)
with the sixteenth highest frequency (24%), and adverse weather encountered late in the
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flight (CF3) also with the sixteenth highest frequency (24%), it could be the case the
adverse weather encountered late in the flight could be influencing the GA pilot’s
decision to continue to the planned destination instead of diverting to an alternate
location. However, since both CF2 and CF3 each have 20 accidents (24% of 85
accidents) identified by the raters with the respective contextual factors present for
adverse weather encountered early and late in the flight, it cannot be stated for certain this
is the case. In either case, the findings of the Wiegmann, Goh, and O’Hare (2002)
research are confirmed for time and distances flown into adverse weather. It is possible
any of the O’Hare and Owen (2002) identified pilot factors could be affecting pilot
circumstances and be contributory factors resulting in the fatal accidents assessed in the
current study. The Wiegmann, Goh, and O’Hare (2002) findings for visibility could not
be assessed, as the current study did not study specific visibilities in the reviewed
accidents. Identification of the heights of the crash sites by the raters varied, and not all
crash site heights could be determined from the NTSB AARs. Heights of the crash sites
identified by the raters included the following: (1) 0 - 999 feet mean sea level (16 out of
85 accidents), (2) 1,000 - 1,999 feet mean sea level (4 out of 85 accidents), (3) 2,000 2,999 feet mean sea level (3 out of 85 accidents), (4) 3,000 - 3,999 feet mean sea level (3
out of 85 accidents), (5) 4,000 - 4,999 feet mean sea level (3 out of 85 accidents), (6)
5,000 - 5,999 feet mean sea level (3 out of 85 accidents), (7) 6,000 - 6,999 feet mean sea
level (2 out of 85 accidents), (8) 7,000 - 7,999 feet mean sea level (2 out of 85 accidents),
(9) 8,000 - 8,999 feet mean sea level (1 out of 85 accidents), and (10) 10,000 - 10,999
feet mean sea level (1 out of 85 accidents). The current study findings for height of crash
site differed from the Wiegmann, Goh, and O’Hare (2002) height above sea level of the
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crash site for IFV crashes at a mean 2,970 feet mean sea level and 150 feet mean sea
level for the AOG crashes. As the current study determined the height of accident crash
site in ranges based on drop down menu options selected by the raters, an exact
comparison with the findings of Wiegmann, Goh, and O’Hare (2002) cannot be made.
However, the most frequently identified height of crash site determined by the raters in
the current study was 0 to 999 feet mean sea level (16 out of 85 accidents (19%) of
accidents) in the range of 150 feet average mean sea level identified in the Wiegmann,
Goh, and O’Hare (2002) study for the AOG crashes. There were only 3 out of 85 (4%)
accidents in the range of 2,970 feet average mean sea level identified in the Wiegmann,
Goh, and O’Hare (2002) study for IFV crashes. Current study findings for the mean age
of pilots involved in the 85 accident sample was 52 years of age. The current study
findings for mean pilot age were higher than the Wiegmann, Goh, and O’Hare (2002)
study findings of pilot mean age in IFV crashes of 37.8 years and AOG pilots was 47
years of age. These current study findings disagree with the Wiegmann, Goh, and
O’Hare (2002) research findings of GA pilots who were involved in weather-related
accidents tended to be younger. A comparison with the Wiegmann, Goh, and O’Hare
(2002) findings for pilot recent flight time could not be completed as the NTSB AARs
did not identify the recency of reported pilot total flight hours. It could be the case the
pilots in the current study were financially motivated to complete the flight and continued
farther into IMC toward the destination than pilots who were not financially motivated
diverting to an alternate location or attempting to return to the departure point confirming
the Saxton (2008) study findings on sunk cost. It is also possible the pilots in the current
study flew too closely to hazardous weather as a conscious choice influenced by level of
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experience and quality of training, supporting the Ball (2008) research. The findings of
the Ahlstrom, Ohneiser, and Caddigan (2016) research could not be addressed from
findings in the current study. Although the raters identified specific accidents where a
weather device was discovered in the wreckage, the use of the device by the pilot during
the flight could not be determined.
The pilot’s failure to file a flight plan has been investigated by Jackman’s (2014)
study investigating pilot policy violations to assess fatal VFR-into-IMC accidents in an
ex post facto, quantitative analysis. Violations including filing a flight plan were
reviewed. A need for training, regulatory modifications, or enforcements was explored.
Information between the years of 1998 and 2013 for NTSB GA VFR-into-IMC accident
data was analyzed using binary logistic regression. Study findings revealed flight plan
violations were not statistically significant predictors of fatality. Ison (2014a) used
logistic regression to investigate potential pilot-related and situational factors including
filing of a flight plan. Two significant relationships were found related to flight plans
including accident type and flight plans and terrain and flight plan. The Ison (2014b)
study found similar and additional information to the Ison (2014a) study. Results of
these studies showed more research is needed to understand the context of pilot actions
resulting in VFR-into-IMC accidents, as there are gaps in understanding among context,
training, and on the additional factors related to the length of time a pilot would fly into
degraded weather conditions including filing of a flight plan. In the current study,
although the raters identified the contextual factor failure to file a flight plan (CF21) in
49% (fourth highest rater identified factor in the study) of the accidents in the 85 NTSB
sample, it was not a significant contextual factor identified in the multiple regression
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analyses. The pilot’s filing of a flight plan was identified as a statistically significant
factor in both regression analyses for crash distance from the departure to the midpoint of
the planned route of the flight (0% to 50% of the planned route completion), p = .04, and
crash distance from the midpoint to the destination of the planned route of the flight (51%
to 100% of the planned route completion), p = .002. Results of the current study did not
refute or confirm the findings of the Jackman (2014) research discovery of flight plan
violations were not statistically significant predictors of fatality only the filing of a flight
plan was determined to be significant. A weak negative relationship was discovered in
the current study as the pilot certification increased from the non-instrument to the
instrument rating, the chance of the pilot not submitting a flight plan to flight service
decreased (CF21) and was significant at the p < .01 level, r = -.277, p = .000. A weak
negative relationship was also discovered in the current study as the flight conditions
increased from VMC to IMC, the chance of the pilot not submitting a flight plan
decreased (CF21) and was also significant at the p < .01 level, r = -.277, p = .000.
The underestimating of risk (CF43) has been assessed by Martin, Davison, and
Orasanu (1998) in a study investigating errors in aviation decision-making. It was
hypothesized by the researcher, errors are facilitated by underestimation of risk and
failure to analyze the potential consequences of continuing with the initial plan as well as
stressors may further contribute to these effects. In the current study, as the raters
identified the contextual factor underestimation of risk (CF43) as the fifth highest (49%)
in the study, it could be the case the GA pilots in the accidents could have failed to
correctly estimate the level of risk and potential consequences of continuing the flight
from VFR-into-IMC to the planned destination resulting in the fatal accidents. The
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related contextual factor, consequences not anticipated (CF13), defined as the pilot being
under stress and not anticipating the consequences of flying in IMC, was identified as a
significant contextual factor in the multiple regression analysis for crash distance from
the midpoint to the destination of the planned route of the flight (51% to 100% of the
planned route completion), p = .017, adding evidence to pilots failing to correctly
estimate the level of risk and potential consequences of continuing the flight into IMC,
confirming the findings of the Martin, Davison, and Orasanu (1998) research. A weak
positive relationship was identified in the current study as the number of total flight hours
increased, the chance of the pilot not being under stress and anticipating the
consequences of flying in IMC increased (CF13) and was significant at the p < .05 level,
r = .153, p = .015. A moderate negative relationship was identified in the current study as
the weather increased from non-inclement to inclement weather, the chance of the pilot
underestimating the level of risk associated with cues that should have signaled a chance
in course of action decreased (CF43) and was significant at the p < .01 level, r = -.322, p
= .000.
The raters provided their personal opinions on how the contextual factors were
manifested in the sample of NTSB accident AARs. Manifestations provided by the raters
for the top five contextual factors of (1) number of passengers on board (CF29-62%), (2)
accident time of day (Day) (CF1-60%), (3) crash distance from planned destination
(CF15-54%), (4) not filing a flight plan (CF21-49%), and (5) underestimating risk (CF4349%) were assessed by the researcher. Raters identified the number of passengers on
board the aircraft in the 85 NTSB accident sample. A total of 53 out of 85 aircraft, or
62% of the accident sample, had passengers on board the aircraft. The break down
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according to category of passenger number on board the aircraft and the associated
percentages were identified as follows: 32 aircraft (0 passengers - 38%), 36 aircraft (1
passenger – 42%), 11 accidents (2 passengers – 13%), 3 accidents (3 passengers – 4%), 1
accident (4 passengers – 1%), and 2 accidents (5 passengers – 2%). As the majority of
accidents had passengers on board the aircraft, it could be the case the pilots may have
been influenced by the passengers in deciding to continue into IMC to the planned
destination instead of diverting to an alternate location, supporting the Barron (2011)
research.
Raters also provided their opinions on the manifestation of the contextual factor
accident time of day (CF1-60%). There was a total of 34 accidents occurring during the
day and 51 accidents took place at night. The particular lighting conditions varied and
included six accidents taking place at dusk, 37 during daylight conditions, 33 during
night light conditions, five during dark light conditions, and four during dawn light
conditions. Two accidents occurred at 0000, one at 0100, two at 0400, five at 0500, three
at 0600, four at 0700, three at 0800, four at 0900, five at 1000, four at 1100, five at 1200,
one at 1300, five at 1400, two at 1500, three at 1600, four at 1700, seven at 1800, ten at
1900, five at 2000, four at 2100, three at 2200, and three at 2300. As previously
described, there was a spike in accidents occurring during the 1800- and 1900-hour
timeframe, increasing the number of accidents occurring at night over day accidents. The
Ison (2014) and Ison (2014b) research indicated additional research is needed to improve
understanding of how time of day affects the decision of pilots to fly in IMC. As the
identified Ison (2014) and Ison (2014b) research could not be assessed for findings
related to time of day and IMC flight, it could be the case the time of day (Day) when the

159
accidents are occurring take place with the added lighting condition difficulties
associated with dawn and dusk. It could also be the case, the time of day (Night) when
the accidents are occurring take place with the added lighting condition difficulties
associated with darkness. These lighting conditions could be contributing to the pilot’s
inability to see the ground resulting in an accident.
The raters also provided their opinions on the manifestation of the contextual
factor crash distance from the planned destination (CF15-54%). The aircraft crash
distances occurring between 51% and 100% of the planned route distance from the
midpoint to the planned destination were also calculated by the researcher based on the
latitude and longitude coordinates provided by the NTSB investigators completing the
AARs. The crash distances from the midpoint to the planned destination as a percentage
of the planned route of flight course completion included the following: (1) 51% (12
accidents), (2) 56% (1 accident), (3) 59% (1 accident), (4) 60% (1 accident), (5) 62% (1
accident), (6) 66% (1 accident), (7) 69% (1 accident), (8) 70% (2 accidents), (9) 71% (1
accident), (10) 73% (1 accident), (11) 74% (2 accidents), (12) 77% (3 accidents), (13)
84% (1 accident), (14) 86% (1 accident), (15) 89% (1 accident), (16) 90% (1 accident),
(17) 94% (1 accident), (18) 95% (1 accident), (19) 96% (1 accident), (20) 97% (1
accident), (21) 98% (1 accident), and (22) 99% (9 accidents). The majority of accidents
occurred between the midpoint to the planned destination and totaled 46 versus 39
occurring from the departure to the midpoint of the planned route of flight. As explained
previously, as the raters identified the contextual factor crash distance from the planned
destination (CF15) with the third highest frequency (54%), crash distance from the
departure (CF14) with the eighth highest frequency (46%), adverse weather encountered
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early in the flight (CF2) with the sixteenth highest frequency (24%), and adverse weather
encountered late in the flight (CF3) also with the sixteenth highest frequency (24%), it
could be the case, supporting the Wiegmann, Goh, and O’Hare (2002) and Barron’s
(2011) research findings, the adverse weather encountered late in the flight and/or
passenger pressure could be influencing the GA pilot’s decision to continue to the
planned destination instead of diverting to an alternate location. As the same percentage
of accidents encountered adverse weather early and late in the flight (24%), a definite
determination cannot be made.
The raters also provided their opinions on the manifestation of the contextual
factor filing of a flight plan (CF21-49%). Manifestations included descriptions of GA
pilots either filing or not filing a flight plan for various reasons. Reasons given by the
raters for the GA pilots in the accident sample filing a flight plan included (1) the flight
plan was input via computer but did not go through due to incomplete information input
by the pilot, (2) the pilot filed a flight plan although the NTSB investigator completing
the report incorrectly indicated no on the form, (3) the pilot filed IFR, then near the
destination, cancelled the IFR flight plan and flew VFR-into-IMC back to point of origin,
(4) the pilot filed IFR, through a malformed request to air traffic control, but was not
rated to do so, (5) the pilot filed IFR was technically true, but, practically, if the pilot was
trying to avoid icing filing IFR was not a practical option. The reasons given by the
raters for the GA pilots not filing a flight plan included (1) it is possible an instrument
rated pilot opted to not file IFR, an IFR pilot in Class G airspace was not in violation of
needing to file a flight plan, and (2) the pilot should have filed IFR and flown IFR
procedures. Reasons reported by the raters for the pilots filing and not filing a flight plan
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were reviewed by the researcher. The reasons reported by the raters for pilots filing a
flight plan included (1) the pilot experienced errors in attempting to enter the flight plan,
(2) NTSB investigators making mistakes in reporting pilots not filing flight plans when
the pilots did file flight plans, (3) the pilots filing flight plans and then cancelling the
flight plans for various reason, and (4) the pilots filing IFR flight plans when not
qualified to file IFR flight plans. Reasons reported by the raters for pilots not filing flight
plans included (1) the pilots felt filing flight plans was not necessary, and (2) the pilots
did not file flight plans when they should have filed flight plans. These rater-identified
manifestations for filing a flight plan could address the areas of future research needed as
identified in the Ison (2014a) and Ison (2014b) studies.
The raters also provided their opinions on the manifestation of the contextual
factor underestimating risk (CF43-49%). In the rater’s opinions, the reasons the GA
pilots underestimated the risk in conducting the flight included (1) after the adverse
weather briefing, the pilot filed VFR indicating an underestimation of risk in conducting
the flight, (2) the pilot underestimated the risk in conducting the flight given the time of
day, night conditions, and mountainous terrain, (3) the pilot exhibited poor decisionmaking in underestimating the risk in conducting the flight, (4) the instructor-rated
passenger presence and bad decision-making factors played into the pilot underestimating
the risk in conducting the flight, (5) the accident was a preflight decision-making
accident, not only for IMC but for thunderstorms, (6) the lighting conditions contributed
to the accident, (7) the pilot received a weather briefing, but it was incomplete and not
factored into the risk estimation of flying in mountainous terrain, (8) the weather brief for
the accident segment was misleading and incomplete, combined with an incomplete pilot
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risk assessment, (9) the pilot was flying in night conditions, (10) the NTSB report
emphasized the pilot had next day work-related obligations, (11) the pilot's bad decisionmaking, (12) a possible intentional self-harm act on the part of the pilot may have been a
factor contributing to the accident, (13) the pilot's underestimation of risk led to getting
caught above the clouds, (14) the pilot underestimated the risk of clouds and
thunderstorms, (15) the pilot underestimated the risk of flying low to avoid IMC, (16)
social pressures led the pilot to underestimate risk in conducting the flight, (17) the pilot
imposed self-induced pressures on himself to make the flight leading to an
underestimation of risk resulting in the accident, (18) it is possible the pilot did not
recognize there was fog, (19) the equipment failure, many unknowns, and probable cause
faulting air traffic control could have contributed to the pilot's underestimation of risk in
completing the flight, (20) the pilot underestimated the risk in conducting the flight at
night, considering the pilot’s lack of night flying experience. Reasons reported by the
raters for the pilots underestimating the risks in conducting the flights were reviewed by
the researcher. These reasons included (1) poor decision-making, (2) time of day, (3)
lighting conditions, (4) terrain, (5) social pressure, (6) incomplete weather briefing, (7)
incomplete pilot risk assessment, (8) pilot intentional self-harm, (9) underestimation of
risk for flight direction/location decision, (10) underestimation of risk for flying near
adverse weather decision, (11) pilot self-imposed pressures, (12) equipment failure, (13)
ATC failure, and (14) underestimation of night flying risk. Rater identified
manifestations for the contextual factor underestimating risk (CF43) were found to be
consistent with the Martin, Davison, and Orasanu (1998) study findings related to human
error and judgement contributing to accidents. The researchers explained the problem
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centers on the pilot falling into the decision error type known as PCE to decide to
continue with the original plan despite cues suggesting a change in course of action is
required. Contextual factors contributing to PCE include organizational and socially
induced conflicts and ambiguous dynamic conditions. Decision errors are facilitated by
the pilot’s underestimation of risk, failure to analyze the consequences of continuing with
the initial plan, and stress. Pilots were using linear versus circular decision making under
extremely stressful situations, supporting the Balog (2013) and Balog (2016) study
findings where pilots commit to one decision without reevaluation after actions have been
implemented. These findings are consistent with all 14 manifestation areas identified
where pilots in the accident sample exhibited an underestimation of risk contributing to
the fatal accidents. Current study findings also confirm the Keller (2015) research where
VFR pilots who flew into IMC did so because they misperceived the severity of the
weather and the associated risks versus pilots who turned, or diverted, did so because
they became aware of the danger and sought to return to safety. It is possible the pilots in
the current study misperceived the severity of the risk in attempting to continue the flight
into IMC to the planned destination. The study also supports the O’Hare and Smitheram
(1995) study finding pilots who viewed risk from a gain standpoint were less likely to
continue into IMC, and those who considered risk from a loss viewpoint were more likely
to continue. It is possible the pilots in the current study who chose to continue into IMC
to the planned destination viewed risk from a loss perspective.
The GA pilot age and the 46 research-identified contextual factors were reviewed
for significant relationships using the point biserial correlation. The analysis identified
several statistically significant relationships between pilot age and the contextual factors.
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A relationship between pilot age and the pilot flying into known icing conditions was
significant at the p < .05 level, r = .164, p = .009 (CF22). As the age of the pilot
increased, the chance of the pilot flying into known icing conditions would also increase.
It was also found as the age of the pilot increased, the chance of being involved in more
accidents during the day than at night decreased, p < .01, r = -.377, p = .000 (CF1).
Statistically significant relationships between pilot age and the other contextual factors
are as follows, as the age of the pilot increased (Table 16):
•

the chance of being able to recognize self-reported weather cues increased,
p < .05, r = .191, p = .002 (CF38)

•

the chance of not being in violation of FAA ratings policy increased, p <
.05, r = .164, p = .009 (CF35)

•

the chance of being involved in fatal GA VFR-into-IMC accidents where
the aircraft crash site was closer to the planned destination than the
departure location increased, p < .05, r = .139, p = .026 (CF15)

•

the chance of being involved in more accidents at night decreased,
p < .01, r = -.277, p = .000 (CF1)

•

the chance of not deciding to obtain and use weather information through
use of in-cockpit installed weather equipment information decreased, p <
.01, r = -.277, p = .000 (CF45)

•

the chance of not being able to recognize self-reported weather cues
decreased, p < .05, r = -.191, p = .002 (CF38)

•

the chance of not deciding to use weather information obtained through
portable weather smart phone applications decreased, p < .05, r = -.174,
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p = .005 (CF46)
•

the chance of being involved in fatal VFR-into-IMC accidents where the
aircraft crash site was closer to the departure location than the planned
destination decreased, p < .05, r = -.158, p = .012 (CF14)

•

the chance of being involved in flight situations where adverse weather
was not encountered after mid flight point was reached decreased, p < .05,
r = -.148, p = .018 (CF3)

•

the chance of being in violation of FAA ratings policy decreased, p < .05,
r = -.141, p = .024 (CF35)

•

the chance of being involved in flight situations where adverse weather
was encountered before mid flight point reached decreased, p < .05,
r = -.14, p = .025 (CF2)

•

the chance of not experiencing an organizational conflict between
productivity and safety decreased, p < .05, r = -.141, p = .025 (CF31)

•

the chance of being involved in flight situations where less than or equal
to half the time and distance was required to reach the destination before
the accident occurred decreased, p < .05, r = -.139, p = .026 (CF6)

•

the chance of not exhibiting circular decision-making decreased, p < .05, r
= -.14, p = .026 (CF10)

•

the chance of exhibiting cognitive anchoring decreased, p < .05, r = -.133,
p = .034 (CF11)
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•

the chance of the aircraft crash site not being closer to the departure
location than the planned destination increased, p = .05, r = .123, p = .05
(CF14)

Table 16
Point Biserial Correlations Between Contextual Factors and Pilot Age

Contextual Factor
Accident time of day
(Day) (CF1)
Accident time of day
(Night) (CF1)
The pilot did not decide to
obtain and use weather
information through use
of in-cockpit installed
weather equipment
information (CF45)
The pilot was able to
recognize self-reported
weather cues (CF38)
The pilot was not able to
recognize self-reported
weather cues (CF38)
The pilot did not decide to
use weather information
obtained through portable
weather smart phone
applications (CF46)
The pilot flew into known
icing conditions (CF22)
The pilot was not in
violation of FAA ratings
policy (CF35)

Age
r = -.377, p = .000
r = -.277, p = .000

r = -.277, p = .000

r = .191, p = .002
r = -.191, p = .002

r = -.174, p = .005

r = .164, p = .009
r = .164, p = .009
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Table 16 continued
Point Biserial Correlations Between Contextual Factors and Pilot Age

Contextual Factor
The aircraft crash site was
closer to the departure
location than the planned
destination (CF14)
Adverse weather not
encountered after mid
flight point was reached
(CF3)
The pilot was in violation
of FAA ratings policy
(CF35)
Adverse weather
encountered before mid
flight point reached (CF2)
The pilot did not
experience an
organizational conflict
between productivity and
safety (CF31)
Less than or equal to half
the time and distance
required to reach the
destination before the
accident occurred (CF6)
The pilot did not exhibit
circular decision-making
(CF10)
The aircraft crash site was
closer to the planned
destination than the
departure location (CF15)
The pilot exhibited
cognitive anchoring
(CF11)
The aircraft crash site was
not closer to the departure
location than the planned
destination (CF14)

Age

r = -.158, p = .012

r = -.148, p = .018

r = -.141, p = .024
r = -.14, p = .025

r = -.141, p = .025

r = -.139, p = .026

r = -.14, p = .026

r = .139, p = .026

r = -.133 p = .034

r = .123, p = .05
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Point biserial correlation results between GA pilot age and the contextual factors
show 18 significant correlations between age and the contextual factors. There were a
total of five positive and 13 negative correlations identified between age and the
contextual factors. The five significant positive correlations included the following:
•

The chance of the pilot to recognize self-reported weather cues increased.

•

The chance of the pilot flying into known icing conditions increased.

•

The chance of the pilots not being in violation of the FAA ratings policy
increased.

•

The chance of the aircraft crash site being closer to the planned destination
than the departure location increased.

•

The chance of the aircraft crash site not being closer to the planned
destination than the departure location increased.

There was a negative correlation between age and 13 of the contextual factors.
As the age of the GA pilot increased, the chance of the accident occurring during the day
decreased. Additionally, as the age of the GA pilot increased, the chance of the accident
occurring at night decreased. The other significant negative correlations included the
following:
•

The chance of the pilot not deciding to obtain and use weather information
through use of in-cockpit installed weather equipment information
decreased.

•

The chance of the pilot not using weather information obtained through
portable weather smart phone applications decreased.

169
•

The chance of the aircraft crash site being closer to the departure location
than the planned destination decreased.

•

The chance of weather not being encountered after mid flight point was
reached decreased.

•

The chance of the pilot being in violation of FAA ratings policy
decreased.

•

The chance of the weather being encountered before the mid flight point
was reached decreased.

•

The chance of the pilot not experiencing an organizational conflict
between productivity and safety decreased.

•

The chance of less than or equal to half the time and distance required to
reach the destination before the accident occurred decreased.

•

The chance of the pilot not exhibiting circular decision-making decreased.

•

The chance of the pilot exhibiting cognitive anchoring decreased.

•

The chance of the pilot not being able to recognize self-reported weather
cues decreased.

These correlations relate to the identified research literature. The current research
correlation findings between pilot age and the applicable contextual factors support the
Saxton (2008) study findings on sunk cost. It is possible the pilots who flew longer
distances and crashed closer to the destination were financially motivated. Correlation
findings of the current study also confirm the study results of the Wiegmann, Goh, and
O’Hare (2002) research. It could be the case when adverse weather was encountered
later in the flight, the pilots were more likely to continue due to increased optimism about
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the possibility of a successful landing at the destination (positive outcome) than the pilots
would have been had they encountered bad weather early in a flight. Johnson and
Wiegmann (2015) and Ahlstrom, Ohneiser, and Caddigan (2016) study results cannot be
addressed with the current study findings as it is unknown how the pilots used the incockpit installed weather equipment information or weather information obtained through
portable weather smart phone applications or other devices. Walmsley and Gilbey (2016)
study findings are also supported by the current results, as it is possible the pilots flew
longer in IMC toward the destination because they interpreted the decisions of pilots who
flew into deteriorating weather conditions toward the same destination more favorably as
they landed at the same destination airport and perhaps heard their radio transmissions
over the common traffic advisory frequency communicating a successful landing had
been accomplished (positive outcome) as opposed to not being able to make the
destination airport (negative outcome). In the research completed by Bazargan and
Guzhva (2011) on the impact of gender, age, and experience of pilots on general aviation
accidents, it was found older pilots have a higher probability of being involved in both
fatal and non-fatal accidents. The statistically significant positive correlation findings
between the identified contextual factors and older pilots support the Bazargan and
Guzhva (2011) research for factors contributing to the higher probability of older pilots
being involved in both fatal and non-fatal accidents.
Statistically significant relationships between GA pilot flight experience (total
flight hours) and the specific research identified contextual factors were also determined
using the point biserial correlation. A total of five positive and six negative significant
correlations were identified. The relationship between total flight hours and the pilot not
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exhibiting permission-seeking behaviors was significant at the p < .01 level, r = -.239, p =
.000 (CF32). As the number of total flight hours increased, the chance of the pilot not
exhibiting permission-seeking behaviors decreased. It was also found as the pilot’s total
flight hours increased, the chance of not being in violation of organizational flight plan
policy, filing IFR when required increased, p < .05, r = .209, p = .001 (C23). The other
statistically significant relationships between GA pilot flight experience (total flight
hours) and the specific research identified contextual factors are as follows, as the flight
experience (total flight hours) increased (Table 17):
•

the chance of not exhibiting linear decision-making increased, p < .05,
r = .200, p = .001 (CF27)

•

the chance of not being under stress and anticipating the consequences of
flying in IMC increased, p < .05, r = .153, p = .015 (CF13)

•

the chance of flying into known icing conditions increased, p < .05,
r = .148, p = .018 (CF22)

•

the chance of not communicating with air traffic control at the time of the
VFR-into-IMC accident increased, p < .05, r = .131, p = .037 (CF12)

•

the chance of the pilot being in violation of FAA ratings policy decreased,
p < .01 level, r = -.231, p = .000 (CF35)

•

the chance of the pilot not being in violation of FAA ratings policy
decreased, p < .01, r = -.231, p = .000 (CF35)

•

the chance of communication with a briefer decreased, p < .01, r = -.178, p
= .004 (CF33)
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•

the chance of being in communication with air traffic control at the time of
the VFR-into-IMC accident decreased, p < .05, r = -.156, p = .012 (CF12)

•

the chance of descending below weather minimums decreased, p < .05,
r = -.149, p = .018 (CF20)

Table 17
Point Biserial Correlations Between Contextual Factors and Experience

Contextual Factor
The pilot did not exhibit
permission-seeking
behaviors (CF32)
The pilot was in violation
of FAA ratings policy
(CF35)
The pilot was not in
violation of FAA ratings
policy (CF35)
The pilot was not in
violation of organizational
flight plan policy - filing
IFR when required
(CF23)
The pilot did not exhibit
linear decision-making
(CF27)
The pilot was in
communication with a
briefer (CF33)
The pilot was
communicating with air
traffic control at the time
of the VFR-into-IMC
accident (CF12)

Experience
r = -.239, p = .000
r = -.231, p = .000
r = -.231, p = .000

r = .209, p = .001

r = .200, p = .001
r = -.178, p = .004

r = -.156, p = .012
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Table 17 continued
Point Biserial Correlations Between Contextual Factors and Experience

Contextual Factor
The pilot was not under
stress and did anticipate
the consequences of
flying in IMC (CF13)
The pilot did not descend
below weather minimums
(CF20)
The pilot flew into known
icing conditions (CF22)
The pilot did not
communicate with air
traffic control at the time
of the VFR-into-IMC
accident (CF12)

Experience

r = .153, p = .015

r = -.149, p = .018
r = .148, p = .018

r = .131, p = .037

There were a total of five statistically significant positive correlations between
experience (total flight hours) and the identified contextual factors. As the total flight
hours increased, the chance of the pilot not being in violation of organizational flight plan
policy, filing IFR when required increased. The other significant positive correlations
included the following:
•

The chance of the pilot not exhibiting linear decision-making increased.

•

The chance of the pilot not being under stress and anticipating the
consequences of flying in IMC increased.

•

The chance of the pilot flying into known icing conditions increased.
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•

The chance of the pilot not communicating with air traffic control at the
time of the VFR-into-IMC accident increased.

There were a total of six statistically significant negative correlations between experience
(total flight hours) and the identified contextual factors. As the total flight hours
increased, the chance of the pilot not exhibiting permission-seeking behaviors decreased.
As the total flight hours increased, the chance of the pilot being in violation of FAA
ratings policy decreased, the chance of the pilot not being in violation of FAA ratings
policy decreased, the chance of the pilot being in communication with a briefer
decreased, the chance of the pilot communicating with air traffic control at the time of the
VFR-into-IMC accident decreased, and the chance of the pilot not descending below
weather minimums decreased.
These positive and negative correlations relate to the identified research literature.
Wiegmann, Goh, and O'Hare (2002) discovered the time and distance GA pilots flew into
the weather before deciding to divert were negatively correlated with previous flight
experience. Findings of the study suggested VFR flight into IMC may be caused, in part,
by poor situation assessment and experience rather than motivational judgment,
encouraging risk-taking behavior as the GA pilot invests more time in the flight. More
research is needed to improve understanding of pilot behavior and VFR-into-IMC
accidents. Current study findings support the Bazargan and Guzhva (2011) research
exploring whether pilot age and experience were factors in VFR-into-IMC occurrences.
Results indicated male pilots over 60 years of age with more experience were more likely
than other pilots to be involved in a fatal accident. As the mean age of the pilots in the
study were 57 years of age, including pilots as old as 82 years of age, it is possible the
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age of pilots over 60 with high flight hours and associated experience (total flight hours)
was a factor contributing to the fatal accidents.
Statistically significant relationships between GA pilot certification
(Instrument/Non-Instrument) and the specific research-identified contextual factors were
determined using the phi correlation. A total of one significant positive and 15
significant negative correlations were identified. The relationship between certification
(Instrument/Non-Instrument) and the pilot not submitting a flight plan to flight service
(CF21) was significant at the p < .01 level, r = .377, p = .000. As the pilot certification
from non-instrument to instrument-rating increased, the chance of the pilot not submitting
a flight plan to flight service increased. It was also found as the pilot’s certification from
non-instrument to instrument-rating increased, the chance of the pilot taking a safety risk
to fly in IMC conditions to the planned destination decreased, p < .01 level, r = -.222, p =
.000 (CF24). The other statistically significant relationships between GA pilot
certification (Instrument/Non-Instrument) and the specific research identified contextual
factors are as follows, as the pilot certification increased from the non-instrument to the
instrument rating (Table 18):
•

the chance of the aircraft crash site being closer to the planned destination
than the departure location decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.186, p = .002
(CF15)

•

the chance of adverse weather being encountered before the mid flight
point was reached decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.165, p = .007 (CF2)
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•

the chance of less than or equal to half the time and distance required to
reach the destination before the accident occurred decreased, p < .05 level,
r = -.163, p = .008 (CF6)

•

the chance of the aircraft crash site not being closer to the departure
location than the planned destination decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.164, p
= .008 (CF14)

•

the chance of adverse weather encountered after the mid flight point was
reached decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.161, p = .009 (CF3)

•

the chance of the aircraft crash site being closer to the departure location
than the planned destination decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.16, p = .009
(CF14)

•

the chance of the pilot not communicating with air traffic control at the
time of the VFR-into-IMC accident decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.159, p =
.01 (CF12)

•

the chance of pilot deciding to continue VFR-into-IMC to the planned
destination decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.156, p = .011 (CF17)

•

the chance of the pilot not being in violation of the FAA flight time
currency policy decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.153, p = .013 (CF16)

•

the chance of the aircraft crash site not being closer to the planned
destination than the departure location decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.139,
p = .024 (CF15)

•

the chance of the adverse weather not encountered before the mid flight
point was reached decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.126, p = .04 (CF2)
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•

the chance of the cues signaling a problem being clear to pilot decreased, p
< .05 level, r = -.126, p = .04 (CF5)

•

the chance of the pilot communicating with air traffic control at the time
of the VFR-into-IMC accident decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.124, p = .044
(CF12)

•

the chance of the pilot overestimating the ceiling and/or visibility weather
conditions decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.122, p = .048 (CF9)

Table 18
Phi Correlations Between Contextual Factors and Certification

Contextual Factor
The pilot did not submit a
flight plan to flight
service (CF21)
The pilot took a safety
risk to fly in IMC
conditions to planned
destination (CF24)
The aircraft crash site was
closer to the planned
destination than the
departure location (CF15)
Adverse weather
encountered before mid
flight point reached (CF2)
Less than or equal to half
the time and distance
required to reach the
destination before the
accident occurred (CF6)

Pilot Certification
r = .377, p = .000

r = -.222, p = .000

r = -.186, p = .002

r = -.165, p = .007

r = -.163, p = .008
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Table 18 continued
Phi Correlations Between Contextual Factors and Certification

Contextual Factor
The aircraft crash site was
not closer to the departure
location than the planned
destination (CF14)
Adverse weather
encountered after mid
flight point was reached
(CF3)
The aircraft crash site was
closer to the departure
location than the planned
destination (CF14)
The pilot did not
communicate with air
traffic control at the time
of the VFR-into-IMC
accident (CF12)
The pilot decided to
continue VFR-into-IMC
to the planned destination
(CF17)
The pilot was not in
violation of the FAA
flight time currency
policy (CF16)
The aircraft crash site was
not closer to the planned
destination than the
departure location (CF15)
Adverse weather not
encountered before mid
flight point reached (CF2)
Cues signaling problem
clear to pilot (CF5)

Pilot Certification

r = -.164, p = .008

r = -.161, p = .009

r = -.16, p = .009

r = -.159, p = .01

r = -.156, p = .011

r = -.153, p = .013

r = -.139, p = .024

r = -.126, p = .04
r = -.126, p = .04
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Table 18 continued
Phi Correlations Between Contextual Factors and Certification

Contextual Factor
The pilot was
communicating with air
traffic control at the time
of the VFR-into-IMC
accident (CF12)
The pilot overestimated
ceiling and/or visibility
weather conditions (CF9)

Pilot Certification

r = -.124, p = .044

r = -.122, p = .048

There was a total of one significant positive and 15 significant negative
correlations between certification (non-instrument verses instrument rating) and the
identified contextual factors. As the pilot certification from non-instrument to
instrument-rating increased, the chance of the pilot not submitting a flight plan to flight
service increased. The other significant negative correlations included the following:
•

The chance of the pilot taking a safety risk to fly in IMC conditions to the
planned destination decreased.

•

The chance of the aircraft crash site being closer to the planned destination
than the departure location decreased.

•

The chance of adverse weather being encountered before the mid flight
point was reached decreased.

•

The chance of less than or equal to half the time and distance required to
reach the destination before the accident occurred decreased.
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•

The chance of the aircraft crash site not being closer to the departure
location than the planned destination decreased.

•

The chance of adverse weather being encountered after the mid flight
point was reached decreased.

•

The chance of the aircraft crash site being closer to the departure location
than the planned destination decreased.

•

The chance of the pilot not communicating with air traffic control at the
time of the VFR-into-IMC accident decreased.

•

The chance of the pilot deciding to continue VFR-into-IMC to the planned
destination decreased.

•

The chance of the pilot not being in violation of the FAA flight time
currency policy decreased.

•

The chance of the aircraft crash site not being closer to the planned
destination than the departure location decreased.

•

The chance of adverse weather not being encountered before the mid
flight point was reached decreased.

•

The chance of cues signaling a problem were clear to pilot decreased.

•

The chance of the pilot not communicating with air traffic control at the
time of the VFR-into-IMC accident decreased.

•

The chance of the pilot overestimating the ceiling and/or visibility weather
conditions decreased.

These positive and negative correlations relate to the identified research literature.
Barron (2011) study results found private pilots who were instrument rated were more
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likely to continue farther into IMC than their low time VFR or high time commercial,
and/or ATP counterparts, a finding pertaining primarily to the pilot’s ratings. The current
study findings confirmed the Baron (2011) research results, as it was discovered as the
GA pilot certification increased from the non-instrument to the instrument rating, the
chance of the aircraft crash site not being closer to the planned destination than the
departure location decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.139, p = .024 (CF15). There were more
instrument rated pilots identified in the current study crashing closer to the destination
than the departure. Current study findings also support the Jackman’s (2014) research
pertaining to the discovery through the results of a binary logistic regression analysis
pilot ratings violations and pilot currency violations were statistically significant
predictors of fatality. The current study discovered as the certification of the GA pilot
increased from the non-instrument to the instrument rating, the chance of the pilot not
being in violation of the FAA flight time currency policy decreased, p < .05 level, r = .153, p = .013 (CF16). Current study findings support the Coyne, Baldwin, and
Latrorella (2008) results. While instrument rated pilots are more likely to continue into
adverse weather, they are, according to Coyne, Baldwin, and Latrorella (2008), less
proficient in accurately determining true visibility. Coyne, Baldwin, and Latrorella
(2005) also explained, on average, pilots overestimated visibility when ceilings were
higher, and overestimated ceilings when visibility was better. It was suggested by the
researchers the interaction of ceiling and visibility shows pilots may be inappropriately
assessing weather conditions. Findings of the current study disagree with the Baldwin
and Latrorella (2005) study conclusions. A weak negative relationship was identified in
the current study. It was determined as the GA pilot certification increased from the non-
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instrument to instrument rating, the chances of the pilot overestimating the ceiling and/or
visibility weather conditions decreased (CF9) and was significant at the p < .05 level, r =
-0.122, p = 0.048.
Statistically significant relationships between Weather (Inclement/NonInclement) and the specific research identified contextual factors were determined using
the phi correlation. A total of one significant positive and 14 significant negative
correlations were identified. The relationship between Weather (Inclement/NonInclement) and the pilot being in violation of conducting an IFR flight without proper
clearance or ratings was significant at the p < .01 level, r = .230, p = .000 (CF26). As the
weather increased from non-inclement to inclement, the chance of the pilot being in
violation of conducting an IFR flight without proper clearance or ratings increased. It
was also found as the weather increased from non-inclement to inclement, the chance of
the pilot not being in violation of FAA medical status policy decreased, p < .01 level, r =
-.293, p = .000 (CF28). The other statistically significant relationships between Weather
(Inclement/Non-Inclement) and the specific research-identified contextual factors are as
follows:
As the weather increased from non-inclement to inclement (Table 19):
•

the chance of the pilot exhibiting PCE behavior decreased, p < .01 level, r
= -.306, p = .000 (CF34)

•

the chance of the pilot misdiagnosing the changes in or severity of the
weather decreased, p < .01 level, r = -.322, p = .000 (CF39)
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•

the chance of the pilot underestimating the level of risk associated with
cues that should have signaled a change in course of action decreased, p <
.01 level, r = -.322, p = .000 (CF43)

•

the chance of adverse weather encountered before the mid flight point was
reached decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.165, p = .007 (CF2)

•

the chance of adverse weather encountered after the mid flight point was
reached decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.161, p = .009 (CF3)

•

the chance of the pilot not being in violation of FAA ratings policy
decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.154, p = .012 (CF35)

•

the chance of the pilot being in violation of FAA ratings policy decreased,
p < .05 level, r = -.150, p = .015 (CF35)

•

the chance of the pilot receiving a weather briefing decreased, p < .05
level, r = -.147, p = .017 (CF36)

•

the chance of the pilot being in communication with a briefer decreased, p
< .05 level, r = -.143, p = .02 (CF33)

•

the chance of the pilot being able to recognize self-reported weather cues
decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.136, p = .027 (CF38)

•

the chance of the pilot not being in communication with a briefer
decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.132, p = .032 (CF33)

•

the chance of adverse weather not encountered before the mid flight point
was reached decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.126, p = .04 (CF2)

•

the chance of the pilot not receiving a weather briefing decreased, p < .05
level, r = -.122, p = .048 (CF36)
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Table 19
Phi Correlations Between Contextual Factors and Weather

Contextual Factor
The pilot was in violation
of conducting an IFR
flight without proper
clearance or ratings
(CF26)
The pilot was not in
violation of FAA medical
status policy (CF28)
The pilot exhibited Plan
Continuation Error (PCE)
behavior (CF34)
The pilot misdiagnosed
the changes in or severity
of the weather (CF39)
The pilot underestimated
the level of risk associated
with cues that should have
signaled a change in
course of action (CF43)
Adverse weather
encountered before mid
flight point reached (CF2)
Adverse weather
encountered after mid
flight point was reached
(CF3)
The pilot was not in
violation of FAA ratings
policy (CF35)
The pilot was in violation
of FAA ratings policy
(CF35)
The pilot received a
weather briefing (CF36)

Weather

r = .230, p = .000

r = -.293, p = .000
r = -.306, p = .000
r = -.322, p = .000

r = -.322, p = .000

r = -.165, p = .007

r = -.161, p = .009

r = -.154, p = .012
r = -.150, p = .015
r = -.147, p = .017
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Table 19 continued
Phi Correlations Between Contextual Factors and Weather

Contextual Factor
The pilot was in
communication with a
briefer (CF33)
The pilot was able to
recognize self-reported
weather cues (CF38)
The pilot was not in
communication with a
briefer (CF33)
Adverse weather not
encountered before mid
flight point reached (CF2)
The pilot did not receive a
weather briefing (CF36)

Weather
r = -.143, p = .02
r = -.136, p = .027
r = -.132, p = .032
r = -.126, p = .04
r = -.122, p = .048

There was a total of one positive significant and 14 negative significant
correlations between weather (inclement/non-inclement) and the identified contextual
factors. As the weather increased from non-inclement to inclement conditions, the
chance of the pilot being in violation of conducting an IFR flight without proper
clearance or ratings increased. The other significant negative correlations included the
following:
•

The chance of the pilot not being in violation of FAA medical status
policy decreased.

•

The chance of the pilot exhibiting PCE behavior decreased.
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•

The chance of the pilot misdiagnosing the changes in or severity of the
weather decreased.

•

The chance of the pilot underestimating the level of risk associated with
cues that should have signaled a change in course of action decreased.

•

The chance of adverse weather being encountered before the mid flight
point was reached decreased.

•

The chance of adverse weather being encountered after the mid flight
point was reached decreased.

•

The chance of the pilot not being in violation of FAA ratings policy
decreased.

•

The chance of the pilot being in violation of FAA ratings policy
decreased.

•

The chance of the pilot receiving a weather briefing decreased.

•

The chance of the pilot being in communication with a briefer decreased.

•

The chance of the pilot being able to recognize self-reported weather cues
decreased.

•

The chance of the pilot being in communication with a briefer decreased.

•

The chance of adverse weather not being encountered before the mid
flight point was reached decreased.

•

The chance of the pilot not receiving a weather briefing decreased.

These positive and negative correlations relate to the identified research literature.
Current research findings confirm the Jackman (2014) study results on FAA ratings and
medical status violations. The findings revealed flight plan violations and pilot medical
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status violations were not statistically significant predictors of fatality. It was discovered
through the results of the binary logistic regression analysis, pilot ratings violations were
statistically significant predictors of fatality. It could be the case the pilots in the study
flying while violating FAA ratings policy contributed to the fatal accidents. The current
research findings also support the Saxton (2008) study conclusions on sunk cost. It is
possible the pilots in the study took greater risks by continuing further into adverse
weather when IMC was encountered later into a flight. It could also be the case as the
pilots were not in communication with a briefer and did not receive a weather briefing
these contextual factors contributed to the fatal accidents as well.
Statistically significant relationships between Flight Conditions (VMC/IMC) and
the specific research identified contextual factors were determined using the phi
correlation. A total of 16 significant negative correlations were identified. The
relationship between Flight Conditions (VMC/IMC) and the pilot not submitting a flight
plan to flight service was significant at the p < .01 level, r = -.322, p = .000 (CF21). As
the flight conditions increased from VMC to IMC, the chance of the pilot not submitting
a flight plan to flight service decreased. It was also found as the flight conditions
increased from VMC to IMC, the chance of the pilot taking a safety risk to fly in IMC
conditions to the planned destination decreased, p < .01 level, r = -.332, p = .000 (CF24).
Other statistically significant relationships between Flight Conditions (VMC/IMC) and
the specific research identified contextual factors are as follows, as the flight conditions
increased from VMC to IMC (Table 20):
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•

the chance of the aircraft crash site being closer to the planned destination
than the departure location decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.186, p = .002
(CF15)

•

the chance of adverse weather encountered before the mid flight point was
reached decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.165, p = .007 (CF2)

•

the chance of less than or equal to half the time and distance required to
reach the destination before the accident occurred decreased, p < .05 level,
r = -.163, p = .008 (CF6)

•

the chance of the aircraft crash site not being closer to the departure
location than the planned destination decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.164, p
= .008 (CF14)

•

the chance of adverse weather encountered after the mid flight point was
reached decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.161, p = .009 (CF3)

•

the chance of the aircraft crash site being closer to the departure location
than the planned destination decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.16, p = .009
(CF14)

•

the chance of the pilot not communicating with air traffic control at the
time of the VFR-into-IMC accident decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.159 p =
.01 (CF12)

•

the chance of the pilot deciding to continue VFR-into-IMC to the planned
destination decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.156 p = .011 (CF17)

•

the chance of the pilot not being in violation of the FAA flight time
currency policy decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.153 p = .013 (CF16)
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•

the chance of the aircraft crash site not being closer to the planned
destination than the departure location decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.139 p
= .024 (CF15)

•

the chance of adverse weather not encountered before mid flight point
reached decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.126 p = .04 (CF2)

•

the chance of cues signaling a problem were clear to the pilot decreased, p
< .05 level, r = -.126 p = .04 (CF5)

•

the chance of the pilot communicating with air traffic control at the time
of the VFR-into-IMC accident decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.124 p = .044
(CF12)

•

the chance of the pilot overestimating the ceiling and/or visibility weather
conditions decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.122 p = .048 (CF9)

Table 20
Phi Correlations Between Contextual Factors and Flight Conditions

Contextual Factor
The pilot did not submit a
flight plan to flight
service (CF21)
The pilot took a safety
risk to fly in IMC
conditions to planned
destination (CF24)

Flight Conditions
r = -.322, p = .000

r = -.231, p = .000

190
Table 20 continued
Phi Correlations Between Contextual Factors and Flight Conditions

Contextual Factor
The aircraft crash site was
closer to the planned
destination than the
departure location (CF15)
Adverse weather
encountered before mid
flight point reached (CF2)
Less than or equal to half
the time and distance
required to reach the
destination before the
accident occurred (CF6)
The aircraft crash site was
not closer to the departure
location than the planned
destination (CF14)
Adverse weather
encountered after mid
flight point was reached
(CF3)
The aircraft crash site was
closer to the departure
location than the planned
destination (CF14)
The pilot did not
communicate with air
traffic control at the time
of the VFR-into-IMC
accident (CF12)
The pilot decided to
continue VFR-into-IMC
to the planned destination
(CF17)
The pilot was not in
violation of the FAA
flight time currency
policy (CF16)

Flight Conditions

r = -.186, p = .002

r = -.165, p = .007

r = -.163, p = .008

r = -.164, p = .008

r = -.161, p = .009

r = -.16, p = .009

r = -.159, p = .01

r = -.156, p = .011

r = -.153, p = .013
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Table 20 continued
Phi Correlations Between Contextual Factors and Flight Conditions

Contextual Factor
The aircraft crash site was
not closer to the planned
destination than the
departure location (CF15)
Adverse weather not
encountered before mid
flight point reached (CF2)
Cues signaling problem
clear to pilot (CF5)
The pilot was
communicating with air
traffic control at the time
of the VFR-into-IMC
accident (CF12)
The pilot overestimated
ceiling and/or visibility
weather conditions (CF9)

Flight Conditions

r = -.139, p = .024

r = -.126, p = .004
r = -.126, p = .04

r = -.124, p = .044

r = -.122, p = .048

There were 16 statistically significant negative correlations between flight
conditions (VMC/IMC) and the identified contextual factors. As the flight conditions
increased from VMC to IMC, the chance of the pilot not submitting a flight plan to flight
service decreased. These negative correlations also included the following:
•

The chance of the pilot taking a safety risk to fly in IMC conditions to the
planned destination decreased.

•

The chance of the aircraft crash site being closer to the planned destination
than the departure location decreased.
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•

The chance of adverse weather being encountered before the mid flight
point was reached decreased.

•

The chance of less than or equal to half the time and distance required to
reach the destination before the accident occurred decreased.

•

The chance of the aircraft crash site not being closer to the departure
location than the planned destination decreased.

•

The chance of adverse weather being encountered after the mid flight
point was reached decreased.

•

The chance of the aircraft crash site being closer to the departure location
than the planned destination decreased.

•

The chance of the pilot not communicating with air traffic control at the
time of the VFR-into-IMC accident decreased.

•

The chance of the pilot deciding to continue VFR-into-IMC to the planned
destination decreased.

•

The chance of the pilot not being in violation of the FAA flight time
currency policy decreased.

•

The chance of the aircraft crash site not being closer to the planned
destination than the departure location decreased.

•

The chance of adverse weather not being encountered before the mid
flight point was reached decreased.

•

The chance of the cues signaling a problem were clear to pilot decreased.

•

The chance of the pilot communicating with air traffic control at the time
of the VFR-into-IMC accident decreased.
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•

The chance of the pilot overestimating the ceiling and/or visibility weather
conditions decreased.

These negative correlations relate to the identified research literature. The current study
findings support the Wiegmann, Goh, and O'Hare (2002) conclusions on the amount of
time and distance GA pilots flew into the IMC weather before deciding to divert. Study
findings identified pilots who encountered the deteriorating weather earlier in the flight
flew longer into IMC before diverting and were more optimistic about the weather
conditions. The GA pilots who encountered the IMC weather later in the flight flew
shorter distances into IMC before diverting and were not optimistic about the weather
conditions. In the current study it was discovered as the weather increased from VMC to
IMC, the crash sites and adverse weather occurred closer to the departure location
slightly more often than the crash sites identified closer to the planned destination. It
could be the case these pilots flew longer into IMC before attempting to divert to an
alternate location and were more optimistic about the weather conditions. It is also
possible as these pilots did not submit flight plans, were not in communication with air
traffic control at the time of the accident, and violated FAA flight time currency policy,
these contextual factors contributed to the fatal accidents as well.
Significant relationships between Accident Time of Day (Day/Night) and the
specific research-identified contextual factors were determined using the phi correlation.
A total of four significant positive and three significant negative correlations were
identified. The relationship between Accident Time of Day (Day/Night) and the aircraft
crash site not being closer to the planned destination than the departure location was
significant at the p < .05 level, r = .189, p = .002 (CF15). As the time of day increased
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from Day to Night, the chance of the aircraft crash site not being closer to the planned
destination than the departure location increased. It was also found as the time of day
increased from Day to Night, the chance of adverse weather encountered before the mid
flight point was reached increased, p < .05 level, r = .177, p = .004 (CF2). Other
statistically significant relationships between Accident Time of Day (Day/Night) and the
specific research-identified contextual factors are as follows, as the time of day increased
from day to night (Table 21):
•

the chance of the aircraft crash being closer to the departure location than
the planned destination increased, p < .05 level, r = .168, p = .006 (CF14)

•

the chance of adverse weather encountered after the mid flight point was
reached decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.155, p = .012 (CF3)

•

the chance of adverse weather not encountered before the mid flight point
was reached decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.146, p = .018 (CF2)

•

the chance of less than or equal to half the time and distance required to
reach the destination before the accident occurred increased, p < .05 level,
r = .133, p = .03 (CF6)

•

the chance of the aircraft crash site being closer to the planned destination
than the departure location decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.13, p = .034
(CF15)
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Table 21
Phi Correlations Between Contextual Factors and Time of Day

Contextual Factor
The aircraft crash site was
not closer to the planned
destination than the
departure location (CF15)
Adverse weather
encountered before mid
flight point reached (CF2)
The aircraft crash site was
closer to the departure
location than the planned
destination (CF14)
Adverse weather
encountered after mid
flight point was reached
(CF3)
Adverse weather not
encountered before mid
flight point reached (CF2)
Less than or equal to half
the time and distance
required to reach the
destination before the
accident occurred (CF6)
The aircraft crash site was
closer to the planned
destination than the
departure location (CF15)

Time of Day

r = .189, p = .002

r = .177, p = .004

r = .168, p = .006

r = -.155, p = .012

r = -.146, p = .018

r = .133, p = .03

r = -.13, p = .034

There were four statistically significant positive correlations between the
Accident Time of Day (Day/Night) and the identified contextual factors. As the time of
day increased from day to night, the chance of the aircraft crash site not being closer to
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the planned destination than the departure location increased. Other significant positive
correlations included the following:
•

The chance of weather being encountered before the mid flight point was
reached increased.

•

The chance of the aircraft crash site being closer to the departure location
than the planned destination increased.

•

The chance of less than or equal to half the time and distance required to
reach the destination before the accident occurred increased.

There were three statistically significant negative correlations between the Accident Time
of Day (Day/Night) and the identified contextual factors. As the accident time of day
increased from day to night, the chance of adverse weather being encountered after the
mid flight point was reached decreased. The other statistically significant negative
correlations included the following:
•

The chance of adverse weather not encountered before the mid flight
point was reached decreased.

•

The chance of the aircraft crash site being closer to the planned
destination than the departure location decreased.

These significant positive and negative correlations relate to the identified research
literature. The current study findings support the Wiegmann, Goh, and O'Hare (2002)
conclusions on the amount of time and distance GA pilots flew into the IMC weather
before deciding to divert. Study findings identified pilots who encountered the
deteriorating weather earlier in the flight flew longer into IMC before diverting and were
more optimistic about the weather conditions. The GA pilots who encountered the IMC
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weather later in the flight flew shorter distances into IMC before diverting and were not
optimistic about the weather conditions. In the current study, it was discovered as the
Time of Day increased from Day to Night, the crash sites and adverse weather occurred
closer to the departure locations than the planned destinations. It could be the case these
pilots flew longer into IMC before attempting to divert to an alternate location and were
more optimistic about the weather conditions.
Significant contextual factors identified included those factors revealed from the
multiple regression analyses with the crash distance from departure to the midpoint of the
planned route (0% to 50% of planned route completion). The results of the multiple
regression analyses with the crash distance from departure to the midpoint of the planned
route (0% to 50% of planned route completion) are the following:
•

The flight time and distance in IMC were less than or equal to half the
time and distance required to reach the destination, p = .033 (CF7).

•

The pilot submitted a flight plan to flight service, p = .040 (CF21).

•

The pilot did not fly into known icing conditions, p = .027 (CF22).

•

The pilot was conducting scud running flight operations at the time of the
accident, p = .054 (CF37).

The results added statistically significantly to the prediction of the crash distance
from departure to the midpoint of the planned route of flight (0% to 50%), F (72, 182) =
1.494, p < .017, R2 = .371. Current study results support the Saxton (2008) study
findings on sunk cost to be a valid concept, as the participants of the study who were
financially motivated did, in fact, continue longer into poor weather conditions than the
participants who were not financially motivated and came upon hazardous weather earlier
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in the flight. It could be the case the pilots in the current study, having encountered IMC
early in the flight, continued farther into IMC because they were financially motivated.
The current study findings also support the Wiegmann, Goh, and O'Hare (2002) results
identifying pilots who encountered the deteriorating weather earlier in the flight flew
longer into IMC before diverting and were more optimistic about the weather conditions.
It is possible the pilots in the current study, having encountered IMC early in the flight,
flew greater distances into IMC and were optimistic about the weather conditions.
Current study findings also support the Walmsley and Gilbey (2016) results of pilots
interpreting the decisions of pilots who flew into deteriorating weather conditions more
favorably when the outcome was positive than when the outcome was negative. It could
be the case the pilots in the current study may have flown farther than they would have
into IMC knowing other pilots had arrived successfully at the planned destination perhaps
through hearing the radio transmissions of the pilots landing at the same destination. The
findings of the current study are also consistent with the Ball (2008) results finding
training improved pilots’ ability to maintain safe distances from poor weather conditions.
It is possible the pilots in the current study made a conscious choice to fly into IMC
influenced by level of experience and quality of training.
The significant contextual factors identified from the multiple regression analyses
also included those factors revealed with the crash distance from the midpoint of the
planned route (51% to 100% of planned route completion) and include the following:
•

The adverse weather was encountered before mid flight point reached, p =
.009 (CF2).
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•

The adverse weather was encountered after the mid flight point was reached, p
= .000 (CF3).

•

The flight time and distance in IMC were greater than half the time and
distance required to reach the destination before diverting, p = .003 (CF7).

•

The pilot was not fixated on visually compelling head down displays, p = .021
(CF8).

•

The pilot was under stress and did not anticipate the consequences of flying in
IMC, p = .017 (CF13).

•

The pilot decided not to continue VFR-into-IMC to the planned destination, p
= .018 (CF17).

•

The pilot decided to continue VFR-into-IMC to the planned destination, p =
.032 (CF17).

•

The pilot submitted a flight plan to flight service, p = .002 (CF21).

•

The pilot flew into known icing conditions, p = .027 (CF22).

•

The pilot exhibited linear decision-making, p = .004 (CF27).

•

The pilot did not exhibit permission-seeking behaviors, p = .011 (CF32).

The findings added statistically significantly to the prediction of the crash distance from
the midpoint to the destination of the planned route of flight (51% to 100%), F (72, 182)
= 3.178, p < .01, R2 = .557. Current study results support the Keller (2015) findings of
VFR pilots who flew into IMC did so because they misperceived the severity of the
weather and the associated risks and pilots who turned, or diverted, did so because they
became aware of the danger and sought to return to safety. It could be the case in the
current study the pilots who attempted to land at the destination in IMC and crashed may
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have misperceived the severity and risks of flying in adverse weather and those pilots
diverting to an alternate did so because they became aware of the risks of flying in IMC
and attempted to divert to an alternate or the departure point. The current study also
supports the O’Hare and Smitheram (1995) research finding pilots who viewed risk from
a gain standpoint were less likely to continue into IMC, and those who considered risk
from a loss viewpoint were more likely to continue. It is possible the pilots in the current
study who attempted to land at the destination viewed risk from a loss perspective and
continued in IMC to the planned arrival point. It could also be the case the pilots in the
current study who viewed risk from a gain perspective diverted to an alternate location or
the departure point. The current study also agrees with the Wiegmann, Goh, and O’Hare
(2002) research results; when adverse weather is encountered later in flight, pilots are
more likely to continue as they might be more optimistic about the possibility of positive
outcomes than they are when they encounter poor weather early in a flight. Results were
consistent with more optimism during poor weather encounters occurring later into
flights and less optimism when hazardous weather was present earlier in flights. It could
be the case the pilots in the current study encountering IMC later in the flight were more
likely to continue to the planned destination being more optimistic of the positive
outcome of a successful landing at the arrival point. It is also possible the pilots in the
current study encountering IMC earlier in the flight were more likely to divert to an
alternate or attempt to return to the departure point being less optimistic with bad weather
encountered early in the flight. The current study results also agree with the Ahlstrom,
Ohneiser, and Caddigan (2016) findings documenting the tendency of the novice pilot to
utilize linear decision-making and the expert pilot utilization of circular decision-making.
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Researchers explained when the pilot chooses to continue into questionable weather
conditions, circumstances including invested time, money and energy, passenger
pressure; and get-there-itis may influence a pilot to continue, rather than divert. It is
possible the pilots in the current study making the decision to continue in IMC to the
planned destination used linear decision making rather than circular decision making and
could have been influenced by any of the identified factors contributing to the fatal
accidents. The current study also supports the Goh and Wiegmann (2001) results
identifying pilots who overestimated personal abilities and inaccurately diagnosed
visibility were more likely to continue into adverse weather. It could be the case the
pilots in the current study making the decision to continue into IMC to the planned
destination were overconfident in their personal abilities and misjudged the decreasing
visibility, thinking the visibility was higher when in fact it was lower, and continued into
IMC to the destination, factors possibly contributing to the accident. Current study
findings also support the Walmsley and Gilbey (2016) results of pilots interpreting the
decisions of pilots who flew into deteriorating weather conditions more favorably when
the outcome was positive than when the outcome was negative. It could be the case the
pilots in the current study heard pilots on the radio arriving at the destination airport and
making a successful landing (positive outcome) and decided to continue to the same
destination airport in IMC to attempt a landing with deteriorating weather conditions
based on the successful landing of other pilots in better weather conditions. The current
study also supports the Coyne, Baldwin, and Latrorella (2005) findings on linear
decision-making, where pilots commit to one decision without reevaluation after actions
have been implemented. It is possible the pilots in the current study used linear rather
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than circular decision making and did not check decisions once they were made to see if
another decision should be made based on updated information, contributing to the fatal
accident. The current study also supports the Ball (2008) research findings for the reason
pilots fly too closely to adverse weather being a conscious choice influenced by level of
experience and quality of training. It could be the case the pilots in the current study
made the conscious choice to fly too closely to adverse weather based on level of flight
experience and quality of the training received. The current study also supports the
Martin, Davison, and Orasanu (1998) research findings investigating errors in aviation
decision-making. It was hypothesized by the researchers errors are facilitated by
underestimation of risk and failure to analyze the potential consequences of continuing
with the initial plan as well as stressors may further contribute to these effects. It could
be the case the pilots in the current study were involved in the fatal aircraft crashes
resulting partially from contributory factors related to bad decision-making,
underestimation of risk, and stress.
Conclusions
The main study was able to answer the three research questions for the 46
research-identified contextual factors related to Part 91, GA pilot intentions and behavior
resulting in VFR-into-IMC accidents. The first and second research questions were as
follows:
1. What contextual factors contribute to Part 91, GA pilot VFR-into-IMC
accidents in the reviewed NTSB AARs?
2. What is the frequency of occurrence for the contextual factors in Part 91, GA
pilot VFR into-IMC accidents in the reviewed NTSB AARs?
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The study’s research questions one and two were able to be answered by the
researcher. The 46 research-identified contextual factors present in the main study
sample of 85 accidents, as identified by the three raters, were sorted to identify the
specific contextual factors and associated frequencies from the results obtained from
SPSSTM (Appendix H; Table H1). Three raters identified a total of 37 out of 46 researchidentified contextual factors in the 85 accident sample used in the main study. Highest
presence and frequencies of the top five rater identified contextual factors in the sample
of 85 GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC NTSB AARs included the following: (1) number of
passengers on board (CF29-62%), (2) accident time of day (Day) (CF1-60%), (3) crash
distance from planned destination (CF15-54%), (4) not filing a flight plan (CF21-49%),
and (5) underestimating risk (CF43-49%).
The third research question was as follows:
3. How are the contextual factors manifested in Part 91, GA pilot VFR-into-IMC
accidents in the sample of reviewed NTSB AARs?
The researcher was able to answer the third research question. Three raters
provided their respective opinions about how the 46 research-identified contextual factors
were manifested in the 85 accident sample. Highest frequency rater-identified contextual
factor manifestations including the following:
The number of passengers on board the aircraft was identified by the raters in the
85 NTSB accident sample. A total of 53 out of 85 aircraft, or 62% of the accident
sample, had passengers on board the aircraft. A break down according to category of
passenger number on board the aircraft and the associated percentages were identified as
follows: 32 aircraft (0 passengers - 38%), 36 aircraft (1 passenger – 42%), 11 accidents (2
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passengers – 13%), 3 accidents (3 passengers – 4%), 1 accident (4 passengers – 1%), and
2 accidents (5 passengers – 2%).
Accident time of day was identified by the raters in the 85 NTSB accident sample.
There was a total of 34 accidents occurring during the day and 51 accidents took place at
night. Particular lighting conditions varied and included six accidents taking place at
dusk, 37 during daylight conditions, 33 during night light conditions, five during dark
light conditions, and four during dawn light conditions. Two accidents occurred at 0000,
one at 0100, two at 0400, five at 0500, three at 0600, four at 0700, three at 0800, four at
0900, five at 1000, four at 1100, five at 1200, one at 1300, five at 1400, two at 1500,
three at 1600, four at 1700, seven at 1800, ten at 1900, five at 2000, four at 2100, three at
2200, and three at 2300.
Crash distances from the midpoint to the planned destination were identified by
the raters for the 85 NTSB accident sample. The crash distances from the midpoint to the
planned destination as a percentage of the planned route of flight course completion
included the following: (1) 51% (12 accidents), (2) 56% (1 accident), (3) 59% (1
accident), (4) 60% (1 accident), (5) 62% (1 accident), (6) 66% (1 accident), (7) 69% (1
accident), (8) 70% (2 accidents), (9) 71% (1 accident), (10) 73% (1 accident), (11) 74%
(2 accidents), (12) 77% (3 accidents), (13) 84% (1 accident), (14) 86% (1 accident), (15)
89% (1 accident), (16) 90% (1 accident), (17) 94% (1 accident), (18) 95% (1 accident),
(19) 96% (1 accident), (20) 97% (1 accident), (21) 98% (1 accident), and (22) 99% (9
accidents). A majority of accidents occurred between the midpoint to the planned
destination and totaled 46 versus 39 occurring from the departure to the midpoint of the
planned route of flight.
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Reasons the pilots filed and did not file flight plans were identified by the raters in
the 85 NTSB accident sample. The reasons reported by the raters for pilots filing a flight
plan included the following: (1) the pilot experienced errors in attempting to enter the
flight plan, (2) NTSB investigators making mistakes in reporting pilots not filing flight
plans when the pilots did file flight plans, (3) the pilots filing flight plans and then
cancelling the flight plans for various reasons, and (4) the pilots filing IFR flight plans
when not qualified to file IFR flight plans. Reasons reported by the raters for pilots not
filing flight plans included (1) the pilots felt filing flight plans was not necessary, and (2)
the pilots did not file flight plans when they should have filed flight plans.
Reasons the pilots underestimated the risks in conducting the flights were
identified by the raters in the 85 NTSB accident sample. The reasons reported by the
raters for the pilots underestimating the risks in conducting the flights included the
following: (1) poor decision-making, (2) time of day, (3) lighting conditions, (4) terrain,
(5) social pressure, (6) incomplete weather briefing, (7) incomplete pilot risk assessment,
(8) pilot intentional self-harm, (9) underestimation of risk for flight direction/location
decision, (10) underestimation of risk for flying near adverse weather decision, (11) pilot
self-imposed pressures, (12) equipment failure, (13) ATC failure, and (14)
underestimation of night flying risk.
The main study identified and demonstrated a method of utilizing expert raters
and historical archival fatal accident data and statistical analyses to identify significant
contextual factors to mitigate incidents and accidents. Significance between the majority
of contextual factors and pilot age, flight experience (total flight hours), pilot certification
level (instrument/non-instrument), weather (inclement/non-inclement), flight conditions
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(VMC/IMC), time of day (day/night), crash distance from departure, and crash distance
from planned destination studied at the p < .01 and p < .05 levels were identified. A
rater-identified possible NTSB archival database taxonomy suggestion of pilot intentional
self-harm was also identified. Findings of the current study provided support/refuted the
key discoveries of the Ahlstrom, Ohneiser, and Caddigan (2016), Baldwin and Latrorella
(2005), Ball (2008), Balog (2013), Balog (2016), Barron (2011), Bazargan and Guzhva
(2011), Coyne, Baldwin, and Latrorella (2008), Goh and Wiegmann (2001), Ison
(2014a), Ison (2014b), Jackman (2014), Johnson and Wiegmann (2015), Keller (2015),
Martin, Davison, and Orasanu (1998), O’Hare and Owen (2002), O’Hare and Smitheram
(1995), Saxton (2008), Walmsley and Gilbey (2016), and Wiegmann, Goh, and O’Hare
(2002) research. The application of the demonstrated methodology is generalizable to
any other field and mode of transportation.
Recommendations
It is recommended archival studies be conducted for all flight domains using the
identified methodology, including additional GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC accident
research. The studies should incorporate secondary data from the NTSB and other GA
pilot historical databases. Populations and samples should be taken from a variety of
geographical areas to support/refute the present study contextual factor and manifestation
findings. These recommendations could increase the possibility of identifying other
contextual factors and manifestations not revealed in the current study. Different groups
of raters should be recruited to provide subject matter expertise for VFR-into-IMC
accidents, such as professional flight instructors. Additional research should be
conducted on the GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC contextual factors and manifestations
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identified in the current study to increase knowledge and understanding of the reasons
these factors and manifestations exist. Additional research should also be completed to
improve understanding of the relationships among the contextual factors, manifestations,
pilot age, flight experience (total flight hours), pilot certification level (instrument/noninstrument), weather (inclement/non-inclement), flight conditions (VMC/IMC) and time
of day (day/night) identified in this study. The GA pilot community should be educated
and trained on the relationships among the contextual factors, pilot age, flight experience,
pilot certification level, weather, flight conditions, time of day, crash distance from
departure, and crash distance from the planned destination as well as the manifestations
revealed in this research.
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APPENDIX A
Permission to Conduct Research
IRB Decision Tree 1

Figure A1. IRB decision tree 1. Adapted from the ERAU IRB website (https://erau.edu//media/files/university/research/irb-decision-tree-2020.pdf)
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Figure A2. IRB decision tree 2. Adapted from the ERAU IRB website (https://erau.edu//media/files/university/research/irb-decision-tree-2020.pdf)
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APPENDIX B
Pilot Study Data Collection Devices
Pilot Study Data Collection Form
Microsoft® AccessTM Pilot Study Database Collection Form

Contextual Factor 1
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Contextual Factor 2

Contextual Factor 3

Contextual Factor 4

221
Contextual Factor 5

Contextual Factor 6

Contextual Factor 7

Contextual Factor 8

Contextual Factor 9

Contextual Factor 10

Contextual Factor 11

Contextual Factor 12

Contextual Factor 13

Contextual Factor 14
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Contextual Factor 15

Contextual Factor 16

Contextual Factor 17

Contextual Factor 18

Contextual Factor 19

Contextual Factor 20

Contextual Factor 21

Contextual Factor 22

Contextual Factor 23

Contextual Factor 24
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Contextual Factor 25

Contextual Factor 26

Contextual Factor 27

Contextual Factor 28
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Contextual Factor 29

Contextual Factor 30

Contextual Factor 31

Contextual Factor 32

Contextual Factor 33

Contextual Factor 34

Contextual Factor 35

Contextual Factor 36

Contextual Factor 37

Contextual Factor 38
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Contextual Factor 39

Contextual Factor 40

Contextual Factor 41

Contextual Factor 42

Contextual Factor 43

Contextual Factor 44
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Contextual Factor 45

Contextual Factor 46

Rater’s Opinion of how contextual factors were manifest
Figure B1. Microsoft® AccessTM Pilot Study Data Collection Form.
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APPENDIX C
Main Study Data Collection Devices
Main Study Data Collection Form

Microsoft® AccessTM Main Study Database Collection Form (page 1 of 4)

Microsoft® AccessTM Main Study Database Collection Form (page 2 of 4)
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Microsoft® AccessTM Main Study Database Collection Form (page 3 of 4)

Microsoft® AccessTM Main Study Database Collection Form (page 4 of 4)
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Contextual Factor 1

Contextual Factor 2

Contextual Factor 3
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Contextual Factor 4

Contextual Factor 5

Contextual Factor 6
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Contextual Factor 7

Contextual Factor 8

Contextual Factor 9

Contextual Factor 10

Contextual Factor 11
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Contextual Factor 12

Contextual Factor 13

Contextual Factor 14

Contextual Factor 15

Contextual Factor 16
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Contextual Factor 17

Contextual Factor 18

Contextual Factor 19

Contextual Factor 20
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Contextual Factor 21

Contextual Factor 22

Contextual Factor 23

Contextual Factor 24
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Contextual Factor 25

Contextual Factor 26

Contextual Factor 27

Contextual Factor 28
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Contextual Factor 29

Contextual Factor 30

Contextual Factor 31
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Contextual Factor 32

Contextual Factor 33

Contextual Factor 34

Contextual Factor 35

Contextual Factor 36
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Contextual Factor 37

Contextual Factor 38

Contextual Factor 39

Contextual Factor 40
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Contextual Factor 41

Contextual Factor 42

Contextual Factor 43
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Contextual Factor 44

Contextual Factor 45

Contextual Factor 46

Rater’s Opinion of how contextual factors were manifest

Figure C1. Main Study Data Collection Form.

241
APPENDIX D
Tables
Table D1
Forty-six Contextual Factor Sources
Contextual Factor Name

Description

Source

1. Accident time of day

The time of day
when the accident
occurred

Ison, 2014a; Ison,
2014b

2. Adverse weather
encountered early in
flight

The VFR-intoWiegmann, & Goh,
IMC weather was 2000; Wiegmann, Goh,
encountered by the
and O’Hare, 2002
pilot early in the
flight path headed
toward the planned
destination

3. Adverse weather
The VFR-intoWiegmann, & Goh,
encountered late in flight IMC weather was 2000; Wiegmann, Goh,
encountered by the
and O’Hare, 2002
pilot late in the
flight path headed
toward the planned
destination
4. Altitude

The cruising
altitude of the
aircraft above sea
level

O'Hare & Owen, 2002

5. Ambiguity

“Cues that signal a
problem are not
always clear-cut.
Conditions can
deteriorate
gradually, and the
decision maker's
situation

Martin, Davison, &
Orasanu, 1998, p. 6
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assessment may
not keep pace”
6. Amount of
The flight time and
time/distance GA pilot distance the pilot
flew into IMC weather flew from VFRbefore the accident
into-IMC before
occurred
an accident
occurred

Saxton, 2008

7. Amount of
The flight time and
time/distance the GA
distance the pilot
pilot flew into the IMC flew from VFRweather before diverting into-IMC before
making the
decision to divert
to an alternate
landing location

Wiegmann, Goh, &
O'Hare, 2002

8. Attentional tunneling

“A concern with Johnson, Wiegmann, &
synthetic vision
Wickens, 2006, p. 30;
displays is the 3D
Wickens, 2005
immersed
perspective of such
displays can cause
pilots to look
extensively at the
display at the
expense of time
spent sampling the
outside world ….
This attentional
tunneling can have
significant
detrimental effects
on pilots’ situation
awareness,
possibly causing
them to miss vital
weather cues only
visible in the
outside world”
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9. Ceiling and visibility “…. pilots allowed
Coyne, Baldwin, &
determination
their estimates of Latrorella, 2005, p. 153;
ceiling and
Coyne, Baldwin &
visibility to
Latrorella, 2008, p. 1;
influence each
FAA, 2016; McCoy &
other. That is,
Mickunas, 2000
pilots tended to
judge a ceiling to
be higher than it
actually was when
it was paired with
a high visibility.
This interaction
may play a
significant role in
pilots’ decisions to
continue into IMC
…. Pilots generally
overestimated
weather
conditions”
10. Circular decisionmaking

The circular
decision- making
process is part of
aeronautical
decision-making
and includes
identifying
hazards, assessing
risks, analyzing
controls, making
control decisions,
using controls, and
monitoring results.
If changes are
needed, hazards
are repeatedly
assessed as needed
in a circular
decision-making
process

Bell & Mauro, 2000;
FAA, 2018c, p. 2-4
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11. Cognitive Anchoring

“…. how pilots
Madhavan &
assess the situation Wiegmann, 2005, pp.
and utilize
44-45; Saxton, 2008, p.
information
iii
obtained before
making a decision
can influence their
decisions …. Any
information the
pilot gains prior to
making a decision
may bias his or her
decision in favor
of that
information….
which has an effect
on a person's
ability to make
decisions under
uncertainty”

12.Communication with “Pilots who were
air traffic control
communicating
with ATC at the
time of the crash
were less likely to
be involved in a
VFR-into-IMC
accident …. seems
to make sense as
ATC could
potentially assist
the pilot get to
VFR weather or
away from
hazardous terrain.
Contrarily, nonVFR-into-IMC
accidents are more
likely to be in
communication
with ATC”

Ison, 2014a, p. 20
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13. Consequences not
anticipated

“If pilots are under Martin, Davison, &
stress, they may
Orasanu, 1998, p. 8;
not do the required
Orasanu, & Martin,
evaluations. Stress 1998; Orasanu, Martin,
limits the decision
& Davison, 1998;
maker's ability to
Orasanu, Martin, &
project the
Davison, 2001
situation into the
future and
mentally simulate
the consequences
of a course of
action”

14. Crash distance from The aircraft crash
departure
site distance from
the departure
location

O’Hare & Owen, 2002

15. Crash distance from The aircraft crash
planned destination
site distance from
the destination
location

O’Hare & Owen, 2002

16. Currency policy
violation

“…. without flight Jackman, 2014, pp. 78time currency
79
policy violations
for flights from
VFR to IMC.
There were two
categorical areas
where violations
manifested in this
area. Both
requirements are
located in FAR
61.57 and
pertained to the
90-day window for
recent flight
currency and IFR
flight currency
requirement to act
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as pilot-incommand”
17. Decision to continue
VFR-into-IMC to the
planned destination

The selection of Beringer & Ball, 2004;
the planned
Wiegmann, Goh, &
destination
O'Hare, 2002
location by the
pilot based on the
pilot’s perception
of the location and
severity of IMC
weather along the
flight path. The
pilot in-flight
decision to
continue into IMC
to the planned
destination

18. Decision to divert The selection of an
from VFR-into-IMC to alternate location
an alternate destination by the pilot based
on the pilot’s
perception of the
location and
severity of IMC
weather along the
flight path
19. Delay in obtaining
the current weather
conditions

Wiegmann, Goh, &
O'Hare, 2002

“[Next-Generation Beringer & Ball, 2004,
Radar] NEXRAD
p. 1
data received in
the cockpit are
always timedelayed from the
actual observation
at least 6 to 7
minutes following
the actual radar
scan. This means
that an image on a
cockpit display
may be as old as
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12 to 14 minutes
before it is
updated. This fact
gives rise to the
legitimate concern
that pilots might be
trying to make
tactical decisions
based upon “old”
data. There is also
the question of
how much
degradation is
acceptable in the
resolution of the
data before pilots
no longer feel that
the displayed
image is
representative of
the weather
phenomena that
they may be able
to view directly
through the
windscreen
20. Descent below
weather minimums

The pilot
intentional or
unintentional
descending flight
below FAAestablished ceiling
and visibility
weather minimums
established for
VFR/VMC pilots

McCoy & Mickunas,
2000, pp. 1-26

21. Filing of a flight plan

The pilot
submission of a
hardcopy or online

FAA, 2018d; Ison,
2014a; Ison, 2014b
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flight plan form to
flight service
22. Flight into known
icing conditions

The pilot either
intentional or
unintentional flight
into known icing
conditions

McCoy & Mickunas,
2000

23. Flight plan policy
violation

“…. general
aviation flights
from visual flight
rules to instrument
meteorological
conditions for pilot
flight plan policy
violations”

Jackman, 2014, p. 63

24. Goal conflicts

“Pilots may be
Martin, Davison, &
willing to take a
Orasanu, 1998;
risk with safety (a
Orasanu, & Martin,
possible loss) to 1998, p. 103; Orasanu,
arrive on time (a
Martin, & Davison,
sure benefit)”
1998; Orasanu, Martin,
& Davison, 2001

25. Height of crash site

Height above
mean sea level of
the crash site

26. IFR flight without
clearance or ratings

The pilot decision Jackman, 2014, pp. 14,
to conduct a flight
42, 131; McCoy &
into instrument
Mickunas, 2000
meteorological
conditions without
proper clearance,
experience, and
instrument rating

27. Linear decisionmaking

A thought process
using a sequence
of steps where a
response to a step
must be produced

O’Hare & Owen, 2002

Bell & Mauro, 2000
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before another step
is taken
28. Medical status policy
violation

29. Number of
passengers on board

“The pilot
Jackman, 2014, p. 123
violation of
medical status
policy by acting as
PIC of a flight
without the FAA
required medical
certificate (first
class, second class,
third class, student,
sport pilot,
expired, revoked,
or no medical)”
The number of
passengers
onboard the GA
PIC flight

Martin, Davison, &
Orasanu, 1998;
Orasanu, & Martin,
1998; Orasanu, Martin,
& Davison, 1998;
Orasanu, Martin, &
Davison, 2001

30. Obtaining an on-line “…. proficiency
preflight weather
using [on-line
briefing
preflight weather
briefing] to find
desired kinds of
information”

Knecht, Ball, & Lenz,
2010, p. 9

31. Organization

32. Permission-seeking
behaviors

“An organization's
Martin, Davison, &
emphasis on
Orasanu, 1998, p. 7;
productivity may
Orasanu, & Martin,
unwittingly set up 1998; Orasanu, Martin,
goal conflicts with
& Davison, 1998;
safety”
Orasanu, Martin, &
Davison, 2001
The pilot seeking
approval for a

McCoy & Mickunas,
2000
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desired action
before deciding
33. Pilot-briefer
communication

“Pilots call flight
service briefers ….
these exchanges
can also be viewed
as a series of
commitments
building on one
another in a form
of plan
continuation that
occurs on the
ground before a
flight ever
launches. Actions
and words build on
one another and
make it
increasingly
difficult to change
the path, to seek
the open fields of
alternative futures.
The plan becomes
more public while
others assist in
defining the
acceptable
outcomes. A flight
service briefer can
even become
complicit in
helping a pilot
achieve a stated
outcome and
solidify a plan that
needs to change.
Rather than adapt
to an alternative,
together the pilot
and briefer try to

McCoy & Mickunas,
2000, p. 29
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force the original
plan to work with
a context no longer
the same”
34. Plan Continuation
Error

35. Ratings policy
violation

36. Receipt of weather
briefing

“…. Pressing on
with the original
plan in the face of
cues that suggest a
change would be
warranted”
Characteristics of
PCE include pilot
fixation on
continuing to the
planned
destination despite
deteriorating
weather along the
flight path.

Martin, Davison, &
Orasanu, 1998, p. 9;
McCoy & Mickunas,
2000

“…. ratings, and Jackman, 2014, p. 142
hence experience
has an impact on
the predictability
of Fatality Status,
accidents from
VFR to IMC. A
pilot with a higher
rating, specifically
an instrument
rating at a
minimum, is 1.2
times less likely to
have a fatal
accident from VFR
to IMC than a pilot
that does not have
an instrument
rating”
“… whether the
pilot received a

Ison, 2014a, p. 11

252
weather briefing or
not”
37. Scud running

A GA practice by
Martin, Davison, &
VFR pilots
Orasanu, 1998;
lowering the flight
Orasanu, & Martin,
altitude to evade 1998; Orasanu, Martin,
clouds or IMC
& Davison, 1998;
staying clear of
Orasanu, Martin, &
weather to
Davison, 2001
continue flying in
VFR/VMC as
opposed to
IFR/IMC

38. Self-reported
weather cues

The ability of the
pilot to recognize
and respond to the
cues associated
with deteriorating
weather conditions
during flight

Wiggins & O’Hare,
2003

39. Situation
Assessment

“…. pilots risk
Goh & Wiegmann,
pressing on into
2001; Orasanu, &
deteriorating
Martin, 1998; Orasanu,
weather because
Martin, & Davison,
they do not fully
2001; Saxton, 2008;
realize they are
Wiegmann, Goh, &
doing so. In other O'Hare, 2002, p. 191
words, pilots
continue VFR
flight into IMC
when they
misdiagnose the
changes in or
severity of the
weather”

40. Social

“Implied
Barron, 2011; Martin,
expectations
Davison, & Orasanu,
among pilots may 1998, p. 7; Orasanu, &
encourage risky Martin, 1998; Orasanu,

253
behavior or may
induce one to
behave as if one is
an expert, even in
the face of
ignorance. This
may result in
unwillingness to
admit that one
does not know
something, is
unfamiliar, is
uncertain, is lost.”

Martin, & Davison,
2001

41. Source of weather
information

The source of
weather
information chosen
by the pilot for a
particular flight

Balog, 2013; Balog
2016

42. Terrain

The physical
characteristics of
the land where the
accident occurred,
such as
mountainous
terrain

O'Hare & Owen, 2002

43. Underestimating risk

“In several
accidents, the crew
clearly was aware
of cues that should
have signaled a
change in course
of action, but
appeared to
underestimate the
level of risk
associated with
them”

Martin, Davison, &
Orasanu, 1998, p. 7

44. Unrecoverable low The decision made Wilson & Sloan, 2003
altitude
by the pilot to fly
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VFR at low
altitudes below the
clouds where a
recovery is not
possible resulting
in a collision with
the terrain
45. Use of in-cockpit
weather information

The pilot decision Johnson, Wiegmann, &
to obtain and use
Wickens, 2006
weather
information
through the
cockpit
instruments

46. Use of portable
weather applications

The pilot decision Ahlstrom, Ohneiser, &
to retrieve weather
Caddigan, 2016
information
through portable
weather
applications
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Table D2
Pilot Study Overall Fleiss’ Kappa
Asymptotic
Kappa

Lower 95% Upper 95%

Standard

Z

P Value

Error
Overall

.496

Asymptotic Asymptotic CI
CI Bound

.021

23.633

.000

Bound

.455

.537

Table D3
Pilot Study Individual Categories for Fleiss’ Kappa

Rating

Conditional

Category Probability

Asymptotic
Kappa Standard

Lower 95% Upper 95%
Z

P Value

Error

Asymptotic Asymptotic
CI Bound

CI Bound

0

.866

.496

.021

23.633

.000

.455

.537

1

.630

.496

.021

23.633

.000

.455

.537

0 = Rater identified the contextual factor as not present
1 = Rater identified the contextual factor as present
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Table D4
Main Study Overall Fleiss’ Kappa

Kappa

Overall

.245

Lower 95% Upper 95%

Asymptotic

Z

Standard Error

.005

P Value

Asymptotic Asymptotic
CI Bound

51.039

.000

.235

CI Bound
.254

Table D5
Main Study Individual Categories for Fleiss’ Kappa

Rating

Conditional

Category Probability

Asymptotic
Kappa Standard

Z

P Value

Error

Lower 95%

Upper 95%

Asymptotic

Asymptotic

CI Bound

CI Bound

0

.485

.376

.009

39.954

.000

.358

.395

1

.659

.509

.009

54.075

.000

.491

.527

2

.199

.011

.009

1.148

.251

-.008

.029

3

.187

.142

.009

15.113

.000

.124

.161

4

.303

.096

.009

10.203

.000

.078

.114

5

.125

.080

.009

8.499

.000

.062

.098

0 = Rater identified the contextual factor as not present
1 = Rater identified the contextual factor as present
2 = Rater provided no rating (blank)
3 = Rater selected the ‘not applicable, N.A.’ response
4 = Rater selected the ‘not enough information’ response
5 = Rater selected the ‘unknown’ response
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APPENDIX E
Figures

NTSB AAR report

Figure E1. National Transportation Board Aviation Accident Report example.
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NTSB aviation accident database & synopses

Figure E2. NTSB Aviation Accident Database & Synopses website. Adapted from the
NTSB website (https://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviation/index.aspx)
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APPENDIX F
Instructions to Raters
INSTRUCTIONS TO RATERS: PILOT STUDY
The pilot study is provided in the attached Microsoft® AccessTM database under the
‘Main’ table. Once you are in the program, click on the ‘Main’ table from the list of
tables located on the left of the screen. The ‘Main’ table has a total of nine General
Aviation (GA) visual flight rules (VFR)-into-instrument meteorological condition (IMC)
fatal accidents selected for testing in the pilot study and will not be used in the
main study. The respective National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Aviation
Accident Report (AAR) numbers are given as well as hyperlinks to the NTSB Aviation
Accident Data Summary and Aviation Accident Final Reports that can be clicked when
the pointing hand icon appears while hovering over the respective links. Once clicked,
the respective NTSB data summary and final reports will open at this point for your
review.
After reviewing the data summaries, final reports, and definition sheet for the 46 research
literature-identified contextual factors, please identify the applicable contextual factors
indicative of the pilots’ actions for each of the nine GA VFR-into-IMC accidents in
the pilot study. This action can be accomplished by clicking the down arrow on the right
side of each cell for each of the 46 contextual factors in moving from left to the right in
the ‘Main’ table. Also, provide any comments in the rater comments cell related to how
the contextual factors were manifest considering the pilot actions indicative of the
identified contextual factor(s) in the last cell of the Microsoft® AccessTM ‘Main’ table.
These instructions should be completed for each of the nine accidents one at a
time. The pilot study Microsoft® AccessTM database ‘Main’ data collection table and
Microsoft® WordTM contextual factor definitions document are provided as attachments
to this email. Please take as much time as you need to complete the pilot study and return
to my email when finished to hartmaj7@my.erau.edu.
The following files are included as attachments to this email for completion of
the pilot study:
46_GA_VFR_IMC_Contextual_Factors_Definitions.docx
GA_VFR_IMC_Pilot_Study.accdb
*Note – If you are having difficulty downloading the attached files, you can also access
them through the following hyperlinks:
https://www.dropbox.com/s/ebx1bdls6sxqmo5/46_GA_VFR_IMC_Contextual_Factors_
Definitions.docx?dl=0
https://www.dropbox.com/s/x63669ip5kxj2t9/GA_VFR_IMC_Pilot_Study.accdb?dl=0
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Please let me know if you have any questions. Thank you for your participation!
Jim
James H Hartman, III
Doctoral Candidate
Student ID: 1556911
3452 N Mayfair
Mesa, AZ 85213
480-540-6016
hartmaj7@my.erau.edu
Figure F1. Instructions to raters (pilot study).
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INSTRUCTIONS TO RATERS: MAIN STUDY
Contextual factors have been generally defined as the degrees of challenge, uncertainty,
predictability of outcome, time pressure, threat, emotionality, and situational
understanding in classifying decisions (Boyes, & Potter, 2015). In the aviation domain,
contextual factors are a multifaceted arrangement of pertinent events or occurrences
contributing to pilot accidents in weather-related decision-making error. Specifically, the
context term has been explained as “… contributing to General Aviation [GA] pilot
errors in weather-related decision making … considered as a complex configuration of
relevant events or phenomenon that may be considered the domain within which the pilot
makes the weather-related decision” (McCoy & Mickunas, 2000, p. 1). As a subject
matter expert (SME) rater, you will be identifying the applicable contextual factors
indicative of the pilots’ actions for each of 85 GA Visual Flight Rules (VFR)-intoInstrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) selected accidents from the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Aviation Accident Database in this main study.
The Main Study is provided in the attached Microsoft® AccessTM database under the
‘Main’ table. Once you are in the program, click on the ‘Main’ table from the list of
tables located on the left of the screen. The ‘Main’ table has 85 GA VFR-into-IMC fatal
accidents selected from the NTSB Aviation Accident Database. The respective NTSB
Aviation Accident Report (AAR) numbers are given as well as hyperlinks to the NTSB
Aviation AARs that can be clicked when the pointing hand icon appears while hovering
over the respective links. Once clicked, the respective NTSB final reports will open at
this point for your review. After reviewing the final reports and definition sheet for the
46 research literature-identified contextual factors, please identify the applicable
contextual factors indicative of the pilots’ actions for each of the 85 GA VFR-into-IMC
accidents. This action can be accomplished by clicking the down arrow on the right side
of each cell for each of the 46 contextual factors in moving from left to the right in the
‘Main’ table.
If none of the drop-down list of options applies to the particular contextual factor, then
select the NA (Not Applicable) option. If, in your opinion, there is not enough
information provided in the NTSB factual report to identify a specific contextual factor,
select the ‘Not enough information provided to identify the contextual factor’ in the dropdown options (select this option if there is a narrative to review and after reviewing, you
feel there is not enough information to select a specific contextual factor). The NTSB
report may lack a narrative to decide. If this is the case, select the ‘Unknown’ option in
the drop down list (select this option if there is no narrative to review).
The hyperlink is provided for skyvector.com (https://skyvector.com/). This publicly
available website includes sectional charts for the United States for rater determination of
the accident site from the departure and destination points for DDLCF14 and
DDLCF15. Also, provide any comments in the rater comments cell related to how, in
your opinion, the contextual factors were manifest considering the pilot actions indicative
of the identified contextual factor(s) in the last cell of the Microsoft® AccessTM ‘Main’
table.
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These instructions should be completed for each of the 85 accidents one at a time. The
main study Microsoft® AccessTM database ‘Main’ data collection table and Microsoft®
Word™ contextual factor definitions document are provided as attachments to this
email. Please take as much time as you need to complete the main study and return to my
email when finished at hartmaj7@my.erau.edu.
The following files are included as attachments to this email for completion of the Main
Study:
46_GA_VFR_IMC_Contextual_Factors_Definitions.docx
GA_VFR_IMC_Main_Study_Sample_Correction3.accdb
Please let me know if you have any questions. Thank you for your participation!
*Note – If you are having difficulty downloading the attached files, you can also access
them through the following hyperlinks:
https://www.dropbox.com/s/ebx1bdls6sxqmo5/46_GA_VFR_IMC_Contextual_Factors_
Definitions.docx?dl=0
https://www.dropbox.com/s/x63669ip5kxj2t9/GA_VFR_IMC_Main_Study_Sample_Cor
rection3.accdb?dl=0
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APPENDIX G
Pilot Study Rater Data
Table G1
Rater-identified Contextual Factors and Frequencies (Pilot Study)
Contextual Factor – Pilot Study
CF1_Accident_time_of_day_Day
CF43_Underestimating_risk
CF14_Crash_distance_from_departure
CF6_Time_Distance_Flew_IMC_Accident_Less
CF29_Number_of_passengers_on_board
CF6_Time_Distance_Flew_IMC_Accident_Greater
CF15_Crash_distance_from_planned_destination
CF1_Accident_time_of_day_Night
CF2_Adverse_weather_encountered_early_in_flight
CF3_Adverse_weather_encountered_late_in_flight
CF34_Plan_Continuation_Error_PCE
CF21_Filing_of_a_flight_plan
CF26_IFR_flight_without_clearance_or_ratings
CF35_Ratings_policy_violation
CF44_Unrecoverable_low_altitude
CF9_Ceiling_visibility_determination
CF12_Communication_with_air_traffic_control
CF17_Decision_Continue_VFR_IMC_Planned_Destination
CF28_Medical_status_policy_violation
CF36_Receipt_of_weather_briefing
CF37_Scud_running
CF40_Social
CF42_Terrain_Type_Mountain
CF4_Altitude_Cruising
CF5_Ambiguity
CF7_Time_Distance_Flew_IMC_Divert
CF8_Attentional_tunneling
CF10_Circular_decision_making
CF11_Cognitive_Anchoring
CF13_Consequences_not_anticipated
CF16_Currency_policy_violation

Total
5
5
5
5
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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CF18_Decision_Divert_VFR_IMC_Alternate_Destination
CF19_Delay_in_obtaining_the_current_weather_conditions
CF20_Descent_below_weather_minimums
CF22_Flight_into_known_icing_conditions
CF23_Flight_plan_policy_violation
CF24_Goal_conflicts
CF25_Height_of_crash_site
CF27_Linear_decision_making
CF30_Obtaining_an_on_line_preflight_weather_briefing
CF31_Organization
CF32_Permission_seeking_behaviors
CF33_Pilot_briefer_communication
CF38_Self_reported_weather_cues
CF39_Situation_Assessment
CF41_Source_of_weather_information_Good
CF41_Source_of_weather_information_Bad
CF45_Use_of_in_cockpit_weather_information
CF46_Use_of_portable_weather_applications

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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APPENDIX H
Main Study Rater Data
Table H1
Rater-identified Contextual Factors and Frequencies (Main Study)
Contextual Factor – Main Study
CF29_Number_of_passengers_on_board_Yes
CF1_Accident_time_of_day_Day
CF15_Crash_distance_from_planned_destination_Yes
CF21_Filing_of_a_flight_plan_No
CF43_Underestimating_risk_Yes
CF26_IFR_flight_without_clearance_or_ratings_Yes
CF14_Crash_distance_from_departure_Yes
CF39_Situation_Assessment_Yes
CF1_Accident_time_of_day_Night
CF24_Goal_conflicts_Yes
CF33_Pilot_briefer_communication_Yes
CF28_Medical_status_policy_violation_No
CF36_Receipt_of_weather_briefing_Yes
CF42_Terrain_Type_Mountain
CF34_Plan_Continuation_Error_PCE_Yes
CF2_Adverse_weather_encountered_early_in_flight_Yes
CF3_Adverse_weather_encountered_late_in_flight_Yes
CF12_Communication_with_air_traffic_control_Yes
CF6_Time_Distance_Flew_IMC_Accident_Less
CF25_Height_of_crash_site_0 - 999 feet mean sea level
CF16_Currency_policy_violation_No
CF33_Pilot_briefer_communication_No
CF15_Crash_distance_from_planned_destination_No
CF17_Decision_Continue_VFR_IMC_Planned_Destination_Yes
CF21_Filing_of_a_flight_plan_Yes
CF35_Ratings_policy_violation_No
CF38_Self_reported_weather_cues_Yes
CF41_Source_of_weather_information_Good
CF2_Adverse_weather_encountered_early_in_flight_No
CF12_Communication_with_air_traffic_control_No
CF29_Number_of_passengers_on_board_2

Total
53
51
46
42
42
41
39
35
34
27
25
23
22
22
21
20
20
18
17
16
15
14
12
12
12
12
12
12
11
11
11
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CF36_Receipt_of_weather_briefing_No
CF28_Medical_status_policy_violation_Yes
CF35_Ratings_policy_violation_Yes
CF37_Scud_running_No
CF5_Ambiguity_Yes
CF6_Time_Distance_Flew_IMC_Accident_Greater
CF37_Scud_running_Yes
CF22_Flight_into_known_icing_conditions_Yes
CF18_Decision_Divert_VFR_IMC_Alternate_Destination_Yes
CF25_Height_of_crash_site_2,000 - 2,999 feet mean sea level
CF42_Terrain_Type_Hill
CF44_Unrecoverable_low_altitude_Yes
CF4_Altitude_Cruising_0 - 999 feet mean sea level
CF4_Altitude_Cruising_10,000 - 10,999 feet mean sea level
CF17_Decision_Continue_VFR_IMC_Planned_Destination_No
CF25_Height_of_crash_site_3,000 - 3,999 feet mean sea level
CF25_Height_of_crash_site_4,000 - 4,999 feet mean sea level
CF25_Height_of_crash_site_5,000 - 5,999 feet mean sea level
CF25_Height_of_crash_site_6,000 - 6,999 feet mean sea level
CF29_Number_of_passengers_on_board_3
CF32_Permission_seeking_behaviors_No
CF40_Social_Yes
CF3_Adverse_weather_encountered_late_in_flight_No
CF4_Altitude_Cruising_13,000 - 13,999 feet mean sea level
CF4_Altitude_Cruising_6,000 - 6,999 feet mean sea level
CF4_Altitude_Cruising_7,000 - 7,999 feet mean sea level
CF25_Height_of_crash_site_1,000 - 1,999 feet mean sea level
CF25_Height_of_crash_site_8,000 - 8,999 feet mean sea level
CF29_Number_of_passengers_on_board_5
CF31_Organization_Yes
CF42_Terrain_Type_Ocean
CF4_Altitude_Cruising_11,000 - 11,999 feet mean sea level
CF4_Altitude_Cruising_12,000 - 12,999 feet mean sea level
CF4_Altitude_Cruising_14,000 - 14,999 feet mean sea level
CF4_Altitude_Cruising_2,000 - 2,999 feet mean sea level
CF4_Altitude_Cruising_4,000 - 4,999 feet mean sea level
CF4_Altitude_Cruising_5,000 - 5,999 feet mean sea level
CF4_Altitude_Cruising_9,000 - 9,999 feet mean sea level
CF7_Time_Distance_Flew_IMC_Divert_Less

9
7
7
7
6
6
6
5
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
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CF10_Circular_decision_making
CF13_Consequences_not_anticipated_Yes
CF25_Height_of_crash_site_10,000 - 10,999 feet mean sea level
CF25_Height_of_crash_site_7,000 - 7,999 feet mean sea level
CF30_Obtaining_an_on_line_preflight_weather_briefing_Yes
CF38_Self_reported_weather_cues_No
CF42_Terrain_Type_Forest
CF44_Unrecoverable_low_altitude_No
CF8_Attentional_tunneling
CF9_Ceiling_visibility_determination
CF11_Cognitive_Anchoring
CF19_Delay_in_obtaining_the_current_weather_conditions
CF20_Descent_below_weather_minimums
CF23_Flight_plan_policy_violation
CF27_Linear_decision_making
CF41_Source_of_weather_information_Bad
CF45_Use_of_in_cockpit_weather_information
CF46_Use_of_portable_weather_applications

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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APPENDIX I
Sample Size Selection
Table I1
Sample Size Selection

Climate
Region

Alaska

Number
of VFRU.S.
into-IMC
State/Territory Accidents
VFR-intoIMC
Occurrence

AK

Number
of VFRinto-IMC
Accidents
by
(Jan. 1,
NOAA
1991Defined
Dec. 31,
Climate
2014)
Region

Percentage
Sample Selection by
of accident NOAA Defined Region
occurrences
% Split
by NOAA
Defined
Climate
Region

34

Total
Central

IL

7

Central

IN

3

Central

KY

9

Central

MO

7

Central

OH

9

Central

TN

26

Central

WV

7

Total
East
North
Central

IA

7

East
North
Central

MI

5

34

4.9%

2.0

68

9.8%

7.00
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East
North
Central

MN

13

East
North
Central

WI

13

Total
Islands

GM

1

Islands

HI

6

Islands

PR

3

Islands

VI

1

Total
Northeast

CT

5

Northeast

MA

5

Northeast

MD

9

Northeast

ME

2

Northeast

NH

3

Northeast

NJ

6

Northeast

NY

9

Northeast

PA

16

Northeast

RI

1

Northeast

VT

2

Total
Northwest

ID

10

38

5.5%

2.00

11

1.6%

1.00

58

8.4%

5.00
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Northwest

OR

16

Northwest

WA

20

Total
South

KS

10

South

LA

9

South

MS

6

South

OK

7

South

AR

12

South

TX

22

Total
Southeast

AL

17

Southeast

FL

30

Southeast

GA

18

Southeast

NC

20

Southeast

SC

7

Southeast

VA

20

Total
Southwest

AZ

16

Southwest

CO

31

Southwest

NM

12

Southwest

UT

16

Total

46

6.7%

3.00

66

9.6%

6.00

112

16.2%

18.00

75

10.9%

8.00
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West

CA

134

West

NV

11

Total
West
North
Central

MT

11

West
North
Central

ND

5

West
North
Central

NE

5

West
North
Central

SD

5

West
North
Central

WY

12

Total
Grand
Total

691

145

21.0%

31.00

38

5.5%

2.00

691

100.0%

85.0
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APPENDIX J
Rater Lesson on Contextual Factors
Objective(s): The objective of this lesson will be to familiarize the rater with the
contextual factors identified in the peer-reviewed research. The lesson
will develop the rater’s skill in recognizing the presence of these
contextual factors and manifestations in the sample of NTSB AARs.
Methods:

Lecture, audio/visuals, and demonstration

Materials:

Three NTSB GA VFR-into-IMC accident case studies

References:

Instructions to raters, complete list of peer-reviewed research-identified
contextual factors, data collection form

Presentation:
Topics:
1. Contextual Factors (Definitions and Descriptions) (Table 1)
2. Data collection form (See Appendix B and Appendix C)
3. Qualitative Approach for Analysis: using the data collection form
a. Coding the presence of the contextual factors within the NTSB AARs will be
completed by the raters such that the contextual factors will be used as a priori
codes. The raters will use selective coding in that they will code
systematically with respect to the contextual factors.
b. The rater will record contextual factor manifestation thoughts and ideas as he
reads the NTSB GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC AARs using the data collection
form comment cell.
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c. The contextual factor presence coding and manifestation note taking
completed by each rater will be cross-compared with the other raters.
4. A demonstration exercise example using the data collection form will be given by the
researcher (Case Study 1)
a. The contextual factors will be identified using the NTSB GA AAR using the
Probable Cause Section.
b. Any other contextual factors will also be identified using the full information
in the NTSB GA AAR.
Practice:

NTSB GA VFR-into-IMC Accident Case Study 2 (Accident to be
determined)

Assessment:
1. A written assessment will be given covering the contextual factor concepts
pertinent to the Part 91 GA flight environment.
2. Practical Test: Case Study 3 (Accident to be determined).
a. coding (individually)
b. note taking (individually)
c. integrative sessions (collectively)
Completion Standards:
1. The raters demonstrate understanding of the peer-reviewed research-defined
contextual factors by passing the written exam with an 80% minimum score. The
researcher will review any incorrect responses to confirm the raters have complete
understanding.
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2. The raters demonstrate competence identifying the presence of the contextual
factors and manifestations using NTSB GA VFR-into-IMC AARs.
3. The raters demonstrate competence using the data collection form.
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APPENDIX K
NTSB GA VFR-into-IMC Accidents Sample (Pilot Study)
Table K1
NTSB GA VFR-into-IMC Accidents Sample (Pilot Study)
ID

1

2

3

4

5

6

NTSB Report
Number

NTSB Data Summary

NTSB Final Report

ANC91LA061

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgene
rator/ReportGeneratorFile.a
shx?EventID=20001212X1
6904&AKey=1&RType=Su
mmary&IType=LA

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator
/ReportGeneratorFile.ashx?Even
tID=20001212X16904&AKey=
1&RType=HTML&IType=LA

ANC91FA107

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgene
rator/ReportGeneratorFile.a
shx?EventID=20001212X1
7402&AKey=1&RType=Su
mmary&IType=FA

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator
/ReportGeneratorFile.ashx?Even
tID=20001212X17402&AKey=
1&RType=HTML&IType=FA

MIA00FA043

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgene
rator/ReportGeneratorFile.a
shx?EventID=20001212X2
0276&AKey=1&RType=Su
mmary&IType=FA

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator
/ReportGeneratorFile.ashx?Even
tID=20001212X20276&AKey=
1&RType=HTML&IType=FA

ATL01FA036

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgene
rator/ReportGeneratorFile.a
shx?EventID=20010221X0
0474&AKey=1&RType=Su
mmary&IType=FA

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator
/ReportGeneratorFile.ashx?Even
tID=20010221X00474&AKey=
1&RType=HTML&IType=FA

MIA08FA026

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgene
rator/ReportGeneratorFile.a
shx?EventID=20071211X0
1926&AKey=1&RType=Su
mmary&IType=FA

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator
/ReportGeneratorFile.ashx?Even
tID=20071211X01926&AKey=
1&RType=HTML&IType=FA

FTW03FA111

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgene
rator/ReportGeneratorFile.a
shx?EventID=20030320X0
0357&AKey=1&RType=Su
mmary&IType=FA

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator
/ReportGeneratorFile.ashx?Even
tID=20030320X00357&AKey=
1&RType=HTML&IType=FA
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7

8

9

WPR12FA091

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgene
rator/ReportGeneratorFile.a
shx?EventID=20120204X0
3117&AKey=1&RType=Su
mmary&IType=FA

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator
/ReportGeneratorFile.ashx?Even
tID=20120204X03117&AKey=
1&RType=HTML&IType=FA

WPR15FA072

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgene
rator/ReportGeneratorFile.a
shx?EventID=20150101X1
5630&AKey=1&RType=Su
mmary&IType=FA

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator
/ReportGeneratorFile.ashx?Even
tID=20150101X15630&AKey=
1&RType=HTML&IType=FA

LAX95LA001

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgene
rator/ReportGeneratorFile.a
shx?EventID=20001206X0
2462&AKey=1&RType=Su
mmary&IType=LA

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator
/ReportGeneratorFile.ashx?Even
tID=20001206X02462&AKey=
1&RType=HTML&IType=LA
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APPENDIX L
NTSB GA VFR-into-IMC Accidents Sample (Main Study)
Table L1
NTSB GA VFR-into-IMC Accidents Sample (Main Study)
NTSB Report
Number

NTSB Final Report

ANC12FA009

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20111130X92124&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

2

ANC12FA066

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20120706X65939&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

3

ATL07FA038

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20070215X00196&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

4

ATL03FA062

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20030324X00372&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

5

ATL07FA081

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20070503X00507&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

6

ATL91FA043

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20001212X16260&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

ID

1
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ATL92FA008

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20001212X18232&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

ATL92FA090

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20001211X14367&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

ATL92GA121

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20001211X14765&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=GA

10

ATL99FA019

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20001211X11359&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

11

CEN09FA195

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20090309X20142&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

12

CEN11FA240

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20110322X03800&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

13

CEN14FA051

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20131112X30325&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

14

CHI02FA193

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20020723X01184&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

7

8

9
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CHI03FA151

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20030610X00829&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

CHI04FA284

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20041007X01595&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

CHI92FA266

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20001211X15642&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

18

CHI93FA137

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20001211X12082&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

19

CHI96FA094

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20001208X05225&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

20

DEN05FA011

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20041015X01641&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

21

ERA09FA311

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20090601X31419&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

22

ERA09FA537

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20090926X65328&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

15

16

17
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ERA10FA062

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20091114X32349&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

ERA10MA188

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20100325X93604&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=MA

ERA12FA012

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20111006X03238&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

26

ERA14FA377

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20140809X04729&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

27

FTW03FA048

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20021202X05541&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

28

FTW01FA171

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20010801X01573&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

29

FTW94FA036

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20001211X13729&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

30

FTW94FA165

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20001206X01272&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

23

24

25
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FTW95FA402

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20001207X04483&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

FTW96FA368

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20001208X06713&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

FTW98FA121

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20001211X09537&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

34

IAD00LA021

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20001212X20498&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=LA

35

LAX00FA017

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20001212X19975&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

36

LAX00FA099

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20001212X20504&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

37

LAX00FA354

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20001212X22001&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

38

LAX01FA023

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20001212X22183&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

31

32

33
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LAX02FA019

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20011113X02226&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

LAX03FA025

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20021122X05506&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

LAX03FA282

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20030904X01456&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

42

LAX04FA061

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20031212X02024&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

43

LAX04FA076

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20040108X00032&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

44

LAX04FA081

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20040106X00022&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

45

LAX04FA096

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20040122X00094&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

46

LAX04FA113

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20040213X00192&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

39

40

41
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LAX04FA139

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20040308X00291&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

LAX05FA023

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20041103X01749&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

LAX05FA167

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20050610X00749&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

50

LAX05FA184

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20050601X00700&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

51

LAX05FA255

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20050806X01177&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

52

LAX05LA014

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20041103X01750&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=LA

53

LAX06FA148

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20060508X00526&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

54

LAX07FA056

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
hx?EventID=20061220X01815&AKey=1&RType=HT
ML&IType=FA

47

48

49
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LAX92LA105

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.as
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APPENDIX M
Short Biographies of Raters
1. Robert “Buck” Joslin joined the FAA in 2005. Prior to being selected in 2010 as the
CSTA-Flight Deck Technology Integration, he served as an FAA Flight Test pilot with
the Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office and the Fort Worth Special Certification Office,
involved in the certification of some of the latest flight deck systems. Robert Joslin has
served on various national/international committees involved in developing regulations
and certification standards for new technology with international experience living and
working in aviation and aviation flight test centers worldwide, to include 3 years in
Japan, and has over 60 published manuscripts in various aviation periodicals. He is an
active FAA Flight Test Pilot and has over 9000 accident free flight hours in over 100
aircraft type and is qualified in AMEL, ASEL, AMES, ASES, Powered-Lift, RotorcraftHelicopter, Glider, and Remote Pilot with type ratings in the A-320, B-737, B-787, BE200, BV-107, DA-2Easy, EMB-500, G-V, N-265, S-70, SA-227, and SK-61 as well CFI,
CFII for Airplane and Rotorcraft, and is a qualified sUAS operator for the RQ-12A
WASP and RQ-20A Puma, and has completed a MQ-1B Predator familiarization course.
Prior to joining the FAA in 2005, Dr. Joslin completed 30 years of military
aviation service where he was a Colonel in the United States Marine Corps and a military
experimental test pilot in jet, propeller, helicopter, and tilt-rotor aircraft at the Naval Air
Test Centers in Patuxent River and China Lake, where he was involved in the early
research and development of new flight deck technologies, many of which were
subsequently adopted for civil use. He was the Commander of Defense Contract
Management Agency-Bell Helicopter responsible for the initial production, acceptance,
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and delivery of the V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft. He also was a "Marine One" pilot for the
President of the United States under the Bush Sr. administration, a 1994 NASA Astronaut
Candidate finalist, an Assistant Professor of Aerodynamics and Aviation Safety at the
Naval Postgraduate School, an Adjunct Assistant Professor with Embry-Riddle
Aeronautical University, and is completely bilingual English-Spanish having been raised
in Latin America.
Member, professional organizations, and societies:
•Associate Fellow - Society of Experimental Test Pilots (SETP)
•Full Member - International Society of Air Safety Investigators (ISASI)
•Member - Human Factors and Ergonomics Society (HFES)
•Fellow - Royal Aeronautical Society (FRAeS)
Industry and government awards:
•Contributor of the Year, Approach magazine
•Scribe of the Year, Rotor Review magazine
•Grampaw Pettibone award, National Naval Aviation Museum
•White House Aircraft Commander - Presidential Pilot
Academic achievement:
•Ph.D. in Aviation, Embry Riddle Aeronautical University
•Assistant Professor-College of Aviation, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
•Assistant Professor of Aerodynamics and Aviation Safety, Naval Postgraduate
School
•Engineering Test Pilot, U.S. Naval Test Pilot School
•M.S. in Aeronautical Engineering, Naval Postgraduate School
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•B.S. in Mechanical Engineering, University of Florida

2. William (“Bill”) Tuccio was a regional airline pilot and has diverse experience in
engineering, aviation, flight instruction, software engineering, accident investigation, and
conversation analysis (CA). In 2010 he joined the first cohort of Embry-Riddle’s PhD in
Aviation program, earning his doctorate with a dissertation studying linguistics applied to
pilot training. He currently is a part-time flight instructor and an investigator for the
National Transportation Safety Board, working with recovery of electronics, including
aviation cockpit voice recorders, and audio and video from aviation and rail. He has
published numerous technical reports in support of accident investigations. His PhD in
Aviation dissertation explored interventionist conversation analysis for pilot training.
After completing his dissertation, he co-authored a paper with his dissertation
committee published in the Pragmatics of Professional Discourse issue of Pragmatics and
Society (2016), “Interventionist Applied Conversation Analysis: Collaborative
Transcription and Repair Based Learning (CTRBL) in Aviation.” Continuing his interest
in CA, he attended Elizabeth Stokoe’s Conversation Analytic Role-play Method (CARM)
affiliate workshop at Loughborough University, England, and then teamed up with Dr.
Maurice Nevile to investigate using CARM to improve flight instructor effectiveness
based upon voluntarily submitted video and audio recordings. Bill continues to
independently pursue CA education through attendance at workshops. As a CARM
affiliate, flight instructor, and FAASTeam Representative, Bill has delivered interactive
CARM seminars to flight instructors.
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Dr. Tuccio received his Bachelor of Science degree in Aeronautical Engineering
from Rensselaer and his Master of Aviation Science degree from Embry-Riddle.
Additional relevant publications include International Journal of Applied Aviation
Studies (2011), Journal of Aviation Technology and Engineering (2012), Journal of
Navigation (2012), Language and Social Interaction Working Group Annual Conference
(2016), and Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research (2011, 2017).

3. Peter A. LeVoci is an Adjunct Professor of Mechanical Engineering at Columbia
University where he teaches aerodynamics. In addition to having served in the U.S.
Navy as an instructor pilot and operationally as an anti-submarine warfare pilot, he was
also a naval test pilot conducting experimental flight testing on prototype V-22 tiltrotor
aircraft. After naval service, he entered his current occupation as a civilian test pilot
where he conducts engineering flight tests for the certification of transport airplanes and
helicopters, as well as small airplanes for the Federal Aviation Administration. Dr.
LeVoci received his BS in Aerospace Engineering from the United States Naval
Academy in 1979, MS in Systems Analysis from the University of West Florida in 1983,
and his PhD in Mechanical Engineering from Columbia University in 2004. He is also a
1988 graduate of the United States Naval Test Pilot School.

4. Benjamin J. Goodheart is an aviation professional with over 20 years of experience
in the field. His diverse career began in aviation line service and has expanded to roles in
aviation safety and loss control, training, and professional flying. He has worked in and
with a variety of aviation organizations, including flight training organizations, business
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and general aviation operators, and major airlines, and his varied experience affords him
a wide variety of opportunities to practice within his passion. Benjamin is an active
author and researcher focused on novel applications within aviation safety management
and organizational climate and culture. He holds a Master of Science in Safety Science,
and a Ph.D. from Embry Riddle Aeronautical University with a specialization in applied
aviation safety. Dr. Goodheart is a Certified Safety Professional as well as an Airline
Transport Pilot and Flight Instructor. Benjamin currently serves as the Managing
Director of Versant, and international safety and risk advocacy firm, and he served as
President of an aviation nonprofit organization, Mercy Wings Network through 2016. In
2014, Dr. Goodheart was named one of Aviation Week and Space Technology
magazine’s Top Forty under 40 in aviation worldwide.

APPENDIX N
Main Study Sample Demographic Information
sample_numb
er

ev_date

ev_typ eventsoe_n
e
o

1

5/24/1991

ACC

24015

2

7/24/1991

ACC

24015

far_pa
rt

ev_stat
e

light_con
d

injury_lev
el

ANC91LA06
1

91

AK

DUSK

FATL

ANC91FA10
7

91

AK

DAYL

FATL

ntsb_no

narr_cause
The pilot’s
decision to
continue VFR into
IMC conditions
and failure to
maintain proper
altitude.
Contributing to the
accident was the
low ceiling and
visibility.
The pilot’s loss of
control in flight
due to spatial
disorientation
while attempting to
operate under
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3

12/8/1999

ACC

24015

MIA00FA04
3

91

AL

DUSK

FATL

4

2/13/2001

ACC

24015

ATL01FA03
6

91

AL

NITE

FATL

visual flight rules
while in instrument
meteorological
conditions.
Contributing to the
accident was the
mountainous
terrain.
The student pilot's
decision to
continue the visual
flight rules flight
into deteriorating
visibility, and his
failure to maintain
altitude clearance
with the terrain.
The pilot
continued visual
flight into
instrument weather
conditions that
resulted in the
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5

12/7/2007

ACC

24015

MIA08FA02
6

91

AL

NDRK

FATL

6

3/15/2003

ACC

24015

FTW03FA11
1

91

AR

DAWN

FATL

inflight collision
with a riverbank.
Factors were
reduced visibility
and dark night.
The flight
instructor’s failure
to maintain control
of the airplane
while attempting to
conduct visual
flight in reduced
visibility
conditions at night.
Factors
contributing to the
accident include
the flight
instructor’s
inadequate
preflight planning.
The pilot's
execution of VFR
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7

2/4/2012

ACC

401

WPR12FA09
1

91

AZ

NITE

FATL

8

12/31/201
4

ACC

401

WPR15FA07
2

91

AZ

DUSK

FATL

flight into IMC and
his failure to
maintain obstacle
clearance. Fog
conditions and the
pilot's lack of an
instrument rating
are contributing
factors.
The pilot’s
encounter with low
clouds/low
visibility
conditions during
the initial climb,
which resulted in
spatial
disorientation and
loss of airplane
control.
The pilot’s
continued visual
flight into
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9

10/1/1994

ACC

24015

LAX95LA00
1

91

CA

NDRK

FATL

instrument
meteorological
conditions which
resulted in an
inflight collision
with terrain.
Contributing to the
accident was the
pilot’s inadequate
preflight planning.
The noninstrument-rated
pilot's failure to
maintain aircraft
control due to
spatial
disorientation after
encountering
instrument
meteorological
conditions after the
pilot decided to
takeoff in adverse
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10

6/16/1998

ACC

24015

LAX98FA19
9

91

CA

DAWN

FATL

11

10/15/199
9

ACC

24015

LAX00FA01
7

91

CA

NDRK

FATL

weather
conditions.
The noninstrument rated
pilot's intentional
VFR flight into
instrument
meteorological
conditions.
Factors were the
low ceiling,
drizzle, and fog.
The pilot's
continued VFR
flight into IMC.
Contributing
factors were the
pilot's self induced
pressure to depart
the airport before
the weather
worsened and the
airport closed, and
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12

2/14/2000

ACC

24015

LAX00FA09
9

91

CA

DAYL

FATL

13

9/30/2000

ACC

24015

LAX00FA35
4

91

CA

NDRK

FATL

the mountain
obscurement and
foggy weather
conditions.
The pilot's
attempted flight
into known
adverse weather
after receiving
hazardous weather
advisories, which
resulted in
inadvertent flight
into instrument
meteorological
conditions while
attempting to
maintain VFR
conditions on top.
The pilot's failure
to maintain
clearance from
terrain while
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14

10/23/200
0

ACC

24015

LAX01FA02
3

91

CA

DAYL

FATL

turning to reverse
course following
inadvertent
nighttime flight
into instrument
meteorological
conditions. A
factor in the
accident was the
pilot's lack of
experience in
nighttime
operations.
The pilot's
inadequate weather
evaluation and
attempted VFR
flight into IMC,
which resulted in
the in-flight
collision with
mountainous
terrain.

300

15

10/31/200
1

ACC

24015

LAX02FA01
9

91

CA

NITE

FATL

16

11/8/2002

ACC

24015

LAX03FA02
5

91

CA

NDRK

FATL

The pilot's
continued VFR
flight into
instrument
meteorological
conditions, which
resulted in a
collision with trees
and terrain.
The pilot's
continued VFR
flight into
instrument
meteorological
conditions and his
subsequent failure
to maintain
clearance from
power lines. A
contributing factor
was the pilot's
impairment by
medication.
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17

8/25/2003

ACC

24015

LAX03FA28
2

91

CA

DAYL

FATL

18

12/7/2003

ACC

24015

LAX04FA06
1

91

CA

NITE

FATL

The student pilot's
spatial
disorientation and
inadvertent descent
into the ocean
while maneuvering
to avoid inclement
weather. Also
causal was the
flight instructor's
inadequate
supervision due to
his improper
approval of his
student's preflight
preparation.
The pilot's
inadequate inflight
planning/decision
by which he
conducted VFR
flight into night

302

19

12/15/200
3

ACC

24015

LAX04FA08
1

91

CA

NITE

FATL

20

12/23/200
3

ACC

24015

LAX04FA07
6

91

CA

NDRK

FATL

instrument
meteorological
conditions.
Mountainous
terrain, dark night
conditions and the
pilot's failure to
obtain a preflight
weather briefing
are contributing
factors.
The student pilot's
intentional VFR
flight into
instrument
meteorological
conditions, and his
failure to maintain
aircraft control as a
result of spatial
disorientation.
The pilot's
improper in-flight
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21

1/19/2004

ACC

24015

LAX04FA09
6

91

CA

NITE

FATL

planning and
decision to
continue flight
under visual flight
rules into
deteriorating
weather
conditions, which
resulted in an
inadvertent inflight encounter
with instrument
meteorological
conditions and a
collision with
ridgeline.
The pilot's
continued visual
flight into
instrument
meteorological
conditions and
failure to maintain
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22

2/27/2004

ACC

24015

LAX04FA13
9

91

CA

DUSK

FATL

an adequate
terrain/object
clearance altitude.
Also causal was
the pilot's improper
in-flight decision
to return to the
origin airport.
The pilot's
continued visual
flight into adverse
weather conditions
at night, which
resulted in an inflight collision
with mountainous
terrain. The pilot's
failure to obtain
preflight weather
information for the
route of flight was
also causal.

305

23

11/13/200
4

ACC

24015

LAX05FA03
4

91

CA

NDRK

FATL

24

5/20/2005

ACC

24015

LAX05FA18
4

91

CA

DAYL

FATL

The pilot's
continued visual
flight into
instrument
meteorological
conditions leading
to spatial
disorientation and
an in-flight loss of
control.
The pilot's
inadvertent
encounter with
instrument
meteorological
conditions and
failure to maintain
adequate terrain
clearance, which
resulted in
controlled flight
into the terrain.
Contributing
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25

8/1/2005

ACC

24015

LAX05FA25
5

91

CA

NDRK

FATL

26

4/23/2006

ACC

24015

LAX06FA14
8

91

CA

DAYL

FATL

factors were the
pilots' delayed
decision to reverse
course.
The pilot's
continued flight
into instrument
meteorological
conditions, and his
failure to maintain
clearance from the
rising hilly terrain.
Contributing
factors were the
pilot's inexperience
regarding flying
during the dark,
nighttime
condition.
The pilot's
improper decision
to continue VFR
flight into

307

27

12/10/200
6

ACC

24015

LAX07FA05
6

91

CA

NDRK

FATL

instrument
meteorological
weather
conditions, which
resulted in
controlled flight
into mountainous
terrain.
The pilot's
inadvertent
encounter with
instrument
meteorological
conditions and
subsequent failure
to maintain terrain
clearance.
Contributing to the
accident were the
dark night
conditions, fog,
and mountainous
terrain.

308

28

2/19/2010

ACC

401

WPR10FA14
2

91

CA

NITE

FATL

29

9/24/1995

ACC

24015

FTW95FA40
2

91

CO

DUSK

FATL

The pilot's
continued flight
into night
instrument
meteorological
conditions during
the landing
approach, which
resulted in an inflight loss of
aircraft control due
to spatial
disorientation.
VFR flight by the
pilot into
instrument
meteorological
conditions (IMC),
and his failure to
maintain sufficient
altitude or
clearance from
mountainous

309

30

10/13/200
4

ACC

24015

DEN05FA01
1

91

CO

DAWN

FATL

terrain. Factors
relating to the
accident were: the
light condition at
dusk and the
adverse weather
conditions.
The pilot's failure
to maintain
clearance from
terrain, and his
inadequate
planning and
decision making
resulting in VFR
flight into IMC.
Contributing
factors include the
pilot's self-induced
pressure to arrive
at his destination
and the low
ceiling.

310

31

3/24/1991

ACC

24015

MIA91FA10
7

91

FL

DAYL

FATL

32

6/7/1995

ACC

24015

MIA95FA14
5

91

FL

NDRK

FATL

The pilot in
command
continued VFR
flight into IFR
conditions
resulting in an
inflight loss of
control and an
inflight collision
with the ground.
The pilot’s loss of
aircraft control due
to spatial
disorientation after
continuing the
VFR flight into
instrument
meteorological
conditions. Factors
relating to the
accident were: the
existing weather
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33

3/3/2003

ACC

24015

MIA03FA07
1

91

FL

NITE

FATL

34

3/15/2003

ACC

24015

ATL03FA06
2

91

GA

NDRK

FATL

conditions and
dark night.
The pilot's
inadequate inflight
planning/decision
by his continued
VFR flight into
instrument
meteorological
condition after
receiving an inflight weather
advisory. Also
causal was his
failure to maintain
aircraft control.
The pilot
continued visual
flight into
instrument
meteorological
conditions, and his

312

35

4/26/2007

ACC

24015

ATL07FA08
1

91

GA

DAYL

FATL

36

8/9/2014

ACC

401

ERA14FA37
7

91

GA

NITE

FATL

failure to maintain
altitude/terrain
clearance.
The pilot’s
improper decision
to continue visual
flight rules flight
into instrument
meteorological
conditions, with a
low cloud ceiling,
over mountainous
terrain.
The noninstrument-rated
pilot’s inadequate
preflight weather
planning and his
improper decision
to attempt a visual
flight rules flight in
night instrument
metrological

313

37

1/31/2004

ACC

24015

LAX04FA11
3

91

HI

NITE

FATL

38

11/18/199
5

ACC

24015

SEA96FA02
1

91

ID

DAYL

FATL

conditions, which
resulted in
subsequent
collision with
terrain.
The pilot's
disregard for an inflight weather
advisory, his likely
encounter with
marginal VFR or
IMC weather
conditions, his
decision to
continue flight into
those conditions,
and failure to
maintain an
adequate terrain
clearance altitude.
Improper
planning/decision
by the pilot, his

314

39

2/18/1996

ACC

24015

CHI96FA094

91

IL

NDRK

FATL

resultant VFR
flight into
instrument
meteorological
conditions (IMC),
and his failure to
maintain altitude
and clearance from
mountainous
terrain. Factors
relating to the
accident were: the
adverse weather
conditions.
VFR flight by the
pilot into
instrument
meteorological
conditions (IMC),
and subsequent
loss of aircraft
control, probably
due to spatial

315

40

4/14/1993

ACC

24015

CHI93FA137

91

IN

NDRK

FATL

41

9/5/1992

ACC

24015

CHI92FA266

91

KS

NDRK

FATL

42

3/21/2004

ACC

24015

NYC04FA09
2

91

KY

NITE

FATL

disorientation of
the pilot. Factors
relating to the
accident were:
darkness and
reduced visibility
due to the weather.
The pilot in
command’s failure
to maintain aircraft
control. Factors
were fog and
drizzle, and the
pilot in command’s
continuing VFR
flight into IMC
conditions.
The pilot in
command’s (CFI)
failure to maintain
the airplane.
The pilot's
improper decision

316

43

9/1/1996

ACC

24015

FTW96FA36
8

91

LA

NDRK

FATL

to continue VFR
flight into IMC
conditions and his
failure to maintain
terrain clearance,
which resulted in
controlled flight
into terrain.
Factors were night,
snow, and a low
ceiling.
VFR flight into
instrument
meteorological
conditions (VMC),
and failure of the
pilot (PIC) to
maintain control of
the airplane after
becoming spatially
disorientation.
Factors relating to
the accident were
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44

1/15/2001

ACC

24015

NYC01LA13
2

91

MA

NITE

FATL

45

9/9/2008

ACC

401

NYC08LA31
0

91
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darkness and the
adverse weather
condition.
The pilot's
improper decision
to takeoff and
attempt VFR flight
in IMC conditions.
The pilot's
inadequate
preflight weather
evaluation which
resulted in an
attempted landing
in fog and
subsequent impact
with terrain.
The pilot's
inadequate weather
evaluation that
resulted flight into
night instrument
meteorological
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conditions and a
subsequent loss of
aircraft control.
Factors to the
accident were the
pilot's lack of
recent night
experience and the
low cloud ceiling.
The inadequate
preflight
planning/preparati
on, the flight into
instrument
meteorological
conditions, and
lack of instrument
certification by the
pilot. Contributing
factors were
fog/clouds and the
pilot's
nondisclosure of
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his physical
condition.
The pilot's
inadvertent flight
into instrument
meteorological
conditions and his
in-flight loss of
control, resulting
in overstress of the
airframe and
subsequent
structural failure.
Clearance from the
ground was not
maintained while
attempting a VFR
flight into IMC
weather
conditions. A
factor to the
accident was fog.
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The inadvertent
flight into
instrument
meteorological
conditions in
mountainous
terrain by the noninstrument rated
pilot.
The inadvertent
flight from visual
flight rules flight
conditions into
instrument flight
rules flight
conditions by the
non-instrument
rated pilot, and his
subsequent failure
to maintain control
of the aircraft.
The pilot’s failure
to adequately
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evaluate the
weather
information and
his continued flight
into instrument
meteorological
conditions, which
resulted in a
collision with high
terrain. A factor
was the dark night.
The noninstrument-rated
pilot's decision to
depart into known
instrument
meteorological
conditions, which
resulted in his
spatial
disorientation and
overcontrol of the
airplane and the
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subsequent inflight structural
failure.
The pilot
attempting VFR
flight into
instrument
meteorological
conditions and his
lack of an
instrument rating.
Factors were
weather conditions
that included
mountain wave
activity conducive
to turbulence, and
clouds obscuring
the mountainous
terrain.
The pilot's
continued visual
flight into
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instrument
meteorological
conditions.
Contributing to the
accident were the
pilot's recent usage
of alcohol and his
subsequent
impairment.
The pilot’s delay in
reversing direction,
his continued flight
into instrument
meteorological
conditions, his
failure to maintain
adequate airspeed
and inadvertent
stall while
maneuvering to
reverse direction.
The pilot’s
decision to attempt
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VFR flight into
instrument
meteorological
conditions, which
included mountain
obscurement and
sever mixed icing,
and his failure to
maintain control of
the aircraft due to a
probable
aerodynamic stall.
The pilot’s
continuation of
VFR flight into
instrument
meteorological
conditions.
Factors which
contributed to the
accident were: the
adverse weather
conditions and
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mountainous
terrain.
The pilot
disregarding the
advice that visual
flight rules were
not recommended;
the pilot’s
inadequate weather
evaluation along
his route of flight;
the pilot
attempting flight
into known
adverse weather
conditions; the
pilot’s loss of
aircraft control.
The pilot’s
continued flight
into instrument
meteorological
conditions (IMC),

326

61

12/24/199
4

ACC

24015

LAX95LA06
0

91

NV

DAYL

FATL

62

7/23/1997

ACC

24015

LAX97FA33
4

91

NV

DAYL

FATL

and his failure to
maintain altitude
(or clearance) from
mountainous
terrain. Factors
related to the
accident were: the
adverse weather
conditions and
high
mountainous/hilly
terrain.
The pilot's
intentional
continued flight
into instrument
meteorological
conditions in
mountainous
terrain.
The pilot's
attempted visual
flight into
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instrument
meteorological
conditions which
resulted in his
spatial
disorientation and
a loss of airplane
control. A
contributing factor
was his
overconfidence in
his personal
ability.
The noninstrument rated
pilot's failure to
maintain control of
the airplane during
an attempted flight
into adverse
weather which
resulted in
inadvertent VFR
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flight into
instrument
meteorological
conditions.
The pilot's likely
inadvertent entry
into instrument
meteorological
conditions created
by the rapidly
changing cloud
conditions that
resulted in his
spatial
disorientation and
exceeding the
glider's ultimate
design loads while
in a spiral dive.
The pilot's
continued VFR
cruise flight into
instrument
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meteorological
conditions in
mountainous
terrain, and his
failure to maintain
clearance from
terrain. A
contributing factor
was mountain
obscuration and
clouds.
The pilot's
continued visual
flight rules flight
into instrument
meteorological
conditions, which
resulted in a
controlled collision
with terrain.
The pilot's
inadequate in flight
decision and
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failure to maintain
aircraft control
during cruise
flight.
Contributing to the
accident were
inadequate
preflight planning,
dark night, and
poor weather
conditions.
The pilot's
improper decision
to attempt a visual
landing under
instrument
meteorological
conditions and his
failure to maintain
adequate
altitude/clearance,
which resulted in
an in-flight
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collision with
trees. A factor in
this accident was
the ground fog.
The pilot in
command’s
continued VFR
fight into IMC. A
factor was fog.
The loss of engine
power during
maneuvering flight
due to carburetor
icing, and
inadvertent flight
into instrument
meteorological
conditions.
Factors were the
ambient weather
conditions
conducive to
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carburetor icing
and fog.
Continued VFR
flight by the pilot
into instrument
meteorological
conditions, and his
failure to maintain
altitude and/or
clearance from
high terrain.
Factors relating to
the accident were:
darkness, low
ceiling, fog, and
high
(mountainous)
terrain.
The pilot’s
inadvertent flight
into IMC, which
resulted in an inflight collision
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with trees. Factors
were the obscured
sky and foggy
weather
conditions, and the
night lighting
conditions at the
time of the
accident.
The pilot
continued VFR
flight into IMC
conditions and lost
control of the
airplane due to
spatial
disorientation.
Factors were foggy
weather conditions
and self-induced
stress.
The pilot’s
decision to
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continue the visual
flight rules flight
into an area of
instrument
meteorological
conditions, which
resulted in the
pilot’s spatial
disorientation and
a loss of control of
the helicopter.
The pilot’s
decision to attempt
the flight into
approaching
adverse weather,
resulting in an
encounter with a
thunderstorm with
localized
instrument
meteorological
conditions, heavy

335

76

11/12/201
3

ACC

401

CEN14FA05
1

91

TX

DAYL

FATL

77

11/24/200
2

ACC

24015

FTW03FA04
8

91

UT

DUSK

FATL

rain, and severe
turbulence that led
to a loss of control.
The noninstrument-rated
private pilot's
decision to
continue a visual
flight rules flight
into instrument
meteorological
conditions, which
resulted in the loss
of airplane control.
Contributing to the
accident was the
pilot’s failure to
obtain a weather
briefing.
The pilot's
inadequate inflight
planning/decision
to continue flight
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from visual to
instrument
meteorological
conditions, which
resulted in his
failure to maintain
clearance from
terrain while in
cruise flight. A low
ceiling,
obscuration, and
mountainous
terrain were
contributing
factors.
The pilot's loss of
control of the
airplane due to
spatial
disorientation after
inadvertently
entering instrument
meteorological
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conditions.
Contributing to the
accident were the
pilot's inadequate
preflight
preparation, and
his enroute
decision-making.
The improper
decision by the
non-instrumentrated pilot to
continue VFR
flight into known
instrument
meteorological
conditions
resulting in spatial
disorientation and
loss of control of
the airplane.
The pilot's
continued flight
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from visual flight
rules into
instrument
meteorological
conditions.
The pilot’s
continued visual
flight into
instrument
meteorological
conditions, which
resulted in
controlled flight
into terrain.
The pilot's VFR
flight into IMC and
his failure to
maintain clearance
from trees. Trees,
mountainous
terrain, dark night
conditions, clouds
and VFR flight
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into IMC were
factors.
The pilot failed to
maintain control of
the airplane after
encountering
instrument
meteorological
conditions during
takeoff. Factors
associated with the
accident were the
low ceiling, fog,
and lack of
instrument rating.
The student pilot’s
inadequate
preflight planning
and his decision to
continue the flight
into instrument
meteorological
conditions, which
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resulted in a
subsequent loss of
airplane control.
The noninstrument rated
pilot's improper
decision to
continue visual
flight into
instrument
meteorological
conditions, which
resulted in spatial
disorientation and
subsequent inflight collision
with mountainous
terrain.
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